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This dissertation is a collection of three essays on macroeconomics, examining the sources
of business cycles. In particular, we are interested in understanding how shocks propagate
over the business cycle in both closed economy and open economy settings. The common
approach we take in these chapters is to use both theory and data in a structural estimation
based on a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model.
In the first chapter, motivated by the correlation of business cycles across countries, we
provide a new empirical evidence about the role of common shocks in business cycles for small
open economies. Specifically, we conduct a structural estimation of a small open economy real
business cycle model featuring a realistic debt adjustment cost and common shocks. Using
a novel dataset for 17 small developed and developing countries between 1900 and 2006,
we find that common shocks are a primary source of business cycles, explaining nearly 50%
of the output fluctuations over the last 100 years in small open economies. The estimated
common shocks capture important historical episodes such as the Great depression, the two
World Wars and the two oil price shocks. Moreover, these common shocks are important
for not only small developed countries but also developing countries. We point out the
importance of our structural approach in identifying the sizable role of both productivity
and other common shocks such as interest rate premium shocks. The reduced form dynamic
factor model approach in the previous literature, which often assumes one type of common
component, would predict only a third of the contribution estimated in the structural model.
In the second chapter, we focus on the transmission from one country to another through
international trade. First, we argue that while we observe substantial business cycle corre-
lation across countries, especially among developed economies, most existing models are not
able to generate strong transmission of shocks endogenously through international trade. In
the framework of structural model, we show that the nature of such transmission depends
fundamentally on the features determining the responsiveness of labor supply and labor de-
mand to international relative prices. We augment a standard international macroeconomic
model to incorporate three key features: a weak short run wealth effect on labor supply,
variable capital utilization, and imported intermediate inputs for production. This model
can generate large and significant endogenous transmission of technology shocks through
international trade. We demonstrate this by estimating the model using data for Canada
and the United States with quasi-Bayesian methods. We find that this model can account
for the substantial transmission of permanent U.S. technology shocks to Canadian aggre-
gate variables such as output and hours documented in a structural vector autoregression.
Transmission through international trade is found to explain the majority of the business
cycle comovement between the United States and Canada while exogenous correlation of
technology shocks is not important.
In the third chapter, we turn to the sources of business cycles in a closed economy
setting and analyzes the effects of news shocks, which are found to be an important driver of
business cycles in the U.S. in the recent literature. The innovation of this chapter is that we
use data on expectations to inform us about the role of news shocks. This approach exploits
the fact that news shocks cause agents to adjust their expectations about the future even
when current fundamentals are not affected, therefore, data on expectations are particularly
informative about the role of news shocks. Using data on expectations, we estimate a
dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium model that incorporates news shocks for the U.S.
between 1955Q1 and 2006Q4. We find that the contribution of news shocks to output is
about half of that estimated without data on expectations. The precision of the estimated
role of news shocks also greatly improves when data on expectations are used. Moreover, the
contribution of news shocks to explaining short run fluctuations is negligible. These results
arise because data on expectations show that changes in expectations are not large and do
not resemble actual movements of output. Therefore, news shocks cannot be the main driver
of business cycles.
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Chapter 1
The Role of Common Shocks in Small
Open Economies Between 1900 and
2006
Wataru Miyamoto and Thuy Lan Nguyen
2
1.1 Introduction
Whether the sources of business cycles are country-specific or common is an important ques-
tion in the international business cycle literature given its relevance to the policymakers to
set domestic and international policies. Nevertheless, the answer for this question has been
scarce and inconclusive for small open economies, especially for emerging economies whose
data are limited. On one hand, the small open economies literature such as Aguiar and
Gopinath (2007) and Garcia-Cicco et al. (2010) has focused entirely on business cycles of
individual country, ignoring the possible influence of common shocks to these small open
economies. On the other hand, the international business cycle literature on the importance
of common shocks such as Kose et al. (2003, 2012) typically finds a small role of common
shocks to emerging economies than industrial countries. However, a drawback of this liter-
ature which estimates reduced-form dynamic factor models is the lack of interpretation for
the estimated common factors and their propagation mechanism in a structural model. Fur-
thermore, their maintained assumption that there is only one common world factor and one
group-specific factor can affect their findings as there can be multiple common components
driving business cycles.
This paper fills in this gap of the literature by providing a new evidence about the role of
common shocks in small open economies in a structural estimation. More specifically, using a
new dataset covering 17 small open economies, both emerging and small developed countries,
between 1900 and 2006, we estimate a structural small open economy real business cycle
model with financial friction where countries are connected with one another through the
existence of common shocks. In contrast with the reduced form dynamic factor literature, our
structural model allows for several types of structural shocks. In particular, each country is
buffeted with five types of shocks, each of which has three components: (i) a world common
3
shock affecting all 17 countries at the same time, (ii) a group-specific shock for countries
within small developed and developing group, and (iii) a country-specific shock.
Estimating the model jointly for 17 small open economies using Bayesian methods, we
find that common shocks are an important source of fluctuations in these open economies
for the last 100 years. In particular, on average, all of the world common and the group-
specific shocks explain to about 49% of all output fluctuations over the last century at the
annual frequency. The roles of the world common and the group-specific shocks are roughly
equal. Common shocks also account for a large fraction of other aggregate variables: 37%,
32% and 40% of the variations in consumption, investment and trade balance, respectively.
Additionally, common shocks have heterogeneous effects on these countries. For example,
the sign of the effects is positive for Canada, Australia and Argentina while it is negative for
Taiwan, Spain and India.
Furthermore, common shocks are important not only for small developed countries like
Canada and Australia but also for emerging countries such as Argentina. Common shocks
explain roughly 55% of output fluctuations in small developed countries and 45% of that of
emerging economies. This result is in contrast with the belief that emerging or developing
countries are mostly subject to their country-specific shocks given that these countries suffer
from frequent country-specific political and economic reforms. Since emerging economies
are more volatile than small developed countries, this variance decomposition suggests that
common shocks may have a larger effect in levels in emerging economies than in small
developed countries.
Our common shocks are identified through both contemporaneous and dynamic correla-
tions across all country pairs. In the model, since each country is modeled as a small open
economy, there is no correlation across countries without common shocks. Therefore, our
structural model forces the comovement across all countries to be explained by world com-
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mon shocks, comovement across countries within each group by group-specific shocks, and
the fluctuations independent from other countries by country-specific shocks. This identifi-
cation implies that common shocks tend to be more important for countries that are more
correlated with the rest of the countries in the sample, which is consistent with our findings.
The common shocks identified in our structural estimation capture both worldwide shocks
and shocks common to these 17 small open economies coming from large countries. Examples
of the worldwide shocks that we capture are important historical episodes such as the Great
Depression, the two World Wars and the two oil price shocks. During these episodes, output
in all these countries drop in synchronization. Our extracted common shocks can also include
shocks from the rest of the world that affect all of the countries in the sample such as U.S.
shocks. In particular, we find that world common shocks explain nearly 50% of output
fluctuations in Canada, which has a strong tie with the U.S., and these common shocks
are highly correlated with U.S. output in the last 100 years. These results suggest that
we may capture shocks from large countries such as the U.S. transmitting to all 17 small
open economies through financial and trade linkages. It is possible that our common shocks
include the shocks originating from one of the 17 countries transmitting to the rest of the
countries in the sample, which can overstate the importance of common shocks. However,
this component should be small. The reason is that since our sample includes 17 small
open economies, shocks originating from Argentina or Canada are unlikely to affect other
countries such as Taiwan or India. In other words, taking advantage of the data from small
open economies, we can avoid the possible upward bias for our estimates coming from internal
propagation among countries in the group.
Our paper further points out the importance of using structural estimation to identify
several types of common shocks, which is not done in the existing literature with reduced
form dynamic factor estimation approach. In particular, in our structural estimation, we
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find that not only common productivity shocks but also other types of common shocks such
as preference and interest premium common shocks are an important source of business cycle
fluctuations for small open economies. When we estimate a standard reduced form dynamic
factor model as in Kose et al. (2003) with our new data set, the contribution of common
shocks to these small open economies would be much lower, about a third of the results
obtained in our structural estimation. The reason for this discrepancy is that while there
can be multiple types of common shocks in the data, reduced form models often assume
that there is only one type of common shocks such as one world common shock and one
group-specific shock which can understate the role of common shocks. We demonstrate this
problem by two experiments. In the first experiment, we show that the dynamic factor model
underestimates the contribution of common shocks when the data generating process has
more than one type of common shocks. In the second experiment, the dynamic factor model
estimated with the data generated from the data generating process with only one type of
common shocks can correctly estimate the importance of common shocks. These experiments
illustrate the advantage of structural estimation as we are able to identify several types of
common shocks for small open economies using cross equation restrictions that would have
been missed otherwise.
Finally, we provide a new evidence about the importance of common shocks over time
for the last 100 years. While there are numerous studies on common shocks driving business
cycle comovement across countries such as Kose et al. (2003, 2008 and 2012) or Guerron-
Quintana (2012), as well as individual country’s business cycles like Aguiar and Gopinath
(2007), the lack of historical data especially for small open economies has limited the analysis
to periods at most after the 1960s, especially for emerging economies. With a new dataset
covering 17 emerging and small developed countries for a much longer period, between 1900
and 2006 for not only output, consumption but also investment and trade balance, this
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paper documents that common shocks are important for small open economies not only in
the recent period but also in the first half of the century. In particular, common shocks
explain between 55% and 65% of output fluctuations in the period before the 1950s, which
is when these small open economies were relatively open in terms of the high trade share in
total output. Common shocks are especially important during large worldwide events such
as the two World Wars and the Great Depression. Common shocks contribute only about
45% on average to the variations in output for these small open economies between 1950 and
1970, but its role rises again at the beginning of the 1970s when the first oil price shock hit.
Our paper contributes to a vast literature on the determinants of business cycles in small
open economies in two ways. First, we focus on the importance of common shocks driving
business cycles of small open economies, which has mostly been ignored in the small open
economy dynamic stochastic model literature. Second, we provide a new evidence about the
type of shocks that are important for these small open economies and decomposing them
into common and country-specific components. By pooling the panel of long run data for
both emerging economies and small developed countries containing several business cycles1,
we gain estimation efficiency and provide additional evidence about the sources of business
cycles in small open economies. Additionally, with regards to the recent debate if trend
shocks are the main driver of business cycles in emerging economies but not small developed
countries as in Aguiar and Gopinath (2007), we find that stationary productivity shocks are
the major source of output fluctuations for emerging countries, which is consistent with the
finding for Argentina in Garcia-cicco et al. (2010), and for small developed countries as well.
Furthermore, our estimation allows us to decompose the total contribution of trend and
1As pointed out in Garcia-Cicco et al. (2010) and Rondeau (2012), long data contain several business
cycles, which help identifying the importance of structural shocks such as trend and stationary productivity
shocks as drivers of business cycles. Thus, even though there may be structural changes of these economies
over the entire 100 years, the fact that short data contain too few business cycles makes long data preferred
for estimation.
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stationary shocks into common components and country-specific components, which shows
that small developed countries are more subject to the world common trend productivity
shocks than emerging economies.
This paper is also related to the literature estimating the contribution of common com-
ponents to business cycles. Unlike prominent works in this literature such as Kose et al.
(2003), we adopt a structural estimation, which allows us to identify several sources of com-
mon components. Additionally, we have a long run dataset, which helps us to document the
pattern of common components over major historical episodes. Some work in the previous
literature also use structural model to distinguish the effects of common and country-specific
shocks but do not estimate the model such as Glick and Rogoff (1995) and Gregory and Head
(1999). These papers, nevertheless, do not have any say in the quantitative importance of
common shocks. The paper closest to ours is Guerron-Quintana (2012). However, while
he focuses on small developed countries using their quarterly data from 1980, we analyze
the importance of common shocks for not only small developed countries but also emerging
countries with 100 years of data. Besides, our model features a more realistic debt adjust-
ment cost to proxy for the reduced form financial friction in these countries, as well as a
flexible common shock structure to capture the comovement observed in the data. Both of
these differences matter for identification and fitness of the model. Finally, an important
difference between our paper and Guerron-Quintana (2012) is that we show how the number
of common shocks matters for the estimation results obtained from our structural approach
compared to the DFM approach.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 documents the main business
cycle statistics of small developed and developing countries between 1900 and 2006. Section
3 describes the baseline model. We discuss the estimation method and the identification
issues in Section 4. We present the main results of the paper in section 5. In Section 6, we
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analyze the robustness of our results such as preference specification. Section 7 concludes.
1.2 Business Cycles in Small Open Economies: 1900-
2006
This section introduces our novel data set for 17 small open economies and documents the
main business cycle statistics for these countries in the last 100 years.
Our new data set includes annual growth rates of output, consumption, investment per
capita and trade balance-to-output ratio for 17 small developed and developing countries
between 1900 and 2006. The countries are selected based on the availability of the data:
they have at least 80 years of data as detailed in Table 1.12. We categorize the countries into
two groups based on their present development level, similar to Kose et al. (2011). There are
ten developing countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, India, Mexico, Peru, Taiwan,
Turkey and Venezuela) and seven small developed countries (Australia, Canada, Finland,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden). This grouping helps us characterize the difference
between small developed countries and developing countries3.
Within Country Statistics Some features of our long span data set are similar to
the facts documented with shorter data in the literature. First, business cycles in many
developing countries are characterized by a more volatile consumption growth rate than
output growth rate as shown in Column (1) and (2) of the upper panel of Table 1.2(a). This
feature also holds on average across developing countries, shown in the last row of the upper
2The data come from several sources such as Barro and Ursua (2008), national statistics offices and
historical data publications. More information on the data sources used are available in Online Appendix.
3We do not group countries by geographical locations because there are only one or two countries in some
regions, which can be a problem when we want to identify the regional shocks.
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panel in Table 1.2(a). Second, investment is the most volatile variable in every country in the
sample as shown in the column (3) of Table 1.2(a). Third, consistent with standard business
cycle facts, consumption and investment are positively correlated with output. Lastly, the
trade balance autocorrelation function is downward sloping for all countries as plotted in
Figure 1.1, similar to the reported values in Garcia-Cicco et al. (2010). This statistics is
one of the important moments in identifying trend and stationary productivity shocks as
reported in Garcia-Cicco et al. (2010) and Chang and Fernandez (2010).
Our data set also exhibits several features that are different from the previously docu-
mented facts. First, consumption volatility is higher than output volatility in small developed
countries, on average. As reported in the first two columns of Table 1.2(a), this fact holds for
five out of seven small developed economies. This fact is in contrast with the documented
facts in previous studies such as Aguiar and Gopinath (2007), who suggest that the excess
volatility of consumption over output is a prominent feature only for developing countries
using quarterly data after 1980 but concistent with other studies that use annual data from
1960 such as Chen and Crucini (2011) and Rondeau (2012). Second, trade balance is not
procyclical for small developed countries as described in previous papers. There is no strong
pattern for trade balance in small developed countries: three out of seven developed coun-
tries have countercyclical trade balance as seen in column (8) of Table 1.2(a). Thus, average
correlation of output and trade balance across countries is only slightly positive.
Cross Country Statistics Business cycles are correlated across these small open economies
for the last 100 years. As shown in Figure 1.2, which plots the output growth rates for all
countries in our sample excluding Taiwan4, output growth rates move in tandem in many
periods between 1900 and 2006 such as in the Great Depression and the two World Wars.
4Taiwan has a large drop of output growth rate in 1945, which can bias the average in our sample, so we
exclude Taiwan from Figure 1.2.
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Besides output, consumption, investment and trade balance are also positively correlated
across countries as reported in Table 1.2(b), where we take average of the cross country
correlation across all pairs of countries. The average correlation of output and consumption
may seem low (0.13 and 0.06, respectively). However, as we calculate the cross correlation
for each pair of countries, we find that the degrees of correlation vary highly across different
pairings of countries. For example, Venezuela and India are negatively correlated or barely
correlated with other countries in the sample while Argentina is significantly positively cor-
related with the rest of the countries (0.19 on average). This explains why on average, the
cross correlation is low among developing economies. We note that although many countries
in the sample may be quite different with some experiencing default episodes in the last 100
years, developing economies such as those within South America region are correlated with
each other significantly, clearly shown in Table 1.2(c) which reports the cross country corre-
lation of output growth rates for each pair of countries. The same is true for consumption
growth rates.
Consistent with the international business cycle features, cross country correlations of
output are higher than that of consumptions in all pairs of countries. When comparing
between small developed and developing countries, we find that cross country correlations of
output and consumption are higher for small developed countries than developing countries,
which suggests a higher degree of business cycle synchronization among small developed
countries than among developing countries. However, investment and trade balance cross
country correlations are higher in developing countries than small developed countries. All
of these patterns, which are calculated using the data between 1900 and 2006, are true also
for the data periods starting after 1945 and 1960. The empirical evidence presented in this
section serves as motivation for our focus on the common component driving the business
cycles of both small developed and developing countries.
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1.3 The Baseline Model
This section presents the baseline model to quantify the contribution of common shocks
to small open economies. Our model is a small open real business cycle model with four
features. First, we augment the shock structure to include common world and group-specific
shocks in addition to country-specific shocks in all of the five structural shocks: trend and
stationary productivity, preference, interest rate premium and government spending shocks.
Common shocks are the only driver of the comovement across countries i.e. there is no
internal propagation of country-specific shocks. This assumption relies on the fact that the
size of each country is small, so it is unlikely that a shock from one country such as Canada
or Argentina can spillover to the rest of the countries. Even though there are relatively
larger countries within one group such as Argentina and Brazil, group-specific shocks have
to explain the comovement of all countries including India and Taiwan, which do not trade
as much with these countries. Therefore, the bias caused by the shocks propagated by these
larger countries within our sample countries may not be significant. We discuss this bias
further in the Identification section below. Additionally, we assume that common shocks
can have different effects on different countries, similar to Gregory and Head (1999). This
assumption is to capture the heterogeneous responses of each country to common shocks.
A second feature of our model is that we allow variable capital utilization in the model to
avoid mismeasurement in total factor productivity. Tsyrennikov (2010) documents that in
Argentina, capital utilization varies widely in his sample period. Baxter and Farr (2005) also
show the importance of variable capital utilization in a two-country model context, where
the cross country correlation of productivity shocks is upward biased if there is no variable
capital utilization. In our model with annual frequency, when a shock hits the economy, since
the capital stock is fixed, it is sensible to allow the level of capital service to adjust. The
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third feature is investment adjustment cost to allow a smooth response of investment. More
specifically, investment adjustment cost is modeled as in Christiano et al. (2005) which is
argued to be a reduced form for time-to-build model. Finally, our country interest rate rules
following Garcia-cicco et al. (2010) allow us to compare across countries how sensitive their
interest rate is to their debt-to-output level, or so-called “financial friction”. We describe
below the detailed model for an individual economy, j ∈ [1, N ].





where bjt is the preference shock of country j at time t, β is the subjective discount factor,
Cjt is consumption of country j at time t, and hjt is hours worked. In the baseline model, the
period utility function u(Cjt, hjt) is assumed to be the Greenwood, Herkowitz and Hoffman
(GHH, 1988) preference, given by:
u(Cjt, hjt) =
[






where θ > 0 determines the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, which is 1
θ−1 , ψ > 0 is a scale
parameter, and Xjt is the trend component in the production function to induce stationarity.
This GHH preference has been used widely in the small open economy literature (Mendoza
1991, Garcia-Cicco et al. 2010, among others) since it can generate trade balance counter-
cyclicality and avoid the case where hours fall in response to a rise in trend productivity due
to wealth effect. We later show that our main results do not change if we use the standard
preference specification proposed by King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988).
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The representative household faces the following period-by-period budget constraint:
Djt+1
Rjt
≥ Djt − Yjt + Cjt +Gjt + Ijt + ã (ujt)Kjt, (1.3)
where Djt+1 is the stock of debts chosen at time t, and Rt denotes the interest rate on bonds
held between period t and t+1, Yjt is the total output, Gjt is the government spending which
is exogenously determined, Ijt is the total investment and ã (ujt) is the utilization cost. We
assume the utilization cost has a following functional form:
ã (ujt) =
[
a1j (ujt − 1) +
1
2
a2j (ujt − 1)2
]
.
Following Christiano et al. (2005), capital stock evolves according to the following law of
motion:










where sj > 0 is a parameter for the investment adjustment cost, δ is the depreciation rate
of capital, µjss is the steady state investment growth rate. Each economy is also subject to
country premium interest rate shocks. The interest rate, Rjt, that country j faces is then
given by:










where Rj,ss is the steady state interest rate of country j, φj is a parameter governing the
financial friction that country j has, yj,ss and dj,ss are the stationary detrended output and
bond holding level of country j, respectively, and pmjt is the interest rate premium shock.
In this specification, interest rate is sensitive to the debt-to-output level relative to its steady
state through φj. The higher φj is, the more interest rate adjusts with respect to the amount
of debt that country j holds, i.e. when debt over steady state output ratio changes by 1%,
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interest rate changes by φj%. This is the ”financial friction” in our model. Unlike many
papers in the literature which assign φj to be small only to induce stationarity for the
model such as Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) and Guerron-Quintana (2012), we estimate this
parameter, which allows us to compare the relative lending and borrowing costs that these
countries are facing.
The representative household maximizes the expected lifetime utility subject to the bud-







The production function takes a standard Cobb-Douglas form:
Yjt = ajt (ujtKjt)
α (Xjthjt)
1−α , (1.7)
where ajt and Xjt are the transitory and trend productivity shocks, respectively.
We follow Gregory and Head (1999) to assume that each type of the structural shocks
consists of world common, group specific and country-specific shocks. More specifically, the
stationary productivity shock process in country j has three components: a world common
shock that affects all countries, act , a developed (developing) group-specific shock, a
g
t , that
affects only countries within the same developed (developing) group, and a country-specific





vagj ajt . (1.8)
The world common shock and group-specific shock can affect the economies differentially,
which is captured by the parameters vacj and vagj, respectively. In our model, we restrict
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the sign of v to be positive for one country to facilitate identification. We can interpret
v’s as the responsiveness of the fundamentals in each country to common shocks. There are
several reasons for why v’s are left unrestricted. First, it is possible that a good shock for one
country can be a bad shock for another country. An example of such shock is the oil price
shock which can have opposite impacts on oil importing and exporting countries. Also, when
we look at each country’s correlation with the rest of the countries in the data set, there are
some countries such as India which are negatively correlated with other countries. Another
reason for the unrestricted v’s is to keep the specification same as the dynamic factor model
(DFM) approach in the sense that that there is a factor structure to the structural shocks,
facilitating our comparison with the reduced-form literature. Lastly, though not reporting
here, we actually estimate a version of the model in which common shocks must affect all
countries in the same manner, i.e. v = 1 for all countries and common shocks and find
that the estimated model cannot capture the cross country correlation. All common and
country-specific shocks follow AR(1) processes, given by:
log act = ρac log a
c
t−1 + εac,t, εac,t ∼ N(0, 1) (1.9)
log agt = ρag log a
g
t−1 + εag ,t, εag ,t ∼ N(0, 1) (1.10)
log ajt = ρaj log a
j
t−1 + εaj ,t, εaj ,t ∼ N(0, σ2aj). (1.11)
The natural logarithm of the trend productivity shocks Xjt is assumed to follow:
logXjt = logXjt−1 + log µjt. (1.12)
Similar to the stationary productivity shock process, the natural logarithm of the gross
growth rate of Xjt, denoted by µjt is a stationary AR process, with three components: world
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common shocks µct , group-specific shocks µ
g
t and country specific shocks µ
j
t which can have
differential effects on each of the economies through vµij for i = c, g. Therefore, the stochastic






log µct = ρµc log µ
c
t−1 + εµc,t, εµc,t ∼ N(0, 1) (1.14)
log µgt = ρµg log µ
g













+ εµj ,t, εµj ,t ∼ N(0, σ2µj). (1.16)
The economy also faces a country premium interest rate shock, which is a combination
of a world common shock, pmct , a group-specific shock, pm
g
t , and a country specific shock,






log pmct = ρpmc log pm
c
t−1 + εpmc,t, εpmc,t ∼ N(0, 1) (1.18)
log pmgt = ρpmg log pm
g
t−1 + εpmg ,t, εpmg ,t ∼ N(0, 1) (1.19)
log pmjt = ρpmj log pm
j
t−1 + εpmj ,t, εpmj ,t ∼ N(0, σ2pmj). (1.20)
We can interpret the world common interest rate premium shock as world or US interest rate
shocks that follow an AR(1) process. Similarly, a positive group-specific premium shocks,
such as for developing group, can be interpreted as an increase in the interest rate that
developing countries face due to some events related to this specific group.
Government spending, Gjt, is assumed to have the same stochastic trend as output. The
log deviations of spending from trend gjt =
Gkt
Xjt
is assumed to have three components: world








log gct = ρgc log g
c
t−1 + εgc,t, εgc,t ∼ N(0, 1) (1.22)
log ggt = ρgg log g
g













+ εgj ,t, εgj ,t ∼ N(0, σ2gj). (1.24)
Lastly, similar to the shocks described above, the stochastic processes of preference shocks






log bct = ρbc log b
c
t−1 + εbc,t, εbc,t ∼ N(0, 1) (1.26)
log bgt = ρbg log b
g
t−1 + εbg ,t, εbg ,t ∼ N(0, 1) (1.27)
log bjt = ρ
j
b log bjt−1 + εbj ,t, εbj ,t ∼ N(0, σ
2
bj). (1.28)
where we can think of the common preference shocks as common demand shocks.
1.4 Estimating Common shocks
In this section, we discuss our estimation and identification strategy for the baseline model.
We first explain calibrated parameters, followed by the Bayesian estimation method and its
estimated parameter with the model fit. We also discuss the identification for the model.
18
1.4.1 Calibrated Parameters
Table 1.3 reports the values of calibrated parameters common for all countries, following the
calibration strategy in Garcia-Cicco et al. (2010). We set the risk aversion parameter σ to
be 2 and capital share α to be 0.32. Labor elasticity parameter θ is set to be 1.6 as frequently
used in the literature such as Mendoza (1994), Neumeyer and Perri (2005), and Garcia-Cicco
et al. (2010). The discount rate β is set to be 0.9224. Since we do not have government
spending series going back to 1900, government spending share in output, G/Y , is set to
match the average government spending share for each country available between 1960 and
2006. We set the steady state level of debt dss to match the average trade balance-output
ratio, and the depreciation rate δ to match the average investment-output ratio in the data
for each country. The parameter related to labor supply, ψ, is set so that the steady state
level of hours h is equal to 1. We also set the steady state growth rate, µ, equal to the average
output growth rate for each country in the data. Since v’s and the standard deviations of
the shocks are not identified separately, we normalize the standard deviation of all common
shocks to be 1 and estimate the effects of the shocks in each country through v’s. Also, we
assume positive v in one of the countries in the same group to identify the sign of the shock.
The rest of the parameters are estimated.
1.4.2 Bayesian Estimation
We estimate the model using the Metropolis-Hasting procedure accommodating missing data.
We draw from the posterior distribution of estimated parameters, denoted as Θ, given the
sample data matrix Y . This requires the evaluation of the product of likelihood function and
prior distribution, which is denoted as L (Y |Θ)P (Θ). To evaluate the likelihood function
L (Y |Θ) numerically, we first solve the model using the first order approximation method in
19
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004) and obtain the following state space form.
Xt+1 = hx (Θ)Xt + η (Θ) εt
obst = gx (Θ)Xt,
where Xt is a vector of state variables and εt is a vector of structural shocks with N (0, I) and
obst are the observables. We have four variables for each country: [∆GDPt,∆Ct,∆It, TBYt],
where ∆ denotes first difference in log, resulting in 68 observables in total. We numerically
evaluate the likelihood function L (Y |Θ) by applying the Kalman filter to this state space
form. Evaluating prior distribution P (Θ) is straightforward since we use known distributions
as described below.
The first columns of Table 1.5(a) and Table 1.5(b) report our prior distributions for
the estimated parameters. We take a conservative stance and impose flat priors following
previous literature such as Garcia-Cicco et al. (2010). We set priors for the parameters
governing the investment adjustment cost, sj, to be Gamma distribution G (0.5, 0.5). We




. When the utilization cost is close to 1,
it is extremely costly to change capital utilization, as a result, capital utilization remains
constant. In contrast, when ucost= 0, the marginal cost of changing capital utilization
is constant. Following Smets and Wouters (2007), we impose a Beta prior distribution
for capital utilization, B (0.5, 0.15). Since there is no evidence on the debt adjustment cost
parameters, φj, we choose a Gamma distribution with fairly large standard deviation G (5, 3).
The priors of all the autocorrelation coefficients of shocks have a Beta prior B (0.5, 0.2).
Lastly, we assume uniform distribution for standard deviations of all shocks and the common
shocks’ effect on individual countries, v’s. Overall, we have 406 parameters to estimate given
68 observables.
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Our baseline estimation does not include measurement errors to reduce the number of
parameters to the minimum. Although historical data are subject to measurement error
problem, especially for developing countries, there are two reasons for us to estimate the
model with long data without measurement errors. First, as argued in Garcia-Cicco et al.
(2010) and Rondeau (2012), long data are helpful for identification of trend shocks as they
contain several business cycles over time. Therefore, the long data set helps us to understand
the driving forces of business cycles in developing countries which has been limited in the
literature. Second, as long as measurement errors are independent across countries, which is
sensible given the fact that data come from several different sources, we expect that the role
of common shock is rather underestimated. In other words, by omitting the measurement
errors, we obtain a lower bound of the importance of common shocks. We check in the
Robustness section how calibrating the model with measurement errors may change the
results.
1.4.3 Estimated Parameters and Model Fit
The estimated parameters are presented in Table 1.5(a) and 1.5(b) for all 17 countries, calcu-
lated from four chains of 200,000 draws. We first highlight the following features: First, the
estimated country-specific deep parameters such as financial friction parameter and invest-
ment adjustment cost vary widely across countries, reflecting the structural heterogeneity of
the countries within the sample. Second, the debt adjustment cost parameter, φj, is signifi-
cantly different from 0 for all countries, implying a non-trivial debt adjustment cost that both
developing and small developed countries face. This finding provides a new evidence for the
financial frictions in small developed countries. Nevertheless, debt adjustment cost is smaller
for small developed (0.9) than developing countries (2.1) on average, which lends support to
the hypothesis that developing countries face larger financial frictions than small developed
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countries. Within each group of countries, the degree of financial friction also varies. For
example, among developing countries, Venezuela, Peru and Taiwan have a relatively low φ,
less than 0.65 and among small developed countries, φ’s in Sweden, Norway and Canada
are the smallest. Third, the utilization cost are significantly lower than 1 in all countries,
meaning that countries are able to adjust their utilization of capital in response to shocks,
so adding utilization cost in our model helps to avoid overstating the role of productivity
shocks.
Table 1.6 reports the theoretical second moments and their empirical counterparts. Not
only can the model match the average standard deviation of output quite well but it can also
generate the excess volatilities of consumption and investment compared to output especially
for developing countries. For example, our model can also generate both countercyclicality
and the autocorrelation of trade balance of developing countries, which are the two features
that have been emphasized as important in identifying trend and stationary productivity
shocks in the literature. Moreover, our baseline model can match many cross country corre-
lations. The last row of Table 1.6 shows that average cross country output and consumption
correlations implied by the model are close to the data. Even for each country pairs, our
model are also able to match closely the cross correlation across countries.
Finally, our baseline specification is preferred by the data compared to a restricted version
where common shocks have the same effect on all countries, i.e. v = 1 for ∀j5. As expected,
the restricted version is far worse than the baseline model, unable to generate the correlation
across country as seen in the data. Furthermore, the log marginal likelihood of the restricted
model is much lower than that of the baseline. Overall, we find that the data support our
full model.
5 Results for the case v = 1 are available upon request.
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1.4.4 Identification
This section discusses how our estimation approach identifies common shocks as well as
different types of shocks in the model. First, our full information estimation uses all moments
of the long data such as the persistence of output and consumption growth rates to separate
trend from stationary productivity shock. This identification scheme is different from the
identification in Aguiar and Gopinath (2007), which is based on the households’ consumption
smoothing behavior when there is no financial frictions. In their identification, households
can borrow and lend in international markets to smooth consumption in response to trend
productivity shocks, causing trade balance to be countercyclical. The excess volatility of
consumption to output in the data is then explained by the persistence of trend productivity
shocks. On the other hand, in our model, that identification may not hold because of the
debt adjustment cost φj, which is interpreted as the degree of “financial frictions,” which
is closely related to the behavior of the autocorrelation function of trade balance. When
this parameter value is very small, trade balance is near random walk. However, as shown
in Figure 1.1, the autocorrelation function of trade balance is steeply downward sloping for
all countries. Therefore, φj is estimated to be larger than the value set in the literature for
both small developed and developing countries. The high value of φj means that borrowing
and lending are costly in international market, implying that households cannot smooth
consumption easily by borrowing internationally even under trend productivity shocks. In
this case, trade balance as well as the growth rates of output and consumption are important
to identify the trend and stationary productivity shocks, which also justifies our use of the
long data as stressed by both Garcia-Cicco et al. (2010) and Rondeau (2012).
The rest of the shocks are identified as follows. Preference shocks, which represent de-
mand shocks, are to explain the highly volatile consumption in these countries. In the
economy where households cannot borrow or lend abroad easily, trade balance does not
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respond much to productivity shocks, which changes the wealth of the country, country pre-
mium shock is necessary to explain trade balance movement. In other words, preference and
interest rate premium shocks are necessary to explain excess volatility of consumption and
the movements of trade balance. This feature where domestic and trade variables explained
by different types of shocks are also present in the literature such as Justiniano and Preston
(2008) and Adolfson et al. (2007). Finally, government spending and preference shocks can
be separately identified as government spending is closely related to the resource constraint,
in which the other four components are observed. Besides, preference shocks increase con-
sumption while government spending shocks do not, which help us to distinguish these two
shocks.
Second, common shocks are identified through both contemporaneous and dynamic cor-
relations across all country pairs. Theoretically, since these countries are modeled as small
open economies, there is no correlation across countries if there is no common shocks. Thus,
our structural model forces the comovement in aggregate variables across all countries to be
explained by world common shocks, and the comovement across countries within each group
by group-specific shocks. On the contrary, the country-specific shocks are to explain the
movements in aggregate variables in each country that are independent from the rest of the
countries. This identification scheme suggests that countries more correlated with the rest of
the countries on average tend to have a higher contribution of common shocks, which is true
in our results below. Additionally, since we estimate the model pooling the data for all 17
countries, we increase the precision of the estimates, especially for the common components,
compared to individual country estimation in the existing literature.
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1.5 The Importance of Common Shocks in Small Open
Economies: 1900-2006
In this section, we discuss what our estimated common shocks capture and their role in driv-
ing business cycle fluctuations in small open economies between 1900 and 2006, highlighting
the difference between small developed and developing countries as well as between our
approach and the reduced form dynamic factor model approach in the previous literature.
1.5.1 What Are Common Shocks?
Common shocks in our estimation capture three components: worldwide shocks, shocks
common to all countries in the sample coming from large countries as well as shocks common
to countries in the sample only.
To show that our estimated common shocks contain worldwide shocks, Figure 1.3 plots
the extracted world common shocks calculated using the parameters at posterior mean.
Our common shocks capture major historical events. The extracted world shocks include
the Great Depression, the two World Wars and the two oil price shocks. These events
appear as large persistent common productivity shocks to all economies, causing output
to fall in tandem. For example, World War II is associated with a negative world trend
productivity shock, but an increase in productivity right after suggests the recoveries of
the world economy. The world common government spending shocks capture the common
policies across countries such as the increase in spending during World War II, followed by
a spending cut at the end of the war.
To gauge the extent to which our extracted common shocks also include shocks that are
from large countries outside of the sample, we also plot in Figure 1.3 the extracted common
shocks alongside with the US output growth rate, which proxies for the US shocks. The
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correlation of the world trend and stationary productivity shocks with the US output growth
are 0.32 and 0.26, respectively. Also, the world preference shock is negatively correlated
with the US output growth (-0.37). Additionally, the world common shocks explain a large
fraction, up to a half, of Canadian output fluctuations. These results suggest that even
though we do not include large countries in our data set, the extracted common shocks may
also capture shocks coming from the U.S. and Europe that are transmitted to these countries
through international trade and financial linkages.
Our common shocks can certainly contain shocks common to countries within our sample
only, but we argue that this component should be small. The reason is as follows: Our sample
includes 17 countries in many different parts of the world. The sizes of these countries
are also small, meaning that it is unlikely there are some type of shocks that affect India
and Peru but not any other countries outside of the sample. Finally, it is possible that
an idiosyncratic shock in Argentina may affect the rest of the countries, such as Brazil,
through their international linkages, causing an upward bias in our estimates for the role of
common shocks. However, these idiosyncratic shocks should be negligible in our estimated
common shocks. One reason is that all of these countries are small open economies in
different regions of the world. Therefore, an idiosyncratic shock in Argentina is unlikely
to affect other 16 countries significantly through trade when Argentina is not the major
trading partner with many countries in the sample. In our estimation results, both world
common and group-specific shocks are important not only for certain pairs of countries such
as Argentina and Brazil but for other countries also. Additionally, as plotted in Figure 1.4
the historical decomposition of output in Argentina (upper panel) and Canada (lower panel),
the 2002 Argentina crisis is captured in our estimation as country-specific. In other words,
the possible bias caused by the propagation of country-specific shocks within our sample
may not be problematic in our case.
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1.5.2 The Contribution of Common Shocks
Although the effects of common shocks are heterogeneous across countries, both world com-
mon and group-specific shocks are a non-negligible source of fluctuations in these countries.
On average, 49% of the fluctuation in output, 37% in consumption, 32% in investment, and
40% in trade balance between 1900 and 2006 can be attributed to all types of common
shocks, as reported in the last row of Table 1.7. We find that both world common and
group-specific shocks play similar roles in explaining these small open economies. For exam-
ple, about 25% of output fluctuations are explained by world common shocks. This result
reflects the substantial comovement of these countries during major historical episodes such
as the Great Depression which are captured in the extracted world common shocks. Besides,
as common shocks have to explain both static and dynamic correlations across countries,
there is a positive relationship between the cross country correlation and the contribution of
common shocks as plotted in Figure 1.5 for the output growth rate.
Contribution of Common Shocks Over time The importance of common shocks in
terms of explaining business cycles in small open economies fluctuates across the 100 year
timespan. Figure 1.6 plots a 20-year window rolling over contribution of common shocks to
output fluctuations across 17 countries between 1900 and 2006. Before 1945, the contribution
of the world common and group-specific shocks increased gradually, explaining about 50%
of output fluctuations on average. By the 1940-1945 period, common shocks explain up to
60% of the output volatilities on average. This increase in importance of common shocks
is due to a substantial increase in the presence of world common shocks, which supports
the argument that there were large disaster shocks propagating strongly to all countries in
the world, causing output to fall in tandem. Between 1950 and 1970, the importance of
common shocks decreased, explaining roughly 40% of output on average. However, the role
of common shocks began to rise again beginning from the 1970s when oil price shocks, which
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are captured as world common shocks, hit all the countries as they became more integrated
with each other. These variations in the importance of common shocks are driven mostly
by the changes in the world common shocks’ contribution, as shown in the second panel of
Figure 1.6. In fact, group-specific shocks explain roughly 25% of the total output variations
on average, and only slightly over 28% after the 1990s. This result is consistent with Kose
et al. (2012), who find an increasing importance of group-specific shocks in recent period
after the 1990s.
The variations in the importance of common shocks over time are positively correlated
with the level of openness of the countries in the sample. We proxy the level of openness
by the total value of trade over output, as plotted in Figure 1.7. Although the degree
of openness varies widely across countries, on average, countries were less open during the
1950-1970 period, which coincides with the time when the role of common shocks are smaller.
This result suggests that international trade and financial linkages may explain why some
countries are more driven by outside shocks than others. Therefore, one can expect large
shocks such as the Great Recession to play a significant role in the drop in economic activities
in these countries as countries are more integrated6.
Types of Common Shocks There are several types of common shocks important for
business cycles in small open economies. In particular, productivity shocks are the most
important type of common shocks for output. On average, common stationary productivity
shocks (28%) are more important than trend productivity shocks (17%). This finding is
consistent with Guerron-Quintana (2012), who finds the same pattern for small developed
countries with quarterly data after 1980. Consumption volatilities are explained by not only
common productivity shocks but also common preference shocks, each of which accounts for
6Ideally, we should include 2006-2012 data. However, as we started our research in 2009, we did not have
access to the data after 2007 for many of the countries in the sample.
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a large fraction of consumption volatility. The reason for this result is as follows. When debt
adjustment cost φj is high, the excess volatility of consumption relative to output is explained
by preference shocks. As consumption are correlated across countries, the estimation assigns
a significant role to common preference shocks.
Common interest rate premium and spending shocks do not explain much of the move-
ments in output and consumptions, but account for a sizable fraction of investment and
trade balance. For example, world common and group-specific interest rate premium shocks
together account for over 20% of the trade balance variations and 12% of investment. The
reason for why common interest rate premium shocks are important to explain the behavior
of trade balance is that when households are not able to lend and borrow internationally,
i.e. φj is large, interest rate premium shocks have to explain the quick tapering off auto-
correlation function of trade balance. Since trade balance is correlated across countries, the
role of common interest rate premium shocks are non-negligible. These results suggest the
importance of φj in our estimation, similar to Garcia-cicco et al. (2010). Additionally, the
fact that different types of shocks explain the comovement of different aggregate variables is
consistent with other papers in the small open economy literature like Adolfson et al. (2007),
Justiniano and Preston (2008) and Garcia-cicco et al. (2010). We show later how this result
is important to understand the difference between our structural approach and the reduced
form dynamic factor model approach.
1.5.3 Small Developed vs Developing Countries
Common shocks are important not only for small developed countries but also for developing
countries. We report in Table 1.7 the fractions of the variations in output, consumption,
investment and trade balance explained by common shocks for small developed and devel-
oping countries on average. On average, common shocks are an important driver of business
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cycles in small developed countries. For example, common shocks explain about 55% of
output fluctuations in small developed, which is sensible because these developed countries
are likely to be integrated and subject to common shocks. Although common shocks are less
important for developing countries than small developed countries, they still contribute to
nearly a half of business cycle fluctuations in developing countries, explaining around 45%
and 42% of output and consumption, respectively. The fact that developing countries are
more volatile than small developed countries, the high contribution of common shocks in the
variance decomposition implies a significant effect in the level to these developing economies.
As plotted in Figure 1.4, the historical decomposition exercise shows that a sizable fraction
of business cycles in Argentina, for example, is explained by common shocks even though
country-specific shocks such as the 2002 crisis explain their large fluctuations. Especially in
the first half of the century, the drops in Argentine output in the 1910s and early 1930s are
largely driven by important world common shocks.
Business cycles in small developed and developing countries are driven by different types
of common productivity shocks. In particular, we find that common trend productivity
shocks are more important than common stationary productivity shocks in small developed
countries, and the reverse is true for developing countries. We can interpret this result as
follows: Developed countries are generally closer to the world technology frontier, so they are
more subject to common trend technology shocks. However, in developing countries, there
are many policy and structural reforms, so the trend productivity shocks that are important
for them are country-specific and not common trend, which is what we find in our estimation.
Another important finding which is a byproduct of our estimation is that country-specific
stationary productivity shocks are more important than country-specific trend productivity
shocks in both small developed and developing countries, on average. For example, only 7%
of Argentine output fluctuations is explained by country-specific trend productivity shocks
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while nearly 41% explained by country-specific stationary shocks. Similarly, 3% of Span-
ish output fluctuations is explained by trend compared to 66% by stationary productivity
shocks. Nevertheless, the importance of trend versus stationary productivity shocks are het-
erogeneous within each group of countries: In four out of ten developing countries and in
three out of seven small developed countries, trend productivity shocks dominate stationary
productivity shock. In other words, the importance of trend versus stationary productiv-
ity shocks in Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) and Garcia-cicco et al. (2010) is not conclusive
for each group of countries even though on average, the total contribution of common and
country-specific trend and that of stationary productivity shocks for each group support the
result in Garcia-cicco et al. (2010): trend is not the cycle.
Finally, investment and trade balance in small developed countries are more subject to
common country premium shocks than those in developing economies. For example, while
world premium shocks explain 12% of trade balance in small developed countries on average,
they are only able to account for 4.4% of trade balance in developing countries. A possible
reason for this result is that developing countries often face highly volatile country premium.
Therefore, country-specific shocks should be more important in these countries than small
developed countries.
1.6 Structural Estimation and the Reduced Form Dy-
namic Factor Model (DFM) Estimation
This section discusses how our results depend on the choice of estimation methods. In par-
ticular, we compare the structural estimation method with the dynamic factor model (DFM)
estimation method often used in the international business cycle literature such as Kose et
al. (2003, 2012). We also show that the DFM approach can underestimate the importance
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of common shocks when there are multiple common shocks driving the comovement across
countries.
To understand if estimation approaches can affect the estimated role of common shocks,
we apply the reduced form dynamic factor model (DFM) approach using our dataset. The
DFM estimation approach is common in the literature on how common factors or shocks
drive business cycle comovement pioneered by Kose et al. (2003). In these papers, except
for Mumtaz et al. (2011) who attribute more than 50% of output fluctuations to common
shocks in an estimation for 36 countries after 1984 using output and inflation, other papers
such as Kose at al. (2003, 2012) find a much limited role of common shocks to small open
economies, explaining less than 20% of output fluctuations. Since we estimate the structural
model using a new data set, we estimate the role of common shocks using the DFM approach
for the same data. In particular, the DFM model assumes that each of the four variables,
yit, in country i at time t can be decomposed into four components: a world common factor
that affects all four variables of all 17 countries, a group-specific factor that affects only those
within the same group, a country-specific factor which is only relevant within a country, and
an idiosyncratic component which is specific to each variable only:












t + εit. (1.29)




t and the idiosyncratic component εt, are assumed
to follow an AR(1) process.7 As reported in Column 1 of Table 1.8, the mean contribution
of world and group shocks is roughly 16% of output fluctuation compared to 49% in our
structural estimation. The discrepancies are also large for other variables. For example,
14% of consumption variation is attributed to common factors compared to 37% in our
7The results do not change if we set more number of lags for the AR processes.
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baseline estimation. In other words, the results obtained from the DFM estimation are
much lower than those from our structural estimation.
Our intuition for the discrepancies between the two approaches is as follows: In the DFM
approach employed in the common shock literature, there are typically only one common
world factor, one common group factor and one country specific factor. In other words,
there is only one common factor at each grouping level, for a total of two common factors
for each country. On the other hand, there may be more than one type of common shocks
that can affect business cycle comovement across countries. In our estimation, we find that
there are a total of 10 types of common shocks and each type of common shocks has a role
in explaining the data. This difference in the number of common shocks assumed in the
two approaches may explain why the DFM estimation results are different from those of
structural estimation.
To demonstrate our intuition that the DFM approach may not be able to correctly esti-
mate the role of common shocks if the data generating process has more than the number
of factors assumed in the estimation, we conduct two counter factual exercises. In the first
experiment, we apply the DFM approach to estimate the role of common shocks in an arti-
ficial data set. The artificial data are generated from our estimated structural model, which
has multiple common shocks. We find that the contribution of common shocks obtained
from the DFM approach is less than 20% for output while in the data generating process,
the contribution of common shocks to output is close to 50%. In the second experiment,
we generate artificial data from our baseline model where all but one world common shock
and one group-specific common shock are shut down. In particular, we keep world common,
group-specific and country-specific stationary productivity shocks since they are important
for output and consumption. We then estimate the contribution of common shocks with
the DFM approach on this generated data set. The results in Columns 2 and 3 of Table
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1.8 show that the DFM estimates are close to the actual contribution of common shocks
to all of the variables, suggesting that the DFM approach works reasonably well when the
data generating process has only one type of common shocks as in the assumption of the
DFM. These two counter factual exercises demonstrate that the number of common shocks
assumed in the estimation process matters for the results. One support for the existence
of multiple factors in our data is that the principle component analysis shows that the first
component explains about 25% while each of the next four components explain between 6%
and 9% of the data. The lesson coming out of our experiment is that one should be cautious
when assuming the number of common factors when conducting dynamic factor estimation.
1.7 Robustness Check
In this section, we discuss the robustness of our results with respect to different data periods,
measurement errors in the estimation, and different preference specification.
1.7.1 Subperiod Data
In our baseline model, we calibrate government spending share in the steady state using
available data after 1960. Therefore, we may overstate the share in the first half of the
twentieth century. To check if this possibility can lead to a bias in our estimation, we break
the data at 1960 and reestimate the model using the steady states specific for each period.
For example, we set G
Y
to be 0.1 for all countries between 1900-1960 as Garcia-Cicco et al.
(2010), and the corresponding steady state using our available data for the 1960-2006 period.
Other calibrated parameters are the same as in the baseline estimation.
The results for the two subperiods are shown in Table 1.9 along side with those from the
baseline estimation. Common shocks are important for both periods, explaining over 50% of
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output fluctuations. Furthermore, consistent with our baseline model, the role of common
shocks is the largest for output, then trade balance, consumption and investment. Moreover,
the pattern of common shock contribution over time is similar as our baseline model where
common shocks are more important in the first half of the century than in the second half.
Lastly, it remains true that while common productivity shocks explain the most variation of
output and consumption among all the common shocks, common premium and preference
shocks are important for investment and trade balance.
1.7.2 Measurement Errors
In our baseline estimation, although we do not include measurement errors for the observ-
ables, which arguably problematic since long data certainly contain measurement errors, we
argue that our estimates for the role of common shocks are not upward-biased. First, as long
as measurement errors are independent across countries, our estimation should not overstate
the role of common shocks. Second, to partially address measurement errors in the observ-
ables, we re-estimate our model with calibrated measurement errors. More specifically, the
state space form of the model is now
Xt+1 = hx (Θ)Xt + η (Θ) εt
observablest = gx (Θ)Xt +met,
where met denotes the measurement error for each observables at time t. Since there are
already 406 estimated parameters, we do not estimate these measurement errors. Instead,
we calibrate the measurement errors as follows. First, we estimate the measurement errors
and other parameters of the baseline model using the Bayesian methods for each country
individually, i.e. there are no common shocks. Following Garcia-Cicco et. al. (2010), the
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measurement errors were restricted to be no more than 5% of the variance of the correspond-
ing observable. Then, we set the measurement errors in the baseline model with common
shocks using the estimated measurement errors from the first step. We finally re-estimate
the 406 parameters of the baseline model as described above.
The variance decomposition of the model with measurement errors averaged across coun-
tries is given in Table 1.10. For ease of comparison, we also report the baseline model (GHH
columns). Although the average contributions of common shocks in models with and with-
out measurement errors are not exactly the same, we find that our main conclusions above
do not change. First, common shocks explain a large portion of the variations in output,
consumption, investment and trade balance. In fact, the contribution is slightly higher in
the model with measurement errors than in the baseline model, especially for trade balance.
Second, even in the estimation with measurement errors, we find that there are multiple
common shocks explaining the behavior of the variables for all 17 countries. Third, when
we plot the common shock contribution over time obtained from the estimation with mea-
surement errors, we find a similar pattern as in the baseline model: common shocks are
more important before the 1950s and after the 1970s. Lastly, it remains true that the most
important world common shock for developing countries is stationary productivity shock
and for small developed countries is trend productivity shocks. In other words, our baseline
estimates are robust even if we allow for measurement errors in the estimation procedure.
1.7.3 Preference Specification
Finally, we re-estimate the model where households have a CRRA preference specification,
which is often used in the business cycle literature such as Guerron-Quintana (2012). Moe
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where θ > 0 is a parameter related with the labor elasticity and ψ > 0 is a scale parameter.
Table 1.10 reports the shares of output, consumption, investment and trade balance explained
by different types of common shocks for the CRRA case as well as the baseline (GHH) case.
Even with a different preference specification, we find a significant contribution of common
shocks for all four variables: 43% for output, 41% for consumption, 34% for investment,
and 46% for trade balance. Furthermore, other results in the baseline model also hold for
the CRRA case. For example, business cycles in small open economies can be attributed to
multiple common shocks: common trend and stationary productivity shocks are important
for output and consumption while interest premium and preference shocks are important for
investment and trade balance. Therefore, when we apply the DFM estimation method to
the artificial data generated from the model with CRRA preferences, we find the same result
as the baseline model, namely that the DFM approach falls short at uncovering the role of
common shocks when there are multiple underlying common shocks in the data generating
process.
1.8 Conclusion
In this paper, we show that common shocks play a large role in driving business cycles
of small open economies between 1900 and 2006 in a structural estimation using Bayesian
methods. Although common shocks are more important for small developed than developing
countries, the fact that 45.5% of output fluctuations in developing countries indicates a
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significant influence of outside shocks to developing countries. As developing countries are
more volatile than small developed countries, this variance decomposition suggests that
outside shocks may have larger impacts in levels to developing countries. Therefore, it
would be interesting to further understand how the transmission mechanism differ across
small developed and developing countries.
Additionally, our results point to the existence of multiple world common and group
specific shocks hitting small open economies in our data, leading to a larger contribution
of common shocks than estimated in reduced form factor analysis with one world common
and one group specific shock. Our analysis suggests that it is important to formally test
the number of factors when we carry out dynamic factor model estimation, and a promising
future research is to augment the DFM approach in the international business cycle literature
to include several types of common factors.
As we look at the whole 100 years of data, we find that common shocks are especially
important when countries are more open, and the large shocks hitting the world economy such
as the Great Depression have had a large impact on all countries, developed and developing
alike. Therefore, we can expect that the recent recession and crisis in the U.S. and Europe
may have caused output to fall significantly in not only small developed countries with strong
financial links with the U.S. and Europe, but also in developing countries. Another line of
research could utilize richer data set for the Great Recession to estimate an elaborative model
with the propagation of shocks to small open economies. Finally, our model does not allow
for transmission mechanism of idiosyncratic shocks across countries, which may contaminate
the estimates of common shocks. Although we argue that this problem is small as we include
several countries of small sizes, future research can purge out these effects from the estimated
common shocks by modeling explicitly trade and financial linkages across countries.
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1.9 Figures and Tables














































Figure 1.1: Autocorrelation functions of trade balance to output ratio for developing and small de-
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Figure 1.5: Scatter plot of the contribution of common shocks against the average correlation of each
country with others in the data set
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Figure 1.6: The contribution of common shocks over 20 year rolling over window (centered moving
average) between 1900 and 2006. Note: before 1910 (after 1996), the contribution is calculated as








































































































































































































Table 1.1: Data availability
Country Y C Inv tby
Argentina 1900-2006 1900-2006 1900-2006 1900-2006
Brazil 1901-2006 1901-2006 1901-2006 1901-2006
Chile 1900-2006 1900-2006 1900-2006 1900-2006
Colombia 1925-2006 1925-2006 1925-2006 1925-2006
India 1919-2006 1919-2006 1919-2006 1919-2006
Mexico 1900-2006 1900-2006 1900-2006 1900-2006
Peru 1900-2006 1900-2006 1900-2006 1900-2006
Taiwan 1901-2006 1901-2006 1901-2006 1901-2006
Turkey 1923-2006 1923-2006 1923-2006 1923-2006
Venezuela 1920-2006 1920-2006 1920-2006 1920-2006
Australia 1901-2006 1901-2006 1901-2006 1901-2006
Canada 1900-2006 1900-2006 1900-2006 1900-2006
Finland 1900-2006 1900-2006 1900-2006 1900-2006
Norway 1900-2006 1900-2006 1900-2006 1900-2006
Portugal 1910-2006 1910-2006 1910-2006 1910-2006
Spain 1900-2006 1900-2006 1900-2006 1900-2006





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.3: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Description Value
σ Risk aversion 2
α Capital share 0.32
θ Labor elasticity 1.6
β Discount rate 0.9224
Table 1.4: Common shocks Parameter Estimates
Para Prior Posterior Para Prior Posterior Para Prior Posterior
ρµc B 0.68 ρµg1 B 0.57 ρµg2 B 0.63
(0.5,0.2) (0.58,0.77) (0.5,0.2) (0.35,0.76) (0.5,0.2) (0.48,0.76)
ρac B 0.84 ρag1 B 0.83 ρag2 B 0.78
(0.5,0.2) (0.76,0.91) (0.5,0.2) (0.74,0.91) (0.5,0.2) (0.69,0.86)
ρpmc B 0.91 ρpmg1 B 0.97 ρpmg2 B 0.99
(0.5,0.2) (0.83,0.97) (0.5,0.2) (0.92,0.99) (0.5,0.2) (0.98,1.00)
ρbc B 0.98 ρbg1 B 0.90 ρbg1 B 0.94
(0.5,0.2) (0.98,0.99) (0.5,0.2) (0.83,0.95) (0.5,0.2) (0.89,0.97)
ρgc B 0.68 ρgg1 B 0.59 ρgg2 B 0.94
(0.5,0.2) (0.57,0.77) (0.5,0.2) (0.45,0.74) (0.5,0.2) (0.89,0.98)
Notes: All results are reported using 4 chains of 200,000 draws from the posterior distribution. g1
denotes developing group-specific shock and g2 denotes developed group-specific shocks. The












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.5: (b): Posterior Estimates for Small Developed Countries
Par Prior Australia Canada Finland Norway Portugal Spain Sweden
s G 1.00 0.57 0.48 0.07 0.11 0.79 0.13
(0.5,0.5) (0.69,1.35) (0.39,0.77) (0.26,0.69) (0.05,0.09) (0.06,0.17) (0.49,1.12) (0.05,0.35)
φ G 1.49 0.65 1.19 0.19 0.08 3.07 0.18
(5,3) (0.89,2.22) (0.40,0.95) (0.40,2.01) (0.13,0.26) (0.05,0.12) (1.66,4.91) (0.07,0.47)
ucost B 0.11 0.71 0.44 0.90 0.41 0.92 0.55
(0.5,0.15) (0.04,0.19) (0.55,0.86) (0.25,0.65) (0.81,0.97) (0.26,0.58) (0.85,0.98) (0.41,0.70)
ρµj B 0.61 0.62 0.60 0.69 0.44 0.45 0.51
(0.5,0.2) (0.29,0.82) (0.41,0.76) (0.32,0.82) (0.39,0.91) (0.16,0.71) (0.17,0.74) (0.25,0.75)
ρaj B 0.60 0.65 0.72 0.73 0.56 0.89 0.57
(0.5,0.2) (0.26,0.87) (0.36,0.83) (0.59,0.85) (0.60,0.85) (0.24,0.86) (0.79,0.96) (0.25,0.87)
ρpmj B 0.77 0.92 0.90 0.44 0.56 0.92 0.95
(0.5,0.2) (0.54,0.95) (0.86,0.97) (0.80,0.96) (0.12,0.81) (0.21,0.88) (0.86,0.97) (0.88,0.99)
ρbj B 0.86 0.53 0.75 0.86 0.96 0.65 0.74
(0.5,0.2) (0.80,0.91) (0.19,0.86) (0.50,0.89) (0.63,0.96) (0.93,0.98) (0.46,0.79) (0.56,0.87)
ρgj B 0.66 0.66 0.52 0.48 0.84 0.90 0.94
(0.5,0.2) (0.55,0.75) (0.55,0.74) (0.35,0.66) (0.22,0.73) (0.80,0.88) (0.77,0.97) (0.91,0.97)
σµj U 0.57 2.47 0.63 1.05 1.20 0.54 0.84
(10,5.7) (0.10,1.02) (0.74,3.58) (0.07,1.40) (0.44,1.70) (0.16,2.20) (0.06,1.20) (0.32,1.34)
σaj U 0.24 1.20 1.17 1.82 0.74 2.21 0.29
(10,5.7) (0.03,0.55) (0.18,2.16) (0.69,1.56) (1.48,2.19) (0.15,1.31) (1.94,2.49) (0.03,0.74)
σpmj U 9.81 4.19 8.70 0.64 1.02 8.18 0.96
(100,57.7) (7.50,12.14) (2.99,5.57) (3.71,14.10) (0.12,1.13) (0.55,1.59) (4.47,13.14) (0.41,2.46)
σbj U 9.26 0.79 3.78 4.17 10.68 5.51 4.37
(100,57.7) (7.52,11.54) (0.09,1.94) (2.46,5.36) (0.70,7.58) (6.53,17.22) (4.32,6.71) (3.24,5.86)
σgj U 4.21 2.86 3.22 1.15 3.04 2.60 1.36
(100,57.7) (3.75,4.73) (2.53,3.24) (2.62,3.78) (0.83,1.47) (2.70,3.42) (2.28,2.99) (1.20,1.53)
vµc U 1.32 2.11 0.88 0.02 0.24 1.07 0.15
(0,28.9) (0.98,1.66) (1.30,2.98) (0.39,1.44) (-0.61,0.62) (-0.23,0.74) (0.46,1.71) (-0.25,0.59)
vac U 0.11 1.58 0.71 0.92 0.28 0.36 0.21
(0,28.9) (-0.14,0.35) (1.05,2.16) (0.31,1.15) (0.48,1.43) (-0.06,0.62) (-0.10,0.80) (-0.11,0.55)
vpmc U 4.26 0.14 0.88 0.33 0.87 4.91 -0.01
(0,28.9) (2.78,5.81) (-0.64,1.00) (-1.01,3.14) (-0.09,0.73) (0.55,1.28) (2.18,8.47) (-0.25,0.31)
vbc U 1.38 30.31 -12.89 3.95 3.01 5.07 2.93
(0,28.9) (-4.36,7.05) (21.29,40.53) (-18.48,-7.64) (-0.57,8.62) (-0.08,6.37) (1.39,8.78) (-2.25,7.55)
vgc U 0.89 1.39 2.89 0.02 0.62 -0.10 0.16
(0,28.9) (0.15,1.63) (0.74,2.01) (2.14,3.66) (-0.35,0.42) (-0.01,1.27) (-0.62,0.42) (-0.15,0.48)
vµg U 0.11 -0.40 1.16 0.94 1.76 1.10 0.74
(0,28.9) (0.01,0.30) (-1.28,0.36) (0.58,1.81) (0.28,1.57) (1.02,2.49) (0.38,1.78) (0.28,1.19)
vag U 0.11 0.63 0.90 1.23 -0.21 -0.40 1.28
(0,28.9) (0.01,0.26) (0.17,1.12) (0.51,1.31) (0.74,1.70) (-0.59,0.18) (-0.84,0.02) (1.00,1.56)
vpmg U 2.25 -0.34 -3.70 -1.47 0.06 3.43 -0.30
(0,28.9) (0.66,4.20) (-0.93,0.18) (-6.51,-1.35) (-1.85,-1.12) (-0.14,0.29) (1.53,6.00) (-0.75,-0.08)
vbg U 1.64 -0.46 -1.23 -5.53 1.13 -3.25 -3.27
(0,28.9) (0.18,3.76) (-4.35,4.16) (-3.78,1.29) (-9.82,-2.05) (-1.30,3.51) (-5.52,-1.12) (-6.53,-0.20)
vgg U 0.90 0.79 2.11 1.38 -0.16 -0.47 0.32
(0,28.9) (0.39,1.46) (0.40,1.23) (1.54,2.80) (1.07,1.71) (-0.67,0.36) (-1.02,0.08) (0.03,0.63)
Notes: All results are reported using 4 chains of 200,000 draws from the posterior distribution. g1
denotes developing group-specific shock and g2 denotes developed group-specific shocks. The





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































gy 15.5 34.1 26
gc 13.8 20 14.9
gi 16.1 8 7
tby 12.4 2.6 4
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Table 1.9: Robustness check: subsamples 1900-1959 and 1960-2006
(a)
gy gc
1900-2006 1900-1960 1961-2006 1900-2006 1900-1960 1961-2006
W
µ 9.3 13.0 11.7 4.3 7.5 7.7
a 14.2 12.0 13.9 8.2 6.8 9.5
pm 0.3 0.2 1.1 0.3 0.6 0.6
b 1.0 1.2 0.2 2.7 2.8 0.9
gvt 0.2 0.3 0.2 1.0 4.1 0.5
Total 25.0 26.7 27.1 16.4 21.8 19.1
G
µ 7.9 10.0 8.1 3.9 6.2 5.8
a 14.0 13.8 14.9 8.5 7.9 11.0
pm 0.7 0.4 1.2 0.4 0.6 0.7
b 1.6 1.7 1.0 6.1 5.3 4.0
gvt 0.1 0.4 0.2 2.0 3.1 3.3
Total 24.4 26.4 25.3 20.9 23.1 24.9
W+G 49.4 53.1 52.4 37.3 44.9 44.0
(b) continued
gi tby
1900-2006 1900-1960 1961-2006 1900-2006 1900-1960 1961-2006
W
µ 1.3 2.7 2.6 0.5 1.6 0.6
a 3.1 2.1 3.6 0.5 0.9 0.7
pm 5.3 5.0 8.6 7.6 8.9 8.8
b 2.5 3.7 0.6 9.1 12.0 14.6
gvt 2.2 3.3 2.0 0.7 1.0 1.9
Total 14.3 16.7 17.5 18.3 24.4 26.6
G
µ 1.5 1.5 2.5 0.5 1.3 0.5
a 3.3 3.5 4.5 0.8 1.0 0.8
pm 6.2 7.1 10.5 13.9 14.9 11.3
b 5.1 6.4 2.7 5.8 5.8 10.6
gvt 1.4 2.4 0.9 0.6 1.1 1.5
Total 17.6 20.9 21.1 21.6 24.1 24.7
W+G 31.9 37.6 38.6 39.9 48.5 51.3
Notes: All results are reported using the mean of variance decomposition computed from 4 chains
of 200,000 draws from the posterior distribution. We take average of the mean variance
decomposition across all countries.
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Table 1.10: Robustness check: GHH vs CRRA
(a)
gy gc
GHH with m.e CRRA GHH with m.e CRRA
W
µ 9.3 9.2 6.2 4.3 4.7 6.7
a 14.2 14.4 14.6 8.2 8.4 10.1
pm 0.3 0.4 0.8 0.3 0.5 0.5
b 1.0 1.6 0.7 2.7 3.4 1.3
gvt 0.2 0.2 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.9
Total 25.0 25.9 23.3 16.4 18.0 19.5
G
µ 7.9 7.4 7.3 3.9 3.9 8.4
a 14.0 13.0 8.9 8.5 8.7 9.4
pm 0.7 0.8 1.1 0.4 0.6 0.6
b 1.6 3.1 1.2 6.1 5.9 1.9
gvt 0.1 0.2 1.1 2.0 3.6 1.4
Total 24.4 24.5 19.5 20.9 22.7 21.7
W+G 49.4 50.4 42.8 37.3 40.7 41.1
(b)
gi tby
GHH with m.e CRRA GHH with m.e CRRA
W
µ 1.3 1.4 1.3 0.5 0.4 0.3
a 3.1 2.9 6.8 0.5 0.3 0.5
pm 5.3 6.3 3.7 7.6 13.3 18.0
b 2.5 3.3 4.4 9.1 13.4 4.8
gvt 2.2 2.0 1.1 0.7 0.4 0.4
Total 14.3 15.9 17.3 18.3 27.9 24.0
G
µ 1.5 1.3 2.1 0.5 0.3 0.7
a 3.3 2.8 2.3 0.8 0.4 0.9
pm 6.2 7.4 5.8 13.9 10.8 14.0
b 5.1 5.7 6.8 5.8 17.4 6.4
gvt 1.4 1.2 0.1 0.6 0.4 0.1
Total 17.6 18.4 17.0 21.6 29.3 22.1
W+G 31.9 34.3 34.3 39.9 57.1 46.1
Notes: All results are reported using the mean of variance decomposition computed from 4 chains
of 200,000 draws from the posterior distribution. We take average of the mean variance
decomposition across all countries for baseline model (GHH), baseline model with measurement
error (with m.e.) and model with CRRA preferences (CRRA).
Chapter 2
Understanding the Cross Country
Effects of U.S. Technology Shocks
Wataru Miyamoto and Thuy Lan Nguyen
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2.1 Introduction
It is widely documented that business cycles comove substantially across countries. Knowl-
edge of how shocks transmit across countries is important to understand business cycles in
each country and to design external policies. One potential explanation for the observed
comovements across countries is endogenous transmission, i.e. shocks propagate from one
country to another country through international trade in goods and financial assets. Yet,
most existing models in the international business cycle literature are not able to gener-
ate significant endogenous transmission. International real business cycle models starting
from Backus et al. (1992, 1995) generate weak correlation of key aggregate variables such
as output and hours.To the extent that business cycles are correlated, it is because shocks
driving business cycles are correlated. In particular, Schmitt-Grohé (1998) demonstrates
that a class of real business cycle models cannot explain the observed dynamic effects of
shocks to U.S. output on the Canadian economy through international trade and financial
assets. Even in the more recent papers such as Engel and Wang (2011) and Johnson (2012),
outputs across countries are only weakly correlated, suggesting that their models still do not
generate substantial endogenous transmission. In the recent New Open Economy Macroeco-
nomics (NOEM) literature, Justiniano and Preston (2010) find that estimated international
business cycle models with nominal rigidities also fail to explain both the documented impor-
tance of U.S. shocks for Canadian business cycles and the comovements of macroeconomic
variables between these two countries. Other papers using estimated NOEM models such
as Adolfson et al. (2006, 2007) and Christiano et al. (2010) also report the similar result:
namely that foreign shocks explain little of the domestic variables in their models. These
results suggest that models with or without nominal rigidities fail to explain the observed
cross-country comovements, especially when one looks beyond the second moments often
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used in this literature.
In this paper, we argue that a standard real international business cycle model aug-
mented with three key features can generate substantial endogenous transmission of tech-
nology shocks and help to explain the observed business cycle comovements. The three key
features are: Jaimovich-Rebelo preferences allowing for a low wealth elasticity of labor sup-
ply, variable capital utilization and imported intermediate inputs for production. We show
that this augmented model is capable of explaining over 90% of the observed transmission
of a permanent U.S. technology shock to Canadian output and hours worked. By contrast,
a model without these three key features can only account for about 10% of the observed
transmission.
The reason for why models without our three key features fail to generate substantial
endogenous transmission is because they cannot explain the response of domestic hours to
foreign shocks. The response of domestic hours plays a central role for the transmission
of foreign shocks to the domestic economy because in the absence of a change in the level
of domestic technology, increases in output require an increase in hours. When there is a
positive permanent technology shock in the foreign country, the supply of foreign goods in-
creases, causing the domestic terms of trade to appreciate. This appreciation of the domestic
terms of trade affects both labor supply and labor demand in the domestic economy. In the
standard model, on the labor supply side, domestic households become richer, and decrease
their labor supply as in Panel (a) of Figure 2.1. On the labor demand side, for a given
appreciation in the terms of trade, labor demand can increase. However, the shift in the
labor demand curve is not sufficient to increase hours worked to generate strong endogenous
transmission under plausible parameterizations of the standard model 1.
1Our key insight is that this relationship between domestic hours and the terms of trade does not depend
on the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods, or the completeness of financial markets,
both of which are often emphasized in the literature for transmission of technology shocks.
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In contrast, the model with our three key features can generate substantial endogenous
transmission. With Jaimovich Rebelo preferences, which allow for a low wealth elasticity of
labor supply, the domestic labor supply curve does not shift substantially as in Panel (b) of
Figure 2.1. On the labor demand side, for a given appreciation in the terms of trade, the
increase in labor demand can be substantially larger when there are both imported inter-
mediate inputs and variable capacity utilization. These two features increase the marginal
product of labor. More specifically, domestic firms increase the amount of imported in-
termediate inputs from the foreign country given the cheaper price of imports, leading to
an increase in labor demand. Additionally, variable capital utilization can shift the labor
demand curve further to the right as it amplifies the change in other inputs in the produc-
tion function. Therefore, in equilibrium, with our three key features, hours can increase
significantly in the domestic economy as demonstrated in Panel (b) of Figure 2.1.
To test the ability of the model to generate endogenous transmission that is consistent
with the data, we build an empirical benchmark that characterizes the transmission of shocks
across countries. To that end, we document the effects of permanent U.S. technology shocks
on the Canadian economy such as output, consumption, investment, hours, net export,
and the terms of trade. We identify permanent U.S. technology shocks using the long run
identification, which imposes that only permanent U.S. technology shocks can affect U.S.
labor productivity in the long run. We find that this identified U.S. technology shock leads
to a significant boom in Canada, where output in Canada increases as much as 60% of the
increase in U.S. output. Also, hours worked in Canada increases with a similar magnitude
as Canadian output, and Canadian terms of trade appreciate.
Given our empirical evidence, we analyze the endogenous transmission in our proposed
model, and show that our model generates substantial endogenous transmission by estimat-
ing the model. More specifically, we demonstrate our intuition for how models with and
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without our three key features generate endogenous transmission using a simple calibration
exercise. Then, we estimate the model using quasi-Bayesian methods by matching the the-
oretical impulse responses to a permanent U.S. technology shock with the corresponding
empirical responses. This exercise demonstrates that our model can generate substantial
endogenous transmission and match the observed transmission without exogenous correla-
tion of technology shocks between the U.S. and Canada. Even when we allow for exogenous
correlation of technology shocks, the data still prefer endogenous transmission, which is con-
sistent with our empirical evidence. Furthermore, our estimation suggests that all three key
features are necessary for the model’s success.
Our insights about the transmission mechanism of technology shocks across countries
are different from those proposed in the literature. For example, in Corsetti et al. (2008),
the authors propose that the large wealth effect under incomplete markets is important to
explain the transmission of technology shocks across countries. In another paper, Burstein
et al. (2008) suggest that production sharing by using a low substitutability of domestic
and foreign goods can increase the comovement of outputs across countries. However, these
features are not able to explain the types of evidence that we have. We do not observe
the movements of the terms of trade predicted in those theories. In Corsetti et al. (2008),
endogenous transmission arises with the wealth effect channel only when the terms of trade
in Canada depreciate and consumption actually decreases. In Burstein et al. (2008), a low
elasticity of substitution helps only when the terms of trade in Canada appreciate a few times
larger than the movements of hours. In the data, the Canadian terms of trade appreciates
with a magnitude slightly larger than hours. Therefore, neither of the features proposed in
these papers can create substantial endogenous transmission. Instead, we need our three key
features to deliver the results consistent with our empirical findings.
Our insights above carry over to models with nominal rigidities, i.e. our three key features
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also help to generate substantial endogenous transmission with plausible parameterizations
of nominal rigidities. To demonstrate that, we estimate a version of our model augmented
with nominal rigidities by matching additionally the responses of Canadian inflation and
nominal interest rate to a permanent U.S. technology shock. We find that when the model
has our three key features, it can match the responses of aggregate variables in Canada under
moderate nominal rigidities. Without these features, the estimated degree of price stickiness
is close to one, meaning prices are fixed. The intuition for this result is as follows. In theory,
price stickiness a la Calvo can generate time varying markups, which can shift the labor
demand curve. If the markups in Canada decline in response to a positive U.S. technology
shock, the demand for hours in Canada can increase and also inflation in Canada increases.
In the data, a positive permanent U.S. technology shock has a negligible effect on inflation
in Canada. Therefore, only when prices are almost fixed can markups vary sufficiently to
help the model match hours without causing substantial inflation in Canada. In contrast,
the three key features we propose can help the model to generate substantial endogenous
transmission without relying heavily on the time varying markups, which is why the degree
of price stickiness does not have to be so high in our case.
Our paper focuses on the transmission of technology shocks from the U.S. to Canada for
the following reasons. First, we can address the large literature studying the transmission of
technology shocks. Also, uncovering the endogenous transmission mechanism of technology
shocks can give insights about that of other types of shocks. Another reason is that we
can identify technology shocks using structural VAR without relying on specific structural
models, and use this empirical evidence to test the ability of the model to generate endoge-
nous transmission. Moreover, by focusing on the U.S. and Canada pair, we can treat the
U.S. as the rest of the world to Canada since the U.S. accounts for over 70% of Canadian
international trade. This assumption simplifies the analysis as there is no feedback effect
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from the U.S. to Canada. Lastly, previous papers fail to explain the relationship between
these two countries, making it an interesting case to study.
To isolate the effects of shocks on Canadian variables without relying on specific struc-
tural model assumptions, we choose a limited information approach where we identify one
type of shocks, i.e. permanent technology shocks, to characterize its transmission on Canada
instead of using non-structural shocks or full information approach. The limited information
approach has several advantages as follows. Cross-country comovements can be driven by
a number of shocks, each of which can have an opposite effect on the international relative
prices. For example, in theory, positive government spending shocks in the U.S. can depreci-
ate Canadian terms of trade while positive U.S. technology shocks can appreciate Canadian
terms of trade. Therefore, a non-structural U.S. shock that increases output in the U.S.,
which is a combination of these two types of shocks, can have ambiguous effects on Canadian
terms of trade, leading to a wrong conclusion about endogenous transmission in the model.
Furthermore, although full information approach can also identify structural shocks, identifi-
cation relies on all aspects of assumptions in the model. In contrast, our empirical approach
can help us test a wide range of models since we do not identify technology shocks using
specific structural model assumptions. This is appealing for us since we can focus exclusively
on the model’s ability to generate endogenous transmission with a single benchmark.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we document the
effects of permanent U.S. technology shocks on Canada in the structural VAR. We present
our baseline model in Section 3. Section 4 analyzes how our model with three key features
generates substantial transmission from the U.S to Canada. We estimate our model and
present the results in Section 5. We further elaborate what features are crucial for the
success of the model in Section 6. Section 7 presents our robustness check to show that even
when we allow exogenous correlation of technology shocks in the model to be estimated, the
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data assign a large role to endogenous transmission through international trade in generating
comovement between the U.S. and Canada. Lastly, in Section 8, we extend our baseline
model to add nominal rigidities into the model to show our three key features also help in
this case and compare with the state of the art model in the New Open Economy Model
literature. We conclude and suggest possible future work in Section 9.
2.2 Empirical Evidence
In this section, we document the effects of U.S. permanent technology shocks on Canadian
economy using quarterly data for the U.S. and Canada post-Bretton Woods period between
1973Q1 and 2012Q32. One of the reasons for our analysis to focus on the U.S. and Canada
relationship is that we can consider the U.S. as the rest of the world to Canada. The U.S.
and Canada have a tight trade linkages. In fact, the U.S. is Canada’s single most important
trading partner: For the last 30 years, the share of exports to the U.S. in total Canadian
exports is, on average, over 75%, and that of imports is 68%, so U.S. shocks propagate to
Canada through international trade directly and there is minimal indirect effects through a
third country. Additionally, the U.S. is ten times larger than Canada. Therefore, we can
assume that there is no feedback from the U.S..
2.2.1 The VAR Model
We estimate a VAR model with both U.S. and Canadian variables to identify US technology
shocks using long run restrictions. The VAR has two blocks, a U.S. block, y1t, and a Canadian









, the growth rates of consumption and








. The Canadian block includes six variables: the growth rates
of output, consumption, and investment, the natural logarithm of hours, net exports and
the growth rate of the terms of trade3. Throughout the paper, the terms of trade is defined
as the ratio of price of imports to price of exports, so a decline in the terms of trade means
appreciation.
Our identification strategy hinges on two assumption. First, Canada is relatively small
compared to the U.S., having no effects on the U.S. block. More specifically, we impose a
block exogeneity of the following form:
 A11 (L) A12 (L)








where the block exogeneity implies that
A12 (L) = 0 for ∀L.
This assumption has also been placed in earlier works, for example, Schmitt-Grohé (1998)
and Justiniano and Preston (2010) although they do not identify any particular structural
shocks.
Second, we can identify U.S. permanent productivity shock from the U.S. block using
long run restriction in Blanchard and Quah (1989) and Gali (1991), i.e. only permanent
3Our unit root and stationarity tests, which include the Augmented Dickey-Fuller and KPSS tests on all
U.S. and Canadian variables, suggest that productivity, consumption, output, investment, and the terms of
trade to be in difference. For the ADF tests, we cannot reject that U.S. output, consumption, investment,
Canadian output, consumption, investment, and terms of trade have a unit root with a 10% significance level.
For KPSS tests, we can reject trend stationarity for the same variables. Hours in the U.S. and Canada are
kept in level as there is no strong evidence of non-stationarity and in the model, hours are stationary. Over-
differencing, as suggested by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Vigfusson (2003) can cause model misspecification.
In fact, Fisher (2006) also specifies hours in level in his empirical exercise. The results are similar if we use
the ratio of consumption to output and investment to output instead.
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technology shocks can affect U.S. labor productivity in the long run. This identification












 C11 (L) C12 (L)





C12 (1) = 0.
We include 4 lags of each of the variables and a constant in the VAR model.
Using the estimates of the VAR model above, we compute the impulse responses of the
variables in the Canadian block, y2t, following a one-standard deviation shock in ε
US
1t . The
dynamic responses are invariant to the ordering of the variables within y2t.
2.2.2 The VAR Result
The impulse response functions of all the variables for the U.S. are displayed in Figure 2.2
and in Canada in Figure 2.3. Lines marked with a plus sign correspond to the point estimate
of the impulse responses, and the shaded areas are the 95% confidence band calculated from
bootstrapping 1,000 times4.
Our result suggests that after a positive U.S. permanent technology shock occurs in
period 1,
4The bootstrap procedure is as follows: from the centered residuals of the estimation, bootstrap residuals
are generated by randomly drawing with replacement. These quantities are used to compute bootstrap time
series, which is then re-estimated. The percentile interval is determined as
[





0.025 are the 0.975 and 0.025 quantiles, respectively, of the distribution of the centered bootstrap IR
(Hall’s percentile confidence interval).
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(1) U.S. output, consumption, investment and hours increase5.
(2) All of the Canadian aggregate quantities go up and the terms of trade appreciates
(falls).
(3) In terms of the relative magnitude, Figure 2.4 shows that output in Canada increases
as much as 60% of the increase in the U.S. at the maximum. Investment increases on impact,
reaching the highest response of about twice as much as output. Consumption also increases
but less than output. Canadian terms of trade appreciate slightly more than Canadian out-
put. Net exports to output ratio in Canada increases significantly. The maximum response
of net exports is about half of Canadian output.
(4) Labor productivity increases slightly, about a fourth of Canadian output, but not
significant at 95% confidence level.
These results are different from Schmitt-Grohé (1998) who finds that the terms of trade
in Canada does not move at all in response to an innovation to U.S. output. One potential
explanation for this difference is that the innovation in U.S. output may includes other types
of shocks that have opposite effects on the terms of trade. For example, a calibrated model
in Backus et al. (1994) suggests that while a technology shock in the U.S. causes Canadian
terms of trade to appreciate, a government spending shock in the U.S. can cause Canadian
terms of trade to depreciate. Therefore, in response to an innovation to U.S. output, the
terms of trade may not change significantly. Focusing on only permanent technology shocks
helps us to avoid this problem.
To gauge the importance of U.S. technology shocks to Canada, we perform a forecast error
variance decomposition of these shocks on Canadian variables. As summarized in Table 2.1,
the identified U.S. shocks explain a sizable fraction of business cycles in Canada, but not 100%
which is why we focus on the conditional responses. In particular, U.S. technology shocks
5On impact, response of hours is close to zero and insignificant.
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contribute significantly to the fluctuations of all real variables, up to 39% of the Canadian
output and 24% of hours at eight-quarter horizon. The contribution to consumption in
Canada is smaller, about 26% at eight-quarter horizon and 35% at 20-quarter horizon. Only
about 14% of investment and 19% the terms of trade variation are explained by this U.S.
permanent technology shock at 20-quarter horizon, suggesting that the high volatility of
these variables is caused by some other factors.
These results are robust to other VAR specifications and data. For example, we find a
significant increase in both output and hours in Canada in response to a U.S. permanent
technology shocks identified from U.S. productivity and hours data in the manufacturing
sector, similar to Corsetti et al. (2008). This result also holds if we use a measure of total
factor productivity from Fernald (2012) for the U.S. instead of labor productivity, or real
exchange rate instead of the terms of trade in the specification. Also, when we use non-
fuel terms of trade in the VAR, we find that this measure of terms of trade exhibit the
same pattern as the standard terms of trade measure, which decreases significantly after a
positive U.S. permanent technology shocks. Besides, real exports and imports of machineries,
automotive and industrial goods in Canada are most affected by this U.S. shock compared
to energy products. This result suggests that the shocks we recover are not oil price shocks6.
Finally, we get the similar response in terms of relative magnitude when we run the same
specification for the U.S. and Mexico.
2.2.3 The U.S. and Canadian Technology Processes
Are the effects of U.S. permanent technology shocks on Canada documented above a product
of technology spillover? One way to empirically diagnose if U.S. and Canadian technology
6Oil price can be an important factor explaining the overall movements of Canadian terms of trade but
not the conditional responses that we focus on.
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shocks are mostly common is to compute the correlation between U.S. and Canadian iden-
tified permanent technology shocks. To this end, we apply the same long run identification
above to Canadian labor productivity growth, hours, consumption and investment growth
rates to extract Canadian permanent technology shocks. The correlation between this identi-
fied shock and that of the U.S. turns out to be negative and insignificant contemporaneously
(-0.07) and only significant and positive at lag six and negative for lag nine7. In other words,
there is little evidence that there is a strong exogenous correlation component in the shock
processes of these two countries in the short run.
Technology can also be spillover directly and gradually if there is some cointegrating
relationship between the U.S. and Canada. To check this possibility, we run cointegration
tests for outputs in both countries. Table 2.2 report the results from the unrestricted coin-
tegration rank test using the trace and maximum eigenvalue methods as Johansen (1991)
with four lags and a constant in the cointegrating vector. The trace statistics are less than
the 5% critical values (15.41 and 3.76, respectively) for both zero and one cointegrating
vector, and similarly, max eigenvalue statistics are less than the 5% critical value. In other
words, there is no strong evidence supporting either cointegration or not between U.S. and
Canadian output.
These results suggest that the strong comovement between the U.S. and Canada in
response to a U.S. technology shock should, to some extent, comes from international goods
and financial trades rather than only correlated shocks. Nevertheless, to quantify how large
the role of spillover is compared with transmission through international trade, we model
below a cointegrating relationship in the technology process and let the data decide how
large the role of this propagation of technology between the U.S. and Canada is.
7The five quarters centered moving average of the U.S. and Canadian shocks are positively but insignifi-
cantly correlated contemporaneously and up to 5 lags (0.10).
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2.3 The Model
This section details our baseline model, which builds on Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992,
1995) models. We treat Canada as a small open economy and the U.S. as a large closed
economy. In other words, Canada plays no role in explaining U.S. aggregate variables. Our
model assumes incomplete financial markets where agents can only trade one-period non-
contingent bonds. The model also includes two other frictions often used in the literature,
namely investment adjustment cost and debt elastic interest rate.
Our main departure from standard international real business cycle models is that we
include three features in the model. These three key features are Jaimovich-Rebelo utility
function, variable capital utilization, and imported intermediate inputs. These features, as
we show later, are key to generating sufficiently strong endogenous transmission of technology
shocks across countries. Moreover, we also show that all three key features are necessary to
deliver substantial transmission through international trade as they interact with each other.
Since U.S. economy is similar to Canada, we describe below the structure of the Canadian
economy. For ease of notation, Canada is denoted as country 1 in the model.
2.3.1 Households















where C1t is consumption , H1t is hours worked and the parameter β ∈ (0, 1) denotes the
subjective discount factor. The subscript 1 denotes country 1, σ is intertemporal elasticity




κ1 X1−κ11t−1 . (2.1)
This preference specification is due to Jaimovich-Rebelo (2009), featuring the parameter κ1
that governs the wealth elasticity of labor supply. This parameter is estimated to understand
the transmission mechanism. When κ1 = 1, the preference is the common CRRA utility
function characterized by King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1988, KPR henceforth). As κ1 → 0, the
utility function becomes linear in consumption and hours worked, which is the Greenwood,
Hercowitz, and Huffman (1988, GHH henceforth) preferences. In that case, there is no wealth
effect on the labor supply decision.
We assume that households can only borrow with one period non-contingent bonds de-
nominated in foreign consumption, BF1t+1, paid with interest rate R
F
1t. To ensure a well-












where RF1t is interest rate which country 1 needs to pay and R
F






is a real foreign asset position where qt is the real exchange rate, which is the
relative price of foreign consumption goods in terms of home consumption goods and the
term Z1t is technology level in country 1. Following Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003) and
























is the steady state value of real foreign asset position.
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Household is assumed to own capital K1t, which evolves over time under the following
law of motion:








where δ is the depreciation rate of capital and It is the gross investment. Following Christiano
et al. (2005), we assume that it is costly to adjust the level of investment for capital, i.e.
S (.) is the adjustment cost satisfying S (µ1) = 0, S
′
(µ1) = 0, S
′′
(µ1) = s1, where µ1 is the















In addition, household has to pay a utilization cost a (u1t) for the intensive use of capital
K1t in terms of consumption unit. The capital utilization, u1t, has an increasing and convex
cost a (u1t) per unit of capital. We adopt a quadratic function for a as follows:




with a11, a21 > 0. The parameter a21 is the sensitivity of the utilization cost to variation in
the rental rate of capital. The parameter a11 governs the steady state level of u1t.













≤ W1tH1t +Rk1t (u1tK1t) +BD1t + qtBF1t − a (u1t)K1t (2.3)
where pIt is the relative price of investment goods in terms of consumption goods. B
D
1t+1 is
the domestic bond with interest rate RDt , W1t is the real wage, and R
k
1t is the real return to
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capital in terms of home consumption goods unit.
Intermediate Good Producer
The intermediate good producer in country 1 specializes in the production of home goods Y Dt
by combining capital service, u1tK1t, labor, H1t, and imported and domestic intermediate





1−α)1−α11−α21 M (M11t,M21t) , (2.4)
where α11 > 0 and α21 > 0 are the shares of domestic and imported intermediate inputs in
gross output, respectively, α (1− α11 − α21) > 0 is the capital share, and M (M11t,M21t) is
the composite of home and imported intermediate good as we assume that the intermediate
good producer uses both its output for intermediate input (M11t) and imported intermediate
input (M21t). Roundabout production is introduced to capture the role of intermediate















The goods produced domestically, Y Dt , can be sold to domestic final good producer to
make domestic consumption goods, DC1t, domestic investment goods, D
I
1t, or be used for
domestic good production, M11t, or sold to foreign producers to make foreign consumption
goods, DC2t, foreign investment goods, D
I
2t, or be used in their production, M12t.
Therefore, the intermediate good producer’s problem is choosing labor, capital service,



















subject to the above production function, where pD1t and p
F
1t are the prices of domestic and
foreign intermediate goods in the domestic market relative to final consumption good price
P1t, which is defined below.
Final Good Producer
The final good producer in the small open economy imports foreign consumption FC1t and
investment F I1t goods from foreign producer at price P
F
1t . The final good producer also buys
domestic consumption DC1t and investment D
I
1t input from the intermediate good producer
at price PD1t . We assume that the law of one price holds.
The final good producer combines the domestic inputs, DC1t, and foreign inputs, F
C
1t to





















where ωC1 > 0 is the home bias parameter for consumption goods, and γ
C
1 is the elasticity
of substitution between home and foreign consumption goods. The final consumption good
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where ωI1 > 0 is the home bias parameter for investment goods and γ
I
1 is the elasticity of
substitution between home and foreign investment goods. Similar to the price of consumption






)1−γI1 + (1− ωI1) (P F1t)1−γI1) 11−γI1
The final good producer then sells consumption C1t and investment I1t to households. The
final good producer’s problem is, then, to choose domestic and foreign inputs to maximize his













)−γC1 C1t, F I1t = (1− ωI1) (pF1tpI1t)−γI1 I1t.
2.3.2 Technology Process
Given our empirical evidence above, we follow Rabanal et al. (2011) and assume that
there is a cointegrating relationship between Canadian and U.S. technology. However, the
difference between our specification and that of Rabanal el al. (2011) is that we allow
for a contemporaneous effect of U.S. shocks on Canada through the correlation of shocks.
Additionally, there is no feedback from Canada to the U.S.. The technology process for
Canada is then described by:
∆ lnZ1t = µ1 + ζ [lnZ2t−1 − lnZ1t−1] + e1t. (2.8)
When technology differential Z2t−1
Z1t−1
is smaller than the long run value, ζ > 0 ensures that
∆ lnZ1t will increase eventually so that we obtain a balanced growth path. Our representa-
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tion implies that ∆ lnZ1t and
Z2t
Z1t
are stationary processes and ζ governs the speed at which
technology ratio Z2t
Z1t
goes back to the long run value.
For the U.S., which is assumed to be closed, the technology growth rate follows an AR(1)
process as follows:
∆ lnZ2t = µ2 + ρ2∆ lnZ2t−1 + e2t. (2.9)











where τ measures the magnitude of impact of shock in the U.S. on Canada. As the purpose
of the paper is to understand U.S. shocks affecting Canada, we ignore the first column of
the matrix A.
2.3.3 Prices and Equilibrium
The optimal conditions for domestic and foreign bond holdings imply an uncovered interest
rate parity condition placing a restriction on the movements of the domestic interest rate.





and we normalize P2t = P
F
2t = 1, then the law of one price dictates that p
F
1t = qt.
With intermediate goods in gross output, we define GDP as gross output subtracting









The model is closed with the demands of home consumption DC2t, investment D
I
2t and
























where ωC2 and ω
I





2 > 0 are the elasticities of substitution between home and foreign country con-
sumption, investment and intermediate goods in the U.S., and C2t, I2t, M22t are consumption,
investment and domestic intermediate inputs in country 2, respectively.







2t +M12t +M11t = Y
D
t (2.14)
C2t + I2t +M22t = Y
F
t . (2.15)
2.4 Understanding the Transmission Mechanism
Before formally estimating the model, we explain in this section how our model can generate
substantial transmission of shocks through international trade. To this end, we first show how
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standard international business cycle models without our three key features fail to explain
the data. Then, we discuss how our three key features help to reconcile the model with the
data.
2.4.1 The Failure of Standard Models
Standard models such as Backus et al. (1994), Corsetti et al. (2008), Burstein et al. (2008)
are not able to generate substantial endogenous transmission in the data. We show that in
these models, a positive technology shock can only generate transmission through interna-
tional trade under unreasonable parameter values. To that end, we analyze a variation of
our model that is similar to standard international business cycle models. More specifically,
we shut down our three key features presented in the baseline model, i.e. household has the
standard King-Plosser-Rebelo preference, there is no variable capacity utilization, and there
is no imported intermediate inputs.
Our analysis focuses on the response of domestic hours as hours play a central role in
the transmission of the foreign shock . In the absence of a change in the level of domestic
technology, increases in output require an increase in hours. To investigate the quantitative
aspects of the model, we log-linearize and combine the following equilibrium conditions on











)γC1 = [ωC1 + (1− ωC1 ) (TOTt)γC1 ]− 1γC1 . (2.18)
Then, the log deviation of hours can be written as a function of the change in the terms of
78










T̂OT t + (1− α) Ẑ1t + αK̂1t
]
(2.19)
This equation allows us to decompose the movement of hours in the domestic economy into
four components: the wealth effect from the change in consumption, the terms of trade effect,
the effect from domestic technology change and the capital accumulation effect. To further
simplify our analysis, we ignore the effect of capital accumulation since it is not quantitatively
important in the short run9. Therefore, when there is no exogenous correlation of technology






To match a 0.5% increase in consumption and a 1% appreciation of the terms of trade found
8To derive this equation, we assume a standard King-Plosser-Rebelo preferences, U (Ct, Ht) =
C1−σt
1−σ V (H)
where V (H) = exp
(





If we assume utility function as in Backus et al. (1994), then U =
(Cµ(1−H)1−µ)
1−σ









T̂OT t + (1− α) Ẑ1t + αK̂1t
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T̂OT t + (1− α) Ẑ1t + αK̂1t
]
9The capital accumulation equation implies that




Ît+j−1 + ...+ (1− δ)j−1 Ît
]




means that it takes approximately 30 periods for capital to increase by 0.5%.
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in VAR, i.e. the terms of trade decreases by 1%, standard models require that ωC1 < 0.5 to
get a positive response of hours. However, ωC1 is interpreted as the home bias parameter,
which is often calibrated using the share of domestic goods in total consumption. In the
case of Canada, ωC1 = 0.9. In other words, standard models without our three key features
cannot generate an increase in hours in Canada under reasonable parameterization. To see
this point in a different way, when we calibrate ωC1 = 0.9 for Canada, the above condition
means hours in Canada can increase only if Ĉ1t < −0.1T̂OTt. From our VAR results, the
increase in consumption is more than 10% of the appreciation in the terms of trade, which
implies that hours decrease.
Our intuition for the above result is through the movements in both labor demand and
the labor supply. In the labor supply side, an appreciation in the terms of trade causes an
increase in consumption, leading to a decline in labor supply due to a strong wealth effect.
In the labor demand side, an appreciation in the terms of trade can shift the labor demand
curve to the extent households import consumption goods. However, this shift in the labor
demand curve is quantitatively small because the share of imported consumption goods is
about 10% of total consumption in Canada. Therefore, in equilibrium, hours in Canada fall.
An important insight that we provide in this paper is that our result above does not
depend on many features that have been highlighted to be important in the previous litera-
ture. For example, v, the labor supply elasticity parameter with respect to real wage under
the assumed utility function, does not play a crucial role in determining the movement of
hours. More importantly, unlike Corsetti et al. (2008) and Enders and Muller (2009) who
emphasize incomplete financial markets as an important feature of the transmission mecha-
nism of technology shocks, we find that market completeness does not alter the relationship
of hours and the terms of trade as shown in equation (19). Additionally, this relationship
does not depend on the elasticity of substitution, γ1 in the sense that given the movements
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of the terms of trade and consumption, the movements of hours are determined regardless
of the elasticity of substitution. The reason we have a different conclusion compared to
Corsetti et al. (2008) or Enders and Muller (2009) is as follows. In Corsetti et al. (2008),
incomplete markets together with a large elasticity of substitution can generate endogenous
transmission because there is a depreciation in the terms of trade for Canada and a decrease
in consumption. However, we observe an increase in consumption and an appreciation in the
terms of trade for Canada in the data, which implies that their mechanism does not work.
The fact that our result does not directly depend on the elasticity of substitution, γ1
also implies that a small elasticity of substitution, as suggested by Burstein et al. (2008),
is not a remedy to generate substantial comovement across countries. In Burstein et al.
(2008), production sharing which can be interpreted as a small elasticity of substitution
can increase the output comovement across countries. However, equation (19) implies that
once we account for the movement of the terms of trade, the relationship between hours
and the terms of trade does not depend on the elasticity of substitution parameter. In
other words, when the elasticity of substitution is small, the model can generate an increase
in hours worked but at the expense of a large appreciation in the terms of trade that are
several times larger than what is observed empirically. Therefore, if we try to match the
joint movements of consumption, hours and the terms of trade, changing the elasticity of
substitution does not work.
Our above analysis shows that standard international business cycle models, and those
with fixes in terms of financial market completeness or elasticity of substitutions across
domestic and foreign goods, are not able to generate strong endogenous transmission through
international trade.
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2.4.2 How Our Model Works
We now discuss how the model with three key features that we propose works. More specifi-
cally, we show that the three key features, Jaimovich-Rebelo preferences, imported interme-
diate inputs and variable capital utilization, interact with each other to generate substantial
endogenous transmission through international trade.
Jaimovich-Rebelo Preferences
Jaimovich-Rebelo preference specification is an important feature to adjust the strength of
the wealth effect on labor supply. Intuitively, one reason for the failure of the standard
models is the strong wealth effect that reduces labor supply. As we show above, since Cana-
dian households become wealthier after a U.S. permanent technology shock, they increase
consumption. This increase in consumption causes hours in Canada to decrease, resulting
in a negative comovement of hours between the two countries. Therefore, unless the shift
in the labor demand curve is sufficiently large, the model requires a small wealth effect on
labor supply so that hours can increase in equilibrium.
To illustrate the intuition above, we analyze the relationship between hours and the terms
of trade assuming that there is no wealth effect on labor supply. To that end, we assume
that κ1 = 0 in our model. Furthermore, we assume that this is the only feature added to










T̂OT t + (1− α) Ẑ1t + αK̂1t
]
. (2.20)
Since consumption does not appear in this equation, Canadian hours can go up without any
change in technology and capital as long as the terms of trade appreciate. In other words,
shutting down wealth effect can help increase endogenous transmission within the model.
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However, the fact that hours increase does not translate to substantial endogenous trans-
mission. To illustrate this point, we calculate the responses of hours when there is a 1%
appreciation in the terms of trade and there is no wealth effect on labor supply. Using the
calibrated parameters for Canada and the U.S. presented in Table 2.3 which we discuss in
the Estimation section, we find that there is only an increase of 0.1% in hours when the








T̂OT t ' −0.1T̂OT t.
We document above that the response of hours is only slightly smaller than that of the terms
of trade, which means that quantitatively a preference specification with no wealth effect
only cannot solve the problem of weak endogenous transmission. The reason is that the
modification of the household preferences prevents labor supply from declining while it has
no effect on the increase in labor demand, which is not sufficiently large. Therefore, this
preference specification which affects the strength of the wealth effect on labor supply is not
sufficient to generate substantial transmission through international trade.
Imported Intermediate Inputs
The second key feature is imported intermediate inputs, whose role is to push labor demand
to respond more strongly to the movement of the relative price of domestic goods. The first







which means that intermediate goods import increases when the relative price becomes
cheaper. Since the marginal product of labor is increasing in imported intermediate goods,
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change in the relative price shifts the labor demand curve. To see this, we combine firms’












1− α11 − α21
]
T̂OT t + (1− α) Ẑ1t + αK̂1t
)
, (2.21)
where we assume again that there is no wealth effect on labor supply for simplicity. Com-





1−α11−α21 . This term reflects the effects of imported intermediate goods on labor
demand.
Quantitatively, imported intermediate inputs can play an important role in generating
substantial increase in hours in Canada. Under the calibrated parameters for Canada, hours
would increase up to 0.26% with imported intermediate inputs in response to a 1% apprecia-
tion in the terms of trade, compared to 0.1% without imported intermediate inputs. In other
words, the presence of imported intermediate goods can more than doubles the response of
hours to the terms of trade.
Variable Capacity Utilization
The third key feature of the model, variable capacity utilization, is important as it amplifies
the effects of both direct and indirect effects of the change in the terms of trade on hours
worked. To see this, the first order condition describing the relationship between hours and
utilization and the domestic goods prices, assuming again that there is no wealth effect on










implies that an increase in utilization shifts the labor demand curve and increases hours.












which implies that utilization is an increasing function in hours given the level of capital and
technology. In other words, utilization moves in the same direction as hours, and thereby
amplifies the effects of other factors on hours10.
To gauge how large the amplification of variable capital utilization can have on hours in
Canada, we calculate the magnitude of the responses of hours to a 1% increase in the terms






= 0.08, i.e. there is a high elasticity of utilization with respect
























 Ĥ1t = − (1− ωC1 ) T̂OT t + ...,
where “...” stands for the terms for technology and capital accumulation, we find that
hours would increase by 0.23% compared to 0.1% without utilization. This simple exercise
demonstrates that utilization can be an important factor as it helps to double the response
of hours to the movements of the terms of trade.
Our simple exercises above also show that one or two features only is not capable of
generating substantial transmission through international trade. In fact, we need all three
of them as they interact with each other to generate about 0.62% increase in hours worked
10With a different utilization cost specification such as Kt+1 = (1− δ (ut))Kt + It, as in Schmitt-Grohé
and Uribe (2012), the amplification effect of utilization may be weaker. The reason is that the value of
capital can increase, which increases the cost of utilization and reduces the response of utilization.
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in Canada for a 1% appreciation in the terms of trade, which is similar to what we find in
the data. Nevertheless, we let the data speak by formally estimating the model in the next
section.
2.5 Estimation
This section quantitatively evaluates the ability of our model to generate substantial trans-
mission through international trade. To that end, we first explain our estimation method,
then present the main results of the paper. More specifically, we show that our model matches
over 90% of the VAR evidence presented above. In contrast, without our three key features,
the model can match less than 10% of the movements in Canadian variables. Furthermore,
we demonstrate that all three key features are necessary to replicate the empirical evidence
we documented in the VAR.
2.5.1 Estimation Method
There are two groups of parameters in the model. We calibrate the first group of parameters
which are related to the steady state and commonly used in the literature. The rest of the
parameters are estimated using quasi-Bayesian estimation methods.
Calibration
Table 2.3 displays our calibrated parameters. Many of these parameters are taken from
previous studies. For example, we set the relative risk aversion parameter, σ, to be 2, which
is standard in the business cycle literature such as Backus et al. (1994), Heathcote and Perri
(2000) and Garcia-cicco et al. (2010). The capital share is set to be 0.36. The depreciation
rate, δ0, is assumed to be 0.025, which means that about 10% of capital depreciates annually.
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The debt elastic interest parameter is set to a small number 0.001 to induce stationarity as
in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003). Following Garcia-Cicco et al. (2010), we set v to be
1.6, which is related to the Frisch elasticity when κ = 0.
Other calibrated parameters related to the steady states are based on the actual U.S.
and Canadian data. We set the steady state growth rates of output, µ1 and µ2, for both
the U.S. and Canada to be 0.34% per quarter using average output growth rates of the two
countries between 1973Q1 and 2012Q3. In the production side, using the 2011 I-O table
of the U.S., we set α22 to be equal to the share of the intermediate input in gross output
which is 0.42. The rest of the parameters for the U.S. governing home bias for consumption
and investment, ωC2 , ω
I
2 , and imported intermediate, α12, are set to target the following
statistics: the export share in total GDP in Canada, which is averaged to be 0.31 during the
1973Q1-2012Q3 period, consumption goods share in total export, investment goods share
in total export and intermediate goods share in total export to be 0.21, 0.12, and 0.67,
respectively. These shares are calculated using the annual Canadian trade data between
1980 and 2011, and assuming the primary good is used as intermediate goods. Similarly,
we set the parameters for Canada governing home bias for consumption and investment
goods, ωC1 , ω
I
1 , and imported intermediate share in the production function, α21, to target
the followings: the average import share in total Canadian GDP to be 0.29, the consumption
goods, investment goods and intermediate goods share in total import to be 0.25, 0.19, and
0.56, respectively. In the end, the imported intermediate share in Canadian production
function, α21, is 0.076.
Finally, in our baseline estimation, we shut down the exogenous correlation in the tech-
nology processes for both countries by setting τ = 0 and ζ = 0.001, although we also estimate
these parameters in the robustness section.
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Quasi-Bayesian Estimation Method










2 to keep the estimation
tractable. The rest of the parameters including elasticities of substitution between home and
foreign goods in both countries, investment adjustment cost, cost of utilization, wealth elas-








, κi, ρ22, σ2, φ
D
)
for i = {1, 2}, are estimated by minimizing a measure of the distance between the model
and empirical impulse responses. Let IR (Θ) denote the theoretical impulse responses given
the estimated parameters Θ and calibrated parameters Θ−1, and ÎR is the corresponding
empirical impulse responses. Since the technology process is fairly persistent and including
long periods helps to identify parameters, we include the first 30 periods of each response
function. To identify U.S. parameter block including its technology process and demand
for Canadian goods, we include in the empirical ÎR the impulse response functions of U.S.
output, consumption, investment and hours. The empirical ÎR also includes the responses of
Canadian output, consumption, investment, hours, net export to output ratio and the terms
of trade for the Canadian block. The results reported below do not change if we include real











Here, V is a diagonal matrix with the inverse of sample variance of ÎR’s along the diagonal.
With this choice of V , Θ is chosen so that IR (Θ|Θ−1) lies as much as possible within
confidence interval plotted in Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3. For practical implementation,
we use quasi-Bayesian estimator proposed in Chernozhukov and Hong (2003) to estimate
and construct confidence intervals for the parameters. This procedure treats the objective




This section presents the main estimation results of our paper. The estimated baseline
model can match over 90% of the empirical responses while without our three key features,
the estimated model can explain less than 10% of the empirical responses of Canada.
The Baseline Model
We first discuss our baseline model results in terms of the estimated parameters and matching
the empirical impulse responses. The first column in Table 2.4 presents the estimates of our
baseline model, which includes our three key features without exogenous technology shock
correlation. An important parameter in our three key features, Jaimovich-Rebelo preference
parameter, κ1, which governs the wealth elasticity of labor supply, is estimated tightly around
0.03. This estimate implies a low short run wealth elasticity of labor supply, consistent with
our analysis above. Our paper is the first to provide the evidence for weak wealth effects in
labor supply as previous papers in the open economy models such as Schmitt-Grohé (1998),
Garcia-Cicco et al. (2010), Raffo (2009) among others often assume no wealth effects on labor
supply. The second important feature of the model, the elasticity of utilization adjustment,
is estimated to be small, 0.07, which means that the cost of changing utilization is low, firms
can easily change the level of utilized capital. We later show that this result is consistent
with how utilization data in Canada changes in response to a U.S. technology shock.
The elasticity of substitution parameter is tightly estimated to be around 0.4, implying a
strong complementarity between U.S. and Canadian goods. The low value of the elasticity of
substitution is consistent with the estimates in previous papers such as Corsetti et al. (2008)
and Enders and Mullers (2009), which focus on the effects of U.S. productivity shocks on
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U.S. real exchange rate, or Justiniano and Preston (2010) which estimate a model for the
Canadian and US economyusing full information estimation. Two other parameters that
we estimate are investment adjustment cost and debt elastic interest rate parameters. The
investment adjustment cost is estimated to be about 5. We explore in the robustness section
how much our results are driven by this adjustment cost. The debt elastic parameter affecting
the interest rate that Canadian households face is quite large, 0.73, meaning a 1% change in
net asset positions leads to 0.73% increase in interest rate. This estimate of the debt elastic
interest rate implies that households face some financial frictions as suggested in Garcia-
Cicco et al. (2010), which explains why, as we show below, this parameter matters for the
large response of net exports in Canada.
In terms of model performance, our estimated model can match over 90% of the empirical
responses of Canadian economy observed in the data, on average11. We plot in Figure 2.5
the theoretical responses of Canadian variables in response to a positive U.S. permanent
technology shock occurred in period one calculated at the mean of the posterior draws,
together with the empirical responses from the VAR. Consistent with the data, in response
to a positive U.S. permanent technology shock, Canadian output, consumption, investment
and hours increase and the terms of trade appreciate. In particular, the model can capture the
gradual boom in Canadian economy, which is due to the extremely slow diffusion technology
process and a substantial transmission through international trade As τ is set to be zero and
ζ is close to zero, technology in Canada does not increase. Instead, given the gradual increase
in U.S. economic activities, the strong endogenous transmission mechanism within the model
enables us to replicate the substantial increase in both hours and output in Canada in the
short run within five to ten quarters. Consistent with our analysis, when there is a positive
11Specifically, for each point, we compute the absolute distance between the empirical and theoretical
impulse responses divided by the empirical impulse responses and take average.
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U.S. permanent technology shock, U.S. goods are more abundant, causing Canadian terms
of trade to appreciate. As a result, even though technology in Canada does not increase, the
strong increase in labor demand in Canada and a weak wealth effects on the labor supply
lead to a substantial increase in hours in equilibrium. Since hours increase, output in Canada
can increase. Investment also increases because of the complementarity between hours and
capital. In the end, the model can account for over 90% of the movements of macroeconomic
activities in Canada, in contrast with the negative results in previous studies such as Schmitt-
Grohé (1998) and Justiniano and Preston (2010) to explain the transmission of US shocks
across countries. This result demonstrates that international real business cycle models with
our three key features changing both the production side and household preferences can
generate substantial transmission through international trade, consistent with the empirical
evidence.
The natural question is, then, if our estimated three key features are consistent with
the data. To that end, we plot in Figure 2.6 the dynamic responses of Canadian capacity
utilization, real wages to a positive U.S. permanent technology shock implied by the model
alongside with their empirical counterparts. First, the estimated model matches the empirical
responses of real wage in Canada to U.S. permanent technology shocks in the short run. We
measure real wages as total wage and compensation deflated by CPI between 1981Q1 and
2012Q3. The reason we pay attention to real wage is that real wage is informative about the
relative role of labor supply and demand. For example, if there is a large negative wealth
effect on labor supply, and labor demand shifts sufficiently to increase hours in equilibrium,
we should observe a large increase in real wage. On the other hand, if the labor supply
curve is flat and the wealth effect is small, and the demand curve shifts to increase hours, we
should observe a small increase in real wage. Empirically, real wage does not move much in
the short run and increases significantly in the long run, which is consistent with our results
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as in our estimated model in the short run, the shift in labor demand dominates and real
wage does not increase substantially. In terms of magnitude, the real wage movements in
our model are smaller than the large increase in real wage after five quarters. Nevertheless,
this evidence suggests that the low wealth effect on labor supply feature of our estimated
model is consistent with the data in the short run.
Second, our estimated model also does not overpredict the role of capacity utilization.
To see this, we plot the theoretical impulse responses of capacity utilization together with its
empirical counterparts, constructed from a measure of capital utilization from the Canadian
Statistics and Bank of Canada between 1973Q1 and 2012Q3. There is a clear consistency in
direction between the model and the data even though the model implies a smaller response of
capacity utilization. As variable capacity utilization is one of the key features of our model,
this result, if anything, indicates that we understate the importance of variable capacity
utilization.
To further assess the performance of the model, we examine the responses of real exports
and real imports implied by the model against their empirical counterparts. As plotted in
Figure 2.6, the model correctly predicts that both real exports and real imports increase after
a U.S. permanent technology shock. The magnitudes of both real exports and real imports
are slightly lower than the empirical counterparts. A possible reason for a smaller increase in
real exports is that our model abstracts from vertical production sharing, which differs from
imported intermediate input in the sense that some Canadian exports which include imports
from the U.S. are only consumed in the U.S.. When a good U.S. shock happens, the volume
of trade are magnified with the vertical production sharing, so the responses of gross real
exports can be larger than our baseline model. Nevertheless, imported intermediate inputs
help the model to generate substantial increase in both exports and imports, consistent with
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the data12.
The estimation results demonstrate that our model is capable of generating substantial
transmission through international trade. Furthermore, we document additional evidence
which suggests that our mechanism is consistent with the observed behaviors of the data in
Canada.
The Model Without our Three Key Features
To show that our three key features are central to endogenous transmission through interna-
tional trade, we show that the estimated model without our three key features cannot gener-
ate substantial endogenous transmission and fails to account for the responses of Canadian
economy observed in the data. To that end, we modify the baseline model as follows: house-
hold preferences are the standard King-Plosser-Rebelo preferences by setting κ1 = 1, there is
no variable capacity utilization, and there is no imported intermediate input. We re-estimate
this model using the same method as in the baseline model. The number of parameters es-
timated in this case is two parameters fewer than the baseline model: Jaimovich-Rebelo







The estimated parameters along with its confidence intervals are displayed in Column 3
of Table 2.4. Compared to the baseline model, the elasticity of substitution is larger, 0.79,
but is still smaller than one, suggesting that U.S. and Canadian goods are complements. The
other parameters, investment adjustment cost and debt elastic parameter, are much different
12 We also examine the movement of real interest rate in Canada, which is a possible mechanism through
which the model generates endogenous transmission. For example, Hernandez and Leblebicioglu (2012)
highlight the change in interest rate though working capital channel amplifies the effects of U.S. shocks to
Mexico. However, we find that in the context of Canada and the U.S., conditional on permanent technology
shocks, the movement of real interest rate is very small, casting doubt on the role of interest rate in generating
endogenous transmission. In fact, when we add working capital requirement for wage payment as in Neumeyer
and Perri (2005), endogenous transmission generated by working capital is negligible and the performance
of the model is quantitatively similar to our baseline model.
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from those estimated in the baseline model, although we show later that these features do
not affect our results.
To assess the performance of the model, we plot in Figure 2.7 the impulse responses
implied by this estimated model along with the empirical responses of the macroeconomic
variables in Canada. Clearly, the model without our three key features is unable to capture
the dynamic responses of output and hours as well as other aspects of the data such as
consumption and investment. In fact, only about 10% of the Canadian responses observed in
the data can be accounted for by this model. Although the model predicts a gradual increase
in Canadian economic activities because of the small cointegrating technology process, the
magnitude of the increase is much smaller than observed in the data. Since the model tries
to match not only output, hours, consumption but also the terms of trade, the estimated
model overpredicts the magnitude of the appreciation of the terms of trade in order to have
hours to increase. Nevertheless, with the strong wealth effect as the model tries to match
consumption behavior, hours decrease on impact and increase only slightly in the longer
run, consistent with our analysis above. Without much change in hours, output in Canada
cannot increase. In other words, without our three key features, the model cannot generate
substantial endogenous transmission.
2.6 Understanding the Features of the Model Quanti-
tatively
This section analyzes quantitatively the key features of the baseline model which can help
the model to generate substantial endogenous transmission. More specifically, we show that
all three key features in the model interacting with each other are necessary for the model’s
success. Furthermore, other features often used in the open economy literature such as
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investment adjustment cost and debt elastic interest rate are not essential to the model’s
success.
2.6.1 The Three Key Features
We first estimate variants of the baseline model where we keep only one of the three key
features with a maintained assumption that there is no exogenous technological spillover,
and find that these models cannot quantitatively generate sufficient endogenous transmission.
More specifically, we plot in Figure 2.8 the three variants of the baseline model: (i) with only
Jaimovich-Rebelo preferences and without variable capital utilization and imported interme-
diate inputs, “JR”, (ii) with only variable capacity utilization and without Jaimovich-Rebelo
preferences and imported intermediate inputs, “utilization”, and (iii) with only imported in-
termediate inputs and without variable capital utilization and Jaimovich-Rebelo preferences,
“intermediate”. To see how keeping one feature helps to generate endogenous transmission
compared to standard models , we also plot in the same figure the case when there is none
of the three frictions, “w/o all three”. None of the variants can generate the substantial
increase in output and hours in Canada although these models do a better job at match-
ing consumption and investment. In the case with only Jaimovich-Rebelo preferences, we
find that the estimated wealth effect is close to zero. However, consistent with our intuition
above, even in the absence of wealth effect, the movements of the terms of trade are too small
to generate a substantial increase in hours. As a result, the “JR” variant of the baseline
model exaggerates the appreciation of the terms of trade but still falls short in explaining
the movement of hours and output in Canada. Similarly, both the model with only variable
capacity utilization and the model with only imported intermediate inputs also fall short in
explaining the movements of output and hours in Canada while trying to match the terms
of trade and other variables. Overall, these variants of the baseline model do not improve
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the match of the baseline model without three key features, “w/o all three”.
We explain the intuition for the results above as follows. The estimation tries to fit
not only hours and output in Canada but also the terms of trade and consumption. These
models can match the movements of output and hours if the terms of trade appreciate more.
Therefore, the terms of trade are predicted to appreciate more than observed in the data in
all cases. Nevertheless, since the estimation procedure also tries to fit the terms of trade, this
appreciation cannot be large enough to fit output and hours. Moreover, without Jaimovich-
Rebelo preferences, the estimation faces a trade off between an increase of consumption and
hours. If the model fits an increase of consumption, it implies a large negative wealth effect
on labor supply, leading to a smaller increase in hours. Therefore, the estimation tends to
underpredict the increase of consumption to generate a larger increase in hours. On top
of these problems, investment is underpredicted in the case “utilization”, i.e. the standard
model with only variable capital utilization. One reason is that the return to investment,
which is related with the expected marginal product of capital, does not increase sufficiently
in the model since hours do not increase sufficiently. If hours increase more, marginal product
of capital can increase and so can investment. In other words, the match of investment is
related with the match of hours. Additionally, in all cases, the model cannot account for the
large increase in Canadian net export over output ratio. The intuition for this result is the
fact that output does not increase much to give an incentive for households to save more.
Therefore, this problem is also related with the problem of hours.
Another way of showing how our three key features are crucial in generating substantial
endogenous transmission is to look at the behavior of the baseline model with two features
only. We plot in Figure 2.9 the three cases when one of the features is shut down from
the estimated baseline model, keeping other estimated parameters. When we shut down
Jaimovich-Rebelo preferences, the model predicts much smaller responses of the output and
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hours. As explained above, this is because of the strong wealth effect associated with King-
Plosser-Rebelo preferences. Without variable capital utilization, the model actually predict
larger movements of output and hours than the data. However, the reason for such large
change in hours is that the model also predicts too large an appreciation of the terms of
trade. Lastly, without imported intermediate goods inputs, the model also cannot match
the large movements of output and hours, consistent with the role of imported intermediate
goods discussed above.
These exercises demonstrate that all of three key features are important for the model to
generate substantial endogenous transmission, which comes from the movements of hours.
More generally, we argue that we need to consider features that affect the labor demand
and supply conditions to be able to generate strong endogenous transmission. For the labor
supply side, we need features that prevent labor supply to decrease sharply. It can be other
features such as real wage rigidity, in which households need to supply labor given a fixed
real wage. For the labor demand side, we need frictions which increase demand sufficiently.
It can also be time varying countercyclical markup such as deep habit mechanism. Judging
the relative importance of those frictions requires additional data and is beyond the scope
of this paper. We argue that between Canada and the U.S. our features are sufficient to
explain the observed transmission of U.S. permanent technology shocks, and are supported
by both empirical and theoretical grounds.
2.6.2 Other Features
Our baseline model also departs from the plain vanilla international business cycle models by
having investment adjustment cost, which is often used in the literature such as Christiano
et al. (2005), or the debt elastic interest rate in the small open economy literature such
as Garcia-cicco et al. (2010). We show that the model’s ability to generate substantial
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endogenous transmission does not depend on these two features.
Since investment adjustment cost is estimated to be large in the baseline model, we
examine how shutting down this investment adjustment cost affects our results to examine
its role in generating substantial endogenous transmission. To that end, we estimate a
version of the baseline model where there is no investment adjustment cost, i.e. s1 = 0.
The theoretical responses of the estimated model are plotted in Figure 2.10. We find that
investment still increases, so do consumption and output. Other responses also match up to
90% of the empirical impulse responses. In other words, the role of investment adjustment
cost is negligible in generating endogenous transmission. Investment adjustment cost reduces
the volatility of investment, but does not stop the outflow of investment from Canada to
the U.S.. The reason for the right response of investment is the increase in hours. With the
three key features in the model, hours can increase, causing marginal product of capital to
increase, leading to an increase in investment. In the baseline model, when we set s1 = 0,
i.e. there is no investment adjustment cost, investment would increase too large relatively
to the data so the estimated utilization cost turns out to be larger than the baseline model.
Second, although our baseline model estimates the debt elastic parameter, φD to be
large, this result is not crucial for the model to generate substantial movements of output
and hours in Canada. In our model, the debt elastic interest rate reflects the financial
friction that households face in international borrowing and lending. Our baseline model
estimates that this debt elastic parameter, φD, is large, implying that there is a high cost of
borrowing or lending internationally for Canadian households. Nevertheless, this parameter
turns out to be not important in explaining the observed responses of output and hours in
Canada. When we re-estimate the model with φD being set to be small, 0.001, as plotted
Figure 2.10, this version of the baseline model can still match most of the empirical impulse
responses of Canada. The exception is the net exports in Canada, which is lower than the
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empirical response. Therefore, we conclude that φD is not important to generate endogenous
transmission in the model but has a role in explaining the movement of net exports.
Finally, although not shown here, the model with neither investment adjustment cost nor
high debt elastic interest rate can still match the effects of U.S. permanent technology shocks
on Canada. In other words, the success of our model only depends on the three key features
which directly affect the responsiveness of the labor market to changes in international
relative prices.
2.7 Robustness
Since the observed boom in Canada after a positive U.S. technology shock may be due to
an exogenous correlation of technology shocks between the U.S. and Canada, we let the
data speak by estimating a version of the baseline model where the exogenous correlation
of technology, “baseline with correlation,” is estimated. The estimated parameters of this
version of the baseline model are presented in the second column in Table 2.4. Notice that
the estimated parameters of this model are similar to those of the baseline model. In fact,
the estimated direct technology correlation τ is 0.10, but its 90% confidence interval includes
zero, which means that the shocks are not strongly correlated. Moreover, the cointegration
parameter, ζ, is estimated to be close to 0.
As the estimated parameters are similar between the baseline model with correlation
and the baseline model, the estimated baseline model with exogenous correlation of technol-
ogy shocks matches the empirical responses similar to the baseline model estimated without
exogenous correlation, as plotted in Figure 2.11. In particular, the baseline model with cor-
relation can also replicate the gradual responses of the Canadian economy, and on average
match over 90% of the empirical responses. Shutting down exogenous correlation of technol-
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ogy while keeping the other estimated parameters, we find that the match of the model does
not deteriorate. This result suggests that the data assign a negligible role to the exogenous
correlation of technology shocks and a larger role for the endogenous transmission, which is
consistent with the empirical evidence in the VAR presented above.
Finally, to further illustrate that exogenous correlation of technology shocks cannot help
the model without our three key features to match the data, we re-estimate the model without
our three key features allowing for exogenously correlated technology shock. As shown in the
last column of Table 2.4, the estimated parameter for the cointegrating process, ζ, is 0.92
and that for the contemporaneous correlation of shock, τ , is 0.75, both of which are large and
significant. In other words, the estimation prefers exogenous correlation in order to explain
the large responses of output. However, as shown in Figure 2.12, even though the strong
exogenous correlation of technology shocks helps output in Canada to increase, the responses
of hours are still much smaller than the empirical counterpart. This result demonstrates two
points. First, when the model is not able to generate substantial endogenous transmission,
the estimation requires a strong exogenous correlation of technology shocks in order to
replicate the data. Second, exogenous correlation by itself is not a panacea to comovement
pattern in the data if we take into account not only output but also hours and the terms of
trade.
2.8 Extension: Model with Nominal Rigidities
We now show that our three key features also help international business cycle models
with nominal rigidities, or the New Open Economy Macroeconomic (NOEM) models to
generate substantial transmission through international trade. More specifically, we discuss
how NOEM models can potentially generate transmission through international trade but
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fail when confronted with the data. Once we add our three key features into international
business cycle models with nominal rigidities, we can explain the data.
To that end, we introduce nominal rigidities in the form of sticky price into our baseline
model. To simplify our exposition, we only explain the structure of country 1 that is different
from the baseline model. Country 2 is simply the closed economy version of country 1. The
final good producers combine a continuum of intermediate goods Y1t (j) where j ∈ [0, 1] to









where ηp is the price markup in the steady state. The intermediate good producers are
monopolistic firms who produce differentiated intermediate goods Y1t(j) using the production
function of the following form:
Y1t (j) ≤ (u1t (j)K1t (j))α (Z1tH1t (j))1−α − FC1t, (2.24)
where FC1t is the fixed cost included to have zero profits in the steady state. We assume that
the intermediate goods firms can change the price with a fixed probability θ1p as in Calvo
(1983) in every period. Lastly, we assume that monetary policy is conducted according to
the Taylor-type rule of the form:
lnRDt = ρR lnR
D
t−1 + (1− ρR)
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where RDss is the steady state level of nominal interest rate, π
∗
1 is the steady state level of
inflation and ∆Y1t is the growth rate of output and ∆Y1ss is the steady state level of ∆Y1t.
In theory, without our three key features, NOEM models can generate endogenous trans-
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mission. To see this, we look at the labor supply and labor demand conditions:






where µpt is the price markup in country 1. Compared to the standard international real
business cycle models without our three key features, this model has the price markup term
appearing in the labor demand condition. Therefore, even though in response to a U.S.
technology shocks, with a positive wealth effect, labor supply decreases in Canada, hours
worked in Canada can still increase if the price markup decreases substantially, implying
that the movements of markup are crucial for this mechanism to work.
To understand how much markup can help standard NOEM models without our three key
features to generate endogenous transmission, we examine how Canadian markup responds
to a U.S. technology shocks. To that end, we document the responses of inflation in Canada.
The reason to use inflation is that the Phillips curve, given by
π1t = βEtπ1t+1 − λpµpt , (2.26)
where π1t is the inflation rate of country 1 at time t, dictates the relationship between the
price markup and inflation. In other words, one can look at how inflation in Canada responds
to a U.S. technology shock to infer the strength of the markup channel to generate endogenous
transmission. Therefore, we augment the baseline VAR specification with inflation and
nominal interest rate in both the U.S. and Canada. We plot the responses of Canadian
inflation as well as other variables in Figure 2.13. Compared to the baseline VAR, this VAR
specification augmented with inflation and interest rate does not alter the direction or the
relative magnitude of the responses in Canadian economy. The main result of this extended
VAR is that the responses of inflation are almost zero, suggesting that it is unlikely that
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markup would move enough to generate substantial transmission as observed in the data.
We validate our intuition that the movements of markup are not enough to help standard
NOEM models to reconcile with the data by estimating our NOEM model above without the
three key features. More specifically, we match additionally the theoretical impulse responses
of Canadian inflation and interest rate with their empirical counterparts to estimate the
parameters of the model including the sticky price parameter. The estimation shows that
the data prefer a specification with an unreasonably high price rigidity, i.e. estimated θ1p
is about 0.99. The reason is that the estimation tries to match the movements of both
inflation and hours. Since the model requires a substantial decrease in markup to explain
a large response of hours and inflation decreases slightly in the data, the estimation would
choose prices to be fixed so that markup can move freely. Therefore, when we restrain the
price rigidities, θ1p ≤ 0.75, we find hat the NOEM model without our three key features fails
to match the substantial movements of hours and output in Canada and exaggerating the
movements of the terms of trade, as displayed in Figure 2.14.
Finally, we estimate the NOEM model with our three key features to show that our
mechanism still holds in this case. As plotted in Figure 2.14, the NOEM model with the
three key features can match the data reasonably with estimated nominal price stickiness
θp = 0.71. In particular, the model is able to come close to matching the movements of
hours in Canada, replicate very well the responses of Canadian output while matching the
inflation movements reasonably well. This result highlights the importance of our features
to match the transmission observed in the data.
The final exercise in our extension is to add nominal wage rigidities in the form of sticky
wage into the model. In this case, we also find that our baseline model with both nominal
price and wage rigidities can match the data reasonably with estimated price and wage
stickiness to be around 0.68 and 0.38. Once we shut down our three key features, this model
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would require wage stickiness to be 0.99. Again, this result suggests that our features are
important to match the transmission observed in the data.
Related to the Literature Our extension exercises relate our work with existing work
in the NOEM literature. In particular, we compare our result with Justiniano and Preston
(2010), who estimate a standard NOEM model without capital accumulation using U.S.
and Canadian data and fail to explain the strong transmission of U.S. shocks to Canada.
Although they use full information estimation method and consider overall comovement
rather than conditional comovement, our analysis shed light on why they have a negative
result that U.S. shocks in their estimated model cannot explain Canadian business cycles, in
contrast with the data. Among other possible problems, we find that their lack of the three
key features that we propose makes it hard to generate substantial endogenous transmission
of shocks from the U.S. to Canada. More specifically, they use a standard preference with
a substantial wealth effect, decreases labor supply, and without variable capital utilization
and imported intermediate inputs, there is no strong reason for labor demand to increase.
Although their NOEM model includes nominal rigidities in the form of sticky price and wage
but as we argue above, markup movements associated with these frictions do not necessarily
generate large endogenous transmission when trying to match with the data such as the
dynamic of inflation and real wage. Therefore, it is possible that their model cannot explain
strong comovement between these two countries.
2.9 Conclusion
This paper examines the transmission mechanism of technology shocks across countries. We
show that the nature of such transmission depends fundamentally on the features that deter-
mine the responsiveness of labor supply and labor demand to international relative price. We
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augment a standard real international business cycle model with three key features that can
generate substantial endogenous transmission. The three key features are a preference spec-
ification which controls for the wealth elasticity of labor supply, variable capacity utilization
and imported intermediate inputs. Estimating this model using the data for Canada and
the U.S. between 1973Q1 and 2012Q3, we show that it can explain over 90% of the observed
effects of permanent U.S. technology shocks on Canadian output and hours. We find that
endogenous transmission explains the majority of the observed comovement conditional on
permanent U.S. technology shocks while exogenous correlation of technology shocks is not
important. Our estimation further suggests that we need all three key features for the suc-
cess of the model in replicating the data. We extend the model to include nominal rigidities
and show that our insights also carry over to this setting.
Despite our initial success on matching conditional comvement, much work can be done
in the international business cycle area. An interesting application of our mechanism is
to use the proposed model to resolve the trade-comovement puzzle documented in Kose et
al. (2006), as we suggest that our mechanism generates substantial comovement through
international trade alone. Another extension of this paper is to investigate if there is any
different transmission mechanism of other foreign shocks such as government spending or oil
price shocks. Finally, future work can focus on the ability of the model to quantitatively
account for the overall comovements across countries taking into account the movements of
international relative prices such as the terms of trade.
2.10 Tables and Figures
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2 quarters ahead 4 quarters ahead 8 quarters ahead 20 quarters ahead
Output 0.12 0.23 0.39 0.52
Consumption 0.08 0.16 0.26 0.35
Investment 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.14
Hours 0.05 0.15 0.24 0.34
Net exports to output 0.04 0.07 0.23 0.4
Terms of trade 0.03 0.08 0.14 0.19
Real exports 0.18 0.27 0.48 0.57
Real imports 0.11 0.23 0.34 0.42
Table 2.1: Forecast variance decomposition of Canadian variables conditional on the U.S. permanent
technology shock
Number of vectors Eigenvalue Trace 5% critical value Max-Eigenvalue 5% critical value
0 5.72 15.41 5.43 14.07
1 0.1 0.28 3.76 0.28 3.76
Table 2.2: Cointegration statistics: Johansen’s test for output
Parameter Value References
β discount parameter 0.99
σ risk aversion 2 Heathcote and Perri (2002)
v governing Frisch elasticity 1.6 Garcia-Cicco et. al. (2010)
α capital share 0.36 Backus et. al. (1992)
δ depreciation rate of capital 0.025 Backus et. al. (1992)
µ1 steady state output growth in Canada 1.0034 average Canadian data
µ2 steady state output growth in the U.S. 1.0034 average U.S. data
α11 Canadian intermediate share 0.45 Canadian I-O table 2009
α21 Canadian imported intermediate share 0.076 Canadian I-O table 2009
α22 U.S. intermediate share 0.42 U.S. I-O table 2011








Table 2.3: Calibrated parameters
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Parameter Baseline Baseline W/o 3 key W/o 3 key
w/ correlation features features w/ correlation
Canada block
γ Elasticity of substitution 0.40 0.39 0.79 0.65
(0.36,0.44) (0.35,0.44) (0.75,0.83) (0.62,0.69)
s1 Investment adjustment cost 5.07 5.08 1.37 8.00
(1.32,9.08) (1.24,9.07) (0.19,4.18) (5.15,9.79)
κ1 Jaimovich-Rebelo parameter 0.03 0.04
(0.03,0.04) (0.03,0.05)
(a1/a2)1 Utilization cost elasticity 0.07 0.08
(0.02,0.15) (0.02,0.17)
φD debt elastic 0.73 0.75 0.03 0.00
(0.41,0.97) (0.47,0.97) (0.00,0.10) (0.00,0.01)
Shock processes
ρ2 Autoregressive for U.S. technology 0.79 0.79 0.77 0.71
(0.75,0.82) (0.76,0.83) (0.73,0.80) (0.67,0.75)
σ2 Standard deviation of U.S. shock 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.21
(0.14,0.20) (0.14,0.19) (0.15,0.21) (0.19,0.24)
τ Direct technology correlation 0.10 0.75
(-0.18,0.37) (0.51,0.94)
ζ Cointegration parameter 0.00 0.92
(0.00,0.01) (0.80,0.99)
U.S. block
s2 Investment adjustment cost 2.24 2.06 8.04 1.34
(0.84,4.33) (0.71,3.91) (5.49,9.77) (0.11,3.32)
κ2 Jaimovich-Rebelo parameter 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
(0.02,0.04) (0.02,0.03) (0.02,0.03) (0.02,0.03)
(a1/a2)2 Utilization elasticity 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.27
(0.02,0.27) (0.02,0.24) (0.02,0.21) (0.16,0.40)
Table 2.4: Estimated parameters for the baseline model with and without correlation of tech-
nology shocks, for the simplified model with and without correlation of technology shocks. The
numbers in parentheses are the 5−95% confidence intervals calculated from the quasi-Bayesian
estimation.
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(a) Plain vanilla case
(b) With three key features
Figure 2.1: Intuition for why model generates endogenous transmission
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Figure 2.2: Responses of the U.S. output, consumption, investment and hours to the U.S. technology
shock occurring in period one. Lines with plus sign is the point estimate and the shaded areas are























































































































































Figure 2.4: Relative magnitude of the responses of Canadian economy to the U.S.
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Figure 2.5: The theoretical impulse responses of Canadian economy to a positive U.S. shock. Lines
with plus sign is the point estimate and the shaded areas are the 95% confidence intervals. Lines
with square sign is theoretical responses of the baseline model.
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Figure 2.6: The theoretical impulse responses of additional variables for Canadian economy to a
positive U.S. shock. Lines with plus sign is the point estimate and the shaded areas are the 95%
confidence intervals. Lines with square sign is theoretical responses of the baseline model.
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Figure 2.7: The theoretical impulse responses of Canadian economy to a positive U.S. shock in the
baseline model without our three key features. Lines with plus sign is the point estimate and the
shaded areas are the 95% confidence intervals. Lines with squared sign is the theoretical responses


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2.10: Robustness of the results when the baseline model has no investment adjustment cost,
debt elastic interest rate. Lines with plus sign is the point estimate and the shaded areas are the
95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 2.11: The theoretical impulse responses of the baseline model with exogenous correlation of
technology shocks to a positive U.S. shocks. Lines with plus sign is the point estimate and the
shaded areas are the 95% confidence intervals. Lines with squared sign is theoretical responses from
baseline model.
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Figure 2.12: The theoretical impulse responses of the baseline model without our three key features
with exogenous correlation of technology shocks to a positive U.S. shocks. Lines with plus sign is
the point estimate and the shaded areas are the 95% confidence intervals. Lines with squared sign
is theoretical responses from baseline model.
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Figure 2.13: The theoretical impulse responses of the NOEM model without our three key features
as we restrict the degree of price stickiness to be less than 0.75. Lines with plus sign is the point
estimate and the shaded areas are the 95% confidence intervals. Lines with squared sign is theoretical
responses from baseline model.
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Figure 2.14: The theoretical impulse responses of the NOEM model with our three key features. Lines
with plus sign is the point estimate and the shaded areas are the 95% confidence intervals. Lines
with squared sign is theoretical responses from baseline model.
Chapter 3
News Shocks in Business Cycles:
Evidence from Forecast Data
Wataru Miyamoto and Thuy Lan Nguyen
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3.1 Introduction
A large recent literature starting from Beaudry and Portier (2006) has focused on news
shocks as the main driver of business cycles. News shocks in this literature are defined
as information about changes in future fundamentals that does not affect current funda-
mentals. When agents learn that there will be changes in exogenous fundamentals in the
future, they change their current behavior, causing economic fluctuations today which in turn
are observed in realized data. Therefore, the literature on news shocks has used standard
macroeconomic realized data such as output and consumption to make inference about news
shocks. However, since news shocks can only affect current outcomes through expectations,
data on expectations should be useful in understanding the role of news shocks.
To illustrate how data on expectations can be informative about the role of news shocks,
we show that news shocks can have strong implications about the movements of expectations
in the model, which are different from the data. Figure 1.1 plots the realized output growth
rate of the US between 1970Q1 and 2006Q4 along with the model-implied expectations of
output in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2012). Estimated with only realized data, the model
implies that news explains about half of the fluctuations in output. As a result, there are
large changes in expectations that resemble the movements of realized output. However,
these movements of the model-implied expectations are significantly different from those of
data on expectations, which are also plotted in Figure 1.1. First, while the model-implied
expectations track the movements of realized output fairly well, data on expectations do
not. For example, in the model, agents could anticipate a year in advance that output would
decline in 2001. However, data on expectations suggest that agents actually expected a
boom. The differences between the model-implied expectations and data on expectations
are also clear in other instances such as the 1981-82 recession. Second, data on expectations
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are generally smoother than the model-implied expectation. Especially after 1985, there are
no drastic movements in data on expectations in contrast to the more substantial changes
in the model-implied expectations.
Motivated by these observations, this paper uses data on expectations to quantify the
role of news shocks in business cycles. More specifically, we estimate a standard real dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium model with Bayesian methods using both realized data and
data on expectations. We use forecast data from the Survey of Professional Forecasters to
measure agents’ expectations in the economy and match them with the corresponding model
concepts.
Our estimation shows that adding data on expectation changes the inference about news
shocks significantly. We find that news shocks explain about 24% of the aggregate fluctua-
tions in output when the estimation includes data on expectations. This estimate is about
half of the estimated contribution of news shocks without data on expectations. Further-
more, this result is robust across a range of model specifications including models with and
without nominal rigidities.
Another important finding of our paper is that the precision of the estimates greatly
improves when using data on expectations, suggesting that data on expectations are useful
in inferring news shocks. Without data on expectations, the contribution of news shocks to
aggregate variables is imprecise. For example, the 95% confidence interval of the share of
the variance of government spending explained by news shocks is between 10% and 90%.
In contrast, estimated with data on expectations, this interval narrows to between 2% and
18%.
The reason for the smaller estimated contribution of news shocks and the substantial
increase in precision is that data on expectations restrict the role of news shocks in driving
business cycle fluctuations. In response to news shocks, the economy responds slowly until
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the shock materializes. Since agents know that the shock will materialize, they can expect
that the largest response of output growth will be when actual changes in fundamentals
materialize. In other words, their expectations about future output growth rate will move.
When we observe data on expectations, we put a restriction on how large the movements of
expectations in the model can be. As data on expectations are generally smooth and do not
resemble realized output much, the estimation with data on expectations attributes a smaller
role to news shocks than the estimation without data on expectations. This restriction is
especially powerful in identifying the types of news shocks that do not create significant
“Pigou cycles”, which are aggregate fluctuations caused by changes in expectations when
shocks have not yet materialized. An example of such news shocks in our model is news
about preference shocks, which only changes expected future output but not current output.
In other words, with these types of news shocks, whether agents know that the shock will
happen in advance or not does not matter for their current behaviors. Therefore, without
data on expectations, it is difficult to distinguish these news shocks from unanticipated
shocks of the same kind, which means estimation results without data on expectations can
be driven by priors. By observing how expectations move in the data, we can separate
unanticipated shocks that change output immediately without changing expectations from
news shocks that only change expectations, which leads to a much more precise estimate of
news shocks.
Although news shocks account for about 24% of output fluctuations in the long run,
news shocks are negligible in explaining the short run fluctuations before actual changes in
fundamentals happen. In the model, there are two types of news shocks: those that create
Pigou cycles and those that do not. News shocks that do not create Pigou cycles cannot
generate substantial fluctuations in the short run. News shocks that generate Pigou cycles
can potentially cause significant short run fluctuations. However, the role of these news
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shocks is quantitatively modest. Therefore, news shocks are not important in explaining
short run fluctuations before the shock materializes, i.e. for horizons up to two years. In
particular, we find that only 10% of the fluctuations of output and 7% of the fluctuations
of hours within two years are explained by news shocks. The rest of the macroeconomic
variations are accounted for by standard macroeconomic unanticipated shocks.
Among different types of news shocks considered, news about demand shocks is close
to zero. For instance, news about preference shocks explain less than 1% of the variations
of output and only 5% of the fluctuations of consumption, and news about government
spending shocks explain less than 6% of the government spending variations. The reason
for such a small contribution of news about demand shocks is because they do not generate
substantial Pigou cycles. When agents receive news that there will be a positive preference
shock in the future, they expect that future output will increase, but their current behaviors
do not change significantly. Therefore, if news about demand shocks were important, we
would observe that expectations of output fluctuate strongly with little change in current
output. However, data on expectations do not exhibit large movements over time, so the
role of news about demand shocks is negligible.
In terms of explaining the post-war business cycles in the U.S., we find that news shocks
can explain to some extent the 1980 recession and the 1993-94 expansion episodes but do not
explain much of other business cycles in our sample, consistent with data on expectations.
In the case of 1980 recession, data on expectations show that agents had information about
the consequences of an oil price increase a year in advance with the Iranian war going on.
Therefore, agents anticipated that output would decline, and output actually declined as
expected. However, for other business cycles in the sample, agents did not change their
expectations much, resulting in news being unimportant.
The results above are robust across model specifications, further suggesting that data
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on expectations have substantial information to help us infer news shocks. In a version of
our model with nominal rigidities, news shocks explain 28% of output fluctuations, similar
to the 24% estimated in the baseline model. This result is consistent with the recent work
by Milani and Rajbhandari (2012). In another variation of the baseline model where we
incorporate a labor adjustment cost to better explain the movement of hours, we also find
that news shocks explain about 25% of the fluctuations in output when we include data on
expectations as additional observables.
Our above insights that given the movements of data on expectations, news shocks are
not the main source of business cycles also carry over to models with imperfect information.
This is important because Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012a, 2012b) emphasize that ratio-
nal expectation imperfect information models may be more appropriate than full information
models in explaining some features of data on expectations such as persistent forecast errors.
However, we argue that whether imperfect information models can fit data on expectations
better, news shocks are unlikely to be a major driver of business cycles. The intuition is
as follows. In imperfect information models, agents receive news about future fundamentals
with a noisy signal. If the signal is accurate, agents recognize that there is a news shock,
then the importance of news shocks would be about the same as in the perfect information
setting, which is our baseline model. When the signal is noisy, agents do not perceive news
shocks accurately, leading to small changes in their expectations. If agents’ expectations do
not change, agents do not change their behaviors until they actually observe the change in
fundamentals. Therefore, news shocks in this case would not be able to generate substantial
Pigou cycles. In other words, there is no good distinction between news shocks and unantic-
ipated shocks, i.e. information about future fundamentals, are not important in explaining
short run fluctuations.
Finally, although we only use data on expectations from the Survey of Professional Fore-
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casters (SPF) in our estimation, we argue that our results can be robust to using other data
on expectations. First, the SPF forecast data are in line with other forecast surveys such as
the Blue Chip, the Consensus Forecast and the Greenbook. Second, the movements of SPF
forecast data on output, which we use in the baseline, are also similar to those of Consumer
Confidence, which conducts a minimum of 500 interviews each time. In other words, the SPF
data can be a proxy for the expectations of agents in the economy. However, since Consumer
Confidence survey does not have an explicit relationship with the defined variables in the
model, we do not use those data for our estimation.
Our paper is directly related to a large literature estimating the roles of news shocks in the
business cycles such as Fujiwara et al. (2010), Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2012) and Khan and
Tsoukalas (2012) which identify the role of news shocks by observing realized macroeconomic
variables. Davis (2007) and Gortz and Tsoukalas (2013) address this question using financial
variables such as corporate bond spreads. Unlike those papers, we propose a new way to
infer news shocks more precisely using data on expectations. Our paper is also connected
with the literature which expands the observation set to more precisely estimate the model.
In particular, Forni et al. (2012) show that news shocks explain less than 25% of output
when including a large number of variables in a FAVAR estimation, which is similar to
our results. We are related to the recent literature incorporating data on expectations in
a structural model. For example, Barsky and Sims (2012) show that consumer confidence
contains news about future fundamentals. Unlike them, we use data on expectations of well-
defined macroeconomic variables to directly map model-implied expectations with the data
to infer the role of news shocks in the economy. Our estimation finds that over 50% of data on
expectations is explained by news shocks, consistent with Barsky and Sims (2012) in the sense
that data on expectations contain news. Other papers such as Del Negro and Schorfheide
(2012) and Del Negro and Eusepi (2012) have incorporated data on expectations in their
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DSGE estimation. However, their models have no news shocks, so they cannot address
the question that we are interested in. Finally, we are also related to the work of Hirose
and Kurozumi (2012) and Milani and Rajbhandari (2012), who use data on expectations
to quantify the role of news shocks. Besides the difference in model specifications as we
use both real DSGE model and model with nominal rigidities while they use model with
nominal rigidities only, we provide insights on how and when data on expectations help to
distinguish news shocks from unanticipated shocks. Furthermore, we explain how our results
can be robust even in an imperfect information setting.
The rest of the paper is organized as followed: Section 2 introduces data on expectations.
In section 3, we describe the full model setup, followed by a discussion of the estimation
methods including priors and observables in Section 4. Section 5 presents the main estimation
results of the model with data on expectations and analyzes how data on expectations help
to identify news shocks. We test the robustness of our results with data on expectations of
different variables and time period in Section 6. We conclude the paper in Section 7.
3.2 Data on Expectations
This section describes data on expectations that we use to estimate a structural model with
news shocks. We make two points about the data. First, these data on expectations are
relatively smooth compared to realized data, and do not track the movements of realized
data well. Second, they reflect what agents know about the current and future states of the
economy.
Our data come from the Survery of Professional Forecaster (SPF) of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Philadelphia. In the second month of every quarter, nine to forty professional
forecasters are asked to report their forecasts up to four quarters ahead for output and other
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macroeconomic variables. This dataset contains the longest possible forecast in quarterly
frequency starting as early as 1968Q4 for output while other surveys such as the Blue Chip,
Consensus or Livingston forecast surveys are either in monthly frequency starting late 1980s
or in semiannual frequency. We use the mean of forecasts across individual forecasters as
our data on expectations.
Data on expectations have two relevant features for our study. First, data on expecta-
tions are smooth relative to realized data, and do not resemble realized data in most of the
sample period. We plot in Figure 1.2 the four-quarter output growth rate together with the
corresponding two- and four-quarter ahead data on expectations, denoted by Ft−2∆ ln yt−4,t
and Ft−4∆ ln yt−4,t, respectively. We observe that the movements of data on expectations,
especially the four-quarter ahead data on expectations, do not exhibit large variations over
time. Even though the two-quarter ahead data on expectations are slightly more volatile
and track realized data better than the four-quarter ahead data on expectations, both are
smoother than realized output. This pattern is clearer when we calculate the standard devi-
ation of quarterly forecast relative to realized data, displayed in Table 1.1. On average, only
5% of the output growth rate fluctuations are anticipated one year in advance. Furthermore,
the correlation of the data on expectations of output and the realized output growth rates
are small.
Second, these data on expectations can represent actual expectations of agents in the
economy. One supporting piece of information is that the SPF data are similar to other
forecast survey data as shown in Figure 1.3 which plots the four-quarter ahead forecast of
the four-quarter growth rate of output from the Blue Chip, the Consensus Forecast and the
Greenbook survey forecast. The SPF forecast data of output growth rate move in a similar
direction and magnitude as other surveys. This pattern is also true for other macroeconomic
variables such as consumption and investment. Since it is possible that these surveys are
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from a small sample of forecasters in the economy, we plot in Figure 1.4 the four-quarter
output growth rate forecast of the SPF survey against a measure of expected changes in
business conditions in the next 12 months taken from the Michigan Survey of Consumer
Confidence. We find that the movements of these two series are similar over time, suggesting
that the SPF forecast data represent what agents expect in the economy.
Nevertheless, there are two major concerns about the forecast data. The first concern
is that data on expectations exhibit persistent forecast errors. The last section of Table
1.1 displays the features of forecast errors within our sample. First, the mean of forecast
errors is insignificant. Second, there is no strong evidence of persistent output forecast
errors. Following Mankiw et al. (2004), we calculate the persistence of forecast errors of
output by regressing forecast errors of output on the forecast errors known at the time agents
make forecast. The coefficients are statistically insignificant, i.e. we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that forecast errors are not persistent. This result justifies the use of output
forecast in our estimation of the baseline model. Nevertheless, as a recent growing literature
such as Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012a and 2012b) suggests that rational expectation
imperfect information models can better explain forecast data, we argue later that whether
data on expectations come from an imperfect information setting does not affect our results
in the sense that news shocks, or information about future fundamentals, are not important
for business cycles.
Another concern is that these forecasters are conservative when writing down their fore-
casts. Coibion and Gordonichenko (2012a and 2012b) present evidence against the hypothesis
that these agents smooth their forecast. Other papers in the literature such as Zarnowitz
and Braun (1993) and Ang et al. (2007) also find that survey forecasts are more accurate
for most variables and spans than forecasts obtained from VAR and other forecasting mod-
els. Besides, data on expectation change over time, suggesting that agents incorporate their
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information into their forecast. For example, forecast data move significantly in the 1970s
period. Also, in the second oil price shock in the 1980 recession, agents were able to predict
a year in advance that output would decline. The predicted decline in output is close to
the realized decline in output, especially when the forecast was made two quarter before
the recession. The reason is that forecasters knew that the war in the Middle East would
disrupt the supply of oil. Also, OPEC countries announced that they would increase the
price of oil for the next year. Therefore, forecasters incorporated these information to their
forecast and could predict a recession in the U.S. one year in advance. Another episode is
during the boom in early 1990s. This is the period where agents were optimistic with the
New Economy. Therefore, they could forecast well the boom after the recession in 1991.
These periods suggest that forecasters actually incorporate available information into their
forecast.
3.3 The Model
This section presents the setup of our baseline model to investigate the role of news shocks
in business cycles. We adopt a standard real DSGE model as in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
(2012), which is the most influential paper using structural estimation to understand news
shocks in this literature. More specifically, the model is a medium-scaled real business cycle
model buffeted by seven types of shocks: preference shocks, neutral stationary and perma-
nent technology shocks, stationary and permanent investment-specific shocks, wage markup
shocks and government spending shocks. Each shock has an unanticipated component as well
as four- and eight-quarter ahead news components. A k-quarter ahead news shock means
that agents know at time t−k that the shock will materialize at time t. The reasons for why
we do not include shorter horizon news shocks such as one- or two-quarter ahead news is
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that it is difficult to distinguish short horizon news with unanticipated shocks. We describe
briefly the model below.
The model consists of a continuum of agents who maximize the expected lifetime utility









where bt is an exogenous preference shifter, β is the discount factor, κ is the habit in con-
sumption, ψ > 0 is a scale parameter, v > 0 is related to the Frisch elasticity, and Nt is a
geometric average of current and past habit-adjusted consumption levels. The law of motion
of Nt is given by:
Nt = (Ct − κCt−1)γ N1−γt−1 . (3.2)
This preference specification is introduced by Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009). These nest as
special cases the two classes of preferences used in the literature while preserving long run
balanced growth path. The parameter γ governs the wealth elasticity of labor supply. When
γ = 1, we obtain the preference of the King, Rebelo and Plosser (1988). When γ → 0,
there is no wealth effect on labor supply in the absence of habit, and the utility function
is of the same form as Greenwood, Hercowitz and Huffman (1988). Jaimovich and Rebelo
(2009) show that γ has to be small in order to generate comovement among output, hours,
consumption and investment in response to news shocks. We estimate this parameter.
Households are assumed to hold capital. The capital stock Kt evolves over time according
to the following law of motion:











where It is gross investment in consumption unit, a
i
t is the exogenous stationary shock to the
technology transforming investment goods to capital goods (stationary IST), which is also
called the marginal efficiency of investment shock in Justiniano et al. (2011), and zit is the
exogenous stochastic IST shock (nonstationary IST). Therefore, zitIt is in investment good





. Given this formulation, the






Households can choose the utilization of capital, denoted by ut, which means that the
effective capital used every period is utKt. However, higher utilization of capital comes with
the cost of faster depreciation δ (ut) . The functional form of depreciation rate is:
δ (ut) = δ0 + δ1 (ut − 1) +
δ2
2
(ut − 1)2 ,
where δ0 > 0 is the depreciation rate at steady state, δ1 is set to be consistent with u = 1 at
steady state, and δ2 > 0 is the sensitivity of capital utilization variation to the rental rate of
capital.
















where s > 0 is a parameter and µI is the investment growth rate at the steady state.
The households maximize their expected utility subject to the following budget con-
straint:
Ct + It = Dt − Etrt,t+1Dt+1 + wht ht +Rkt (utKt)− Tt + Πt, (3.4)
where wht is the wage that households receive, R
k
t is the rental rate of effective capital, Dt
is the bond holdings and rt,t+1 is the stochastic discount factor such that Etrt,t+1Dt+1 is the
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period-t price of a random payment Dt+1 in period t+1, Tt is the lump sum tax levied by the
government to finance government expenditure, and Πt is the profit accruing to households
from ownership of the firms.







where Kt and ht denote the amount of capital and labor employed, L is a fixed factor that
can be interpreted as land, ant is the neutral stationary technology shock and z
n
t is the neutral
labor-augmenting technological progress. The fixed factor of production allows for decreasing







In the labor market, each household is a monopolistic supplier of differentiate labor
ht (j). A large number of employment agencies combine the differentiated labor ht (j) into









where ηw is the elasticity of substitution. The elasticity ηw,t follows an exogenous stochastic
process. Since ηw,t is the desired markup of the wage over the households’ marginal rate of
substitution, the literature refers to this as a wage markup shock which helps to explain the
movement of hours. Profit maximization by the perfectly competitive employment agencies




























which means that the wage rate that households receive is smaller than the wage paid by
firms.
We assume that government spending is determined exogenously and financed by a lump-
sum tax. Government spending Gt has a trend X
G
t , so gt =
Gt
XGt
is the detrended government
spending. The trend of government spending is assumed to be smoother than that of output








where ρxg is the parameter determining the smoothness of XGt .
All seven shocks, namely stationary and permanent neutral technology shocks, stationary
and permanent investment-specific technology (IST) shocks, preference shocks, wage markup
shocks and government spending shocks, include an unanticipated and news component. The
news component consists of four- and eight-quarter ahead news shocks, meaning that agents
receive information at time t that the shock will happen at time t+ 4 for four-quarter ahead
news shocks and t+ 8 for eight-quarter ahead news shocks. Therefore, all exogenous shocks
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denotes unanticipated shocks known










are the four- and eight-quarter ahead
news shocks, respectively.
3.4 Estimation
We estimate the model using Bayesian methods with U.S. data between 1955Q1 and 2006Q4.
The length of data is dictated by the available observables although we later show that our
results are robust to different data periods. We estimate a subset of the deep structural
parameters of the model such as those governing the shock processes.
3.4.1 Calibrated Parameters
As is common in the literature, we calibrate the parameters that are related to the steady
state or often calibrated in the literature as shown in Table 1.2. The discount factor is set
to be 0.99. The capital elasticity of the production, α, is set to be 0.225, implying that
the labor share is 0.67 given the degree of decreasing returns to scale. This setting does
not matter for our results as our robustness check shows that a constant returns to scale
production without fixed capital L would yield similar results. Following previous literature,
we adopt log utility function, i.e. the risk aversion parameter, σ, is 1. The depreciation rate
at the steady state, δ0, is 0.025, implying that about 10% of capital is depreciated annually.
We calibrate δ1 such that in the steady state, utilization is 1. The parameter ψ is then set
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such that hours worked at the steady state is 0.2. The steady state growth rates of output
and investment, and the steady state share of government spending in total output are set
to be equal to the corresponding U.S. data average between 1955Q1 and 2006Q4.
3.4.2 Bayesian Estimation
The rest of the parameters are estimated using Adaptive Random Walk Metropolis Hasting
as discussed in Haario et al. (2001) to obtain a more efficient estimation. As in standard
Bayesian estimation, we have to assign priors. Following Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2012),
we set our priors to be the same as theirs as reported in Table 1.2. Given the priors for
the parameters and the sample data Y , we can draw from the posterior distributions of
the estimated parameters, denoted as Θ. This requires the evaluation of the product of
the likelihood function and prior distributions, which is denoted by L (Y |Θ)P (Θ). The
likelihood function L (Y |Θ) is found numerically after solving the model using first order
approximation method in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004). We obtain the following state
space form:
Xt+1 = hx (Θ)Xt + η (Θ) εt
obst = gx (Θ)Xt +me
obs
t ,
where Xt is a vector of state variables and εt is a vector of structural shocks with N (0, I),




To understand how data on expectations change the inferences about the news shocks,
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we estimate the model with two observable sets. The first set includes seven observables:
[∆ ln yt−1,t,∆ ln ct−1,t,∆ ln It−1,t,∆ lnht−1,t,∆ lnTFPt−1,t,∆ ln pinv,t−1,t,∆ lnGt−1,t],
which is the quarterly growth rates of output, consumption, investment, hours, TFP, price of
investment and government spending, respectively. These observables are matched with the
corresponding model concepts. We only allow measurement errors, meyt , for output growth
rate to take into account the fact that we ignore the net exports component of output. The
measurement error for output growth is assumed to be an i.i.d. innovation with mean zero
and standard deviation mey, which is also estimated. We restrict mey to be at most 10% of
the standard deviation of output growth rate.
The second set of observables consists of nine observables: the seven observables above
and data for two- and four-quarter ahead expectation of output growth rate. More specif-
ically, the data on expectation used in the estimation are defined as follows: let ∆ ln yt,t+k








k = 1, 2, 3, 4. Then, Et∆ ln yt,t+k is the model expectation at horizon k, or k−period ahead
expectation, of the cumulative growth rate made at time t, and Ft∆ ln yt,t+k is the forecast
of ∆ ln yt,t+k at horizon k made at time t. The data and the model concept of expectations
are linked by the following equations:
Ft∆ ln yt,t+2 = Et∆ ln yt,t+2 +me
y2
t , (3.11)
Ft∆ ln yt,t+4 = Et∆ ln yt,t+4 +me
y4
t , (3.12)
where mey2t and me
y4
t are the measurement errors for two- and four-quarter ahead data on
expectations, respectively. The measurement errors for data on expectations are assumed to
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be i.i.d. innovation with mean zero and standard deviations mey2 and mey4, respectively. We
allow mey2 and mey4 to be no more than 10% of the standard deviation of the corresponding
data on expectations. Since we do not have data on expectations dating back to 1955Q1,
we treat data on expectations as missing data points between 1955Q1 and 1970Q1. We also
check that having the earlier period 1955Q1-1970Q1 with the missing data points does not
affect our results.
We numerically evaluate the likelihood function L (Y |Θ) by applying the Kalman filter
to this state space form. Evaluating prior distribution P (Θ) is straightforward using the
known distributions discussed above. Using the Adaptive Random Walk Metropolis Hasting
method, we update the chains multiple times to increase efficiency of the estimation. We
perform several checks to make sure the estimation has converged. In total, we have four
chains of 180,000 draws each. All of our results below are computed from the last 50,000
draws of those four chains. The results do not change if we use longer chains.
3.4.3 Estimated Parameters and Model Fit
First, the parameters governing the investment adjustment cost, habit, wealth elasticity of
labor supply and utilization cost do not change when estimated with data on expectations.
As displayed in Table 1.3, the posterior median of the parameters estimated with and without
forecast for s, κ, γ, and δ2
δ1
are similar between the two cases.
Second, the main differences between the two cases are the shock parameters, meaning
that adding data on expectations mostly changes the shock processes driving the economy.
The standard deviations of news for both government spending and preference shocks at
four- and eight-quarter ahead are much smaller when estimated with data on expectations
than without data on expectations while the standard deviations of the unanticipated shocks
become larger. This result indicates that the role of news about preference and government
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spending shocks is smaller than before. However, the standard deviations of some news
shocks become larger, which means that data on expectations change the timing of shocks.
For example, the standard deviation of the eight-period ahead wage markup news shocks
is larger in the case estimated with data on expectations than without data on expecta-
tions. Importantly, the estimated parameters with data on expectations are more precisely
estimated than without data on expectations in the sense that the 5-95% credible sets are
smaller. This result suggests that data on expectations add strong restriction to the estima-
tion to recover the states of the economy including news shocks.
In terms of model fit, we find that the model estimated with data on expectations matches
the empirical second moments well, similar to the model estimated without data on expec-
tations. In Table 1.4, we report the medians of the posterior distributions of the population
second moments computed from the last 200,000 draws of the posterior distributions in both
cases together with the corresponding empirical second moments. The estimated model with
data on expectations is able to replicate most of the second moments of the data. In particu-
lar, it does a better job in matching the second moments of consumption than the estimated
model without data on expectations. Nevertheless, both estimated models do not capture
the persistence of hours and the correlation of hours with output in the data.
3.5 News shocks and Business Cycles
This section discusses the role of news shocks in business cycles and highlights the role of
data on expectations in identifying news shocks. In particular, we show that news shocks
play a much less important role in explaining the fluctuations of macroeconomic variables in
the model estimated with data on expectations than estimated without data on expectations.
We interpret the results to explain the features of data on expectations that help to identify
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news shocks in the model.
3.5.1 The Contribution of News Shocks in Business Cycles
The model estimated with data on expectations attributes a smaller contribution of news
shocks than the model estimated without data on expectations. To facilitate the comparison
between the two cases, we report in the first and second columns of Table 1.5 the shares
of the unconditional variances of output, consumption, investment and hours growth rates
explained by all types of news shocks in the model estimated without and with data on
expectations between 1955Q1 and 2006Q4. All of these results are computed as the mean of
the posterior distributions of the variance decomposition, together with their 5-95% credible
sets.
The total contribution of news shock to U.S. output fluctuation is about half of the es-
timated contribution without data on expectations. News shocks account for about 24% of
output growth rate, compared with 43% estimated without data on expectations. Decom-
posing the contribution of each type of news shocks, we find that news about preference,
government spending shocks, and wage markup shocks to some extent become much less
important than in the model estimated without data on expectations. For example, news
about preference shocks explain about 1% of output variation compared to 9% without data
on expectations, and news about wage markup shocks explain only 7.5% of output variation,
which is half of the contribution estimated without data on expectations.
To gauge how much news shocks explain past business cycles, we compute the historical
decomposition of the U.S. output between 1955 and 2006. We find that most of the business
cycles in our sample are not driven by news shocks. Figure 1.5 plots the historical decom-
position for news shocks along with the time series of the four-quarter U.S. output and the
corresponding four-quarter ahead forecast. Two exceptions are the 1980-81 recession and
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1992-93 expansion. This result is consistent with the timing of data on expectations which
show that agents could predict correctly the movements of output a year in advance. For
example, in the second oil price shock, agents read news about the Iranian war in 1979 and
announcement about oil prices, so they could anticipate a year in advance that output would
decline, which was true in 1980. Therefore, news shocks are estimated to be important in
that recession. However, the fact that news shocks do not account for most of the output
fluctuations during this sample period suggests that news shocks are not the main source of
business cycles.
Data on expectations also have a large impact on the inference about the contributions
of news shock to both consumption and government spending: news shocks are negligible
in the model estimated with data on expectations. Only 11% of the consumption volatility
is explained by news shocks compared to 53% estimated without data on expectations.
Similarly, news shocks account for less than 8% of the variations in government spending, in
contrast with 58% estimated without data on expectations. The reason for these substantial
decline in the role of news shocks is that news for preference and government spending shocks
is much less important than before, 4% and 5% respectively, while unanticipated shocks of
the same type of shocks become more important.
However, even when estimated with data on expectations, news shocks remain relatively
important in explaining the movements of hours, contributing 46% to the variations of
hours growth rates, respectively. Without data on expectations, news shocks explain 76% of
hours, meaning data on expectations also reduce the importance of news shocks to aggregate
fluctuations but to a lesser extent compared to consumption and government spending. The
total contribution of news shocks to hours remain large because the important news shocks,
i.e. stationary investment specific technology shocks and wage markup shocks, are able to
generate the delayed responses of hours to output as documented in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
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(2012). These news shocks cause immediate changes in output and consumption while hours
worked adjust slowly. In fact, the immediate response of hours is negligible and takes place
mostly when fundamentals actually change. Therefore, the model assigns a non-negligible
role to these news shocks.
Besides changing the total contribution of news shocks to aggregate fluctuations, data
on expectations also changes the estimated timing of news shocks. For example, without
data on expectations, the four- and eight-quarter ahead news shocks explain equal fractions
of the aggregate fluctuations while the model estimated with data on expectations assigns a
larger role to the eight-quarter ahead news shocks.
Lastly, although news shocks do not explain a large fraction of output fluctuations, we
find that news shocks explain a large share of the volatilities of data on expectations. More
specifically, 53% and 57% of the fluctuations in the two-quarter and four-quarter ahead
forecast of output growth rate are explained by news shocks. This result is consistent with our
intuition that forecast contains information about news shocks, similar in spirit to Barsky and
Sims (2010), who show that consumer confidence contains news about future productivity.
In our case, the important news shocks for the variations of data on expectations are news
about wage markup and stationary investment-specific technology shocks.
3.5.2 The Precision of the Estimates
One of our central findings is that the contribution of news shocks for all variables are much
more precisely estimated with data on expectations than without data on expectations. We
plot in Figure 1.6 the posterior distributions of the shares of output, consumption, invest-
ment, hours and government spending explained by news shocks with and without data on
expectations as well as the prior distributions. The posterior distributions of the shares of the
unconditional variance of the growth rates of all variables are tighter when estimated with
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data on expectations than without data on expectations. The difference between the poste-
rior distributions of the two cases is especially significant for consumption and government
spending: the posterior distributions without data on expectations are similar to the prior
distributions and flat between 0 and 100% while those with data on expectations are tightly
estimated to be under 20%. In other words, without data on expectations, the estimates are
highly influenced by priors, and since data on expectations give a lot of information about
what agents know in advance, we obtain a much more precise estimate for the role of news
shocks.
3.5.3 The Importance of News Shocks in the Short Run
Even though news shocks can explain around 24% of the unconditional variance of output,
news shocks play a much more negligible role in explaining short run fluctuations. We focus
on horizons up to two years because this is when agents know that the shock will happen
but has not yet materialized. As shown in Figure 1.7 which plots the forecast error variance
decomposition of news and unanticipated shocks for the growth rates of output, consumption,
investment and hours1, news shocks explains less than 10% of all the macroeconomic variables
for up to two year horizons. The reason is that although some of the news shocks such as
news about future productivity shocks can cause changes in output today, these news shocks
play a negligible role in business cycles. Other types of news shocks such as government
spending news shocks do not cause agents to adjust their current behaviors significantly,
resulting in a small fraction of output being explained by news shocks in the short run.
The forecast error variance decomposition for hours illustrates our intuition more clearly. In
the case of hours, news about wage markup shocks is the most important news shocks but
1In the forecast error variance decomposition for the level of output, consumption, investment and hours,
we also find a small role of news shocks in the short run in the two year horizon.
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does not affect hours much until wage markup shocks actually materialize. Therefore, even
though news shocks explain nearly half of the movements in hours in the long run, it explains
almost nothing of hours in the short run, and we obtain the result that the importance of
news shocks for hours jumps at horizon 4 and 8
We note that news shocks play a much smaller role in the short run when estimated with
than without data on expectations. Without data on expectations, news shocks in the short
run explain up to 25% of output fluctuations. However, as adding data on expectations
reduces the importance of news shocks overall, the role of news shocks in the short run
becomes much smaller than estimated without data on expectations.
3.5.4 The Role of Data on Expectations in Inferring News shocks
This section explains how data on expectations change the inference about news shocks
and help us obtain a much more precise estimate. The intuition behind our results is as
follows. If news shocks were a major driver of business cycles, expectations would exhibit
movements that resemble realized output. Since data on expectations do not have large
movements over time and do not resemble realized output, news shocks cannot be the main
source of fluctuations. This intuition especially works to help us distinguish news shocks
such as preference and government spending news shocks, which are hard to distinguish
from unanticipated shocks of the same kind without data on expectations.
In the model, there are two types of news shocks that are different in terms of how
agents respond to the news before shocks actually materializes. We call the first type “non-
Pigou cycle” news shocks, which are news shocks that do not generate substantial aggregate
movements until fundamentals actually change. In our model, news about demand shocks
such as preference and government spending news shocks falls into this “non-Pigou cycle”
category. To understand how data on expectations help to identify these news shocks, we
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plot the responses of output growth rate to both unanticipated and news for these two
shocks in the first two panel of Figure 1.8. Given the response of output growth rate, the
response of the four-quarter ahead expectations made at time t is the same as the response of
output growth rate at time t+ 4 in our perfect information setting. These responses exhibit
two distinct characteristics. First, in response to an unanticipated shock, output growth
rate increases immediately and four-quarter ahead expectations of output growth rate do
not change much, which is due to the transitory nature of the shock process. Second, in
response to a four-quarter ahead news shock, there is not much “Pigou cycle” generated,
i.e. agents do not change their behaviors much until fundamentals actually change. The
responses of output to a news shock look just like their responses to an unanticipated shock
shifted by four periods. In other words, the only thing that move at time t when agents
learn about the news shock is their four-quarter ahead expectations. As whether agents
know in advance about these shocks going to happen in the future does not affect their
current behaviors, observing output growth rate only is not informative about the timing, so
it is difficult to distinguish news shocks from unanticipated shocks. However, if we observe
additionally data on expectations, we can tell apart news shocks, which change expectations
substantially, from unanticipated shocks, which do not have much impacts on expectations.
Therefore, without data on expectations, the contributions of preference and government
spending news shocks are imprecisely estimated and driven by priors; and once we add data
on expectations in the observable set, we obtain a much more precise estimate for these
news shocks. Furthermore, since expectations react strongly to news shocks, the fact that
we observe expectations puts a restriction on how large news shocks can be. As data on
expectations are relatively smooth, news shocks of these types cannot be important, which
explains why the importance of preference and government spending news shocks is much
smaller when we estimate the model with data on expectations.
147
The second type of news shocks is the “Pigou cycle” news shocks, which include stationary
and nonstationary TFP shocks among others. The main difference between this type of
news shocks and the “non-Pigou cycle” news shocks is that output growth rate responds
immediately to the news shocks as shown in the third to last panel of Figure 1.8. In response
to an unanticipated shock such as an unanticipated stationary TFP shock, output growth rate
increases right away while four-quarter expectations do not move as much. Output growth
rate also increases immediately after a stationary TFP news shock but this increase is gradual
and peaks in period five when TFP actually increases. Therefore, in theory, observing output
can help distinguish news shocks from unanticipated shocks of this type. Nevertheless, it is
possible for the estimation to interpret the responses of output growth rate to news shocks
as the responses to two consecutive unanticipated shocks. Therefore, observing additionally
data on expectations is still helpful. For example, data on expectations of TFP would help
pin down news about TFP shocks as news would lead to expected movements in TFP. In
our case, we only observe data on expectations of output but these data still add more
information about the timing of the shock since expectations of output react strongly to
news shocks. Since data on expectations are smooth relatively to the actual output, this
type of news shocks turns out to be not important either.
A natural question is then if there is any situation in which adding data on expectations
does not change the inferences about news shocks, its importance and the precision of the
estimates. When news shocks generate strong immediate responses of output, i.e. shocks that
can generate substantial “Pigou cycles”, but do not change expected future output, including
data on expectations of output or endogenous variables as observables in the estimation may
not change the contribution of news shocks compared to the results obtained without data
on expectations. An example of this type of news shocks is news about future TFP shocks
in a model where prices are substantially sticky. The intuition is that in an extreme case
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when prices do not change at all, output will increase immediately after a TFP news shock.
Since agents know that technology will increase in the future, they demand more goods
from today. The demand is higher when price is fixed, causing output to increase strongly
from today. In this case, under some shock process parameters, the four-quarter ahead
expectations of output growth rate will not respond much, consistent with the movements of
data on expectations. Therefore, adding data on expectations of output into the observable
set may not change the inference of news shocks2. This problem arises because we only
observe data on expectations of endogenous variables such as output. If we can observe data
on expectations of exogenous variables such as TFP, these “Pigou cycle” news shocks would
be better identified.
However, in general, only under extreme parameterization can we obtain news shocks that
generate such strong Pigou cycles that data on expectation cannot help to better identify.
As shown in Figure 1.8, in our baseline model, for all types of news shocks including news
about productivity shocks, expectations of output growth rate fluctuate significantly as the
peak response happens at the time that the shock materializes, which explains why data on
expectations help to better identify all types of news shocks in our model. We explore later
in our Robustness section if data on expectations are still helpful in our estimation for the
role of news shocks in models with nominal rigidities.
3.6 Robustness
This section provides the robustness of our results with respect to different data period, data
vintages, and data on expectations. We also show that our result is robust with a wider range
of models when we include nominal rigidities or labor adjustment cost in the model. Finally,
2In this case, we can identify news shocks by observing key aggregate variables.
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we offer intuition why our results do not change under imperfect information assumption.
3.6.1 Data Period
Column 1 of Table 1.7 presents the estimated importance of news shocks using data from
1970Q1 to 2006Q4 to avoid missing data on expectations. Similar to the baseline model,
our estimation of the model with data on expectations predict that news shocks account
for nearly 27% of output fluctuations, 15% of consumption, 30% of investment and 40% of
hours. The posterior distributions of the shares of the variances of these variables are also
tightly estimated. Consistent with our explanation above, news about demand shocks are
negligible. Other results such as the negligible role of news shocks in short run fluctuations
also carry over to this case. This result suggests that data on expectations are informative,
so whether to include the 1955Q1 to 1969Q4 or not does not alter the conclusion about the
role of news shocks in business cycles3.
3.6.2 Realized Data Vintages
Since data are released with different vintages and agents form forecast when they only know
the first releases of realized data, we re-estimate the model using first release realized data
instead of the revised data as in our baseline estimation. All of the results in our baseline
estimation are robust to this change in data as shown in Column 2 of Table 1.7, which
displays the result of the baseline model estimated with output, consumption, investment
and government spending data between 1955Q1 and 2006Q4 using its first vintage from
the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. In particular, all types of news shocks explain
about 18% of output growth rate, 5% of consumption, 28% of investment, and 45% of hours,
3We also verified that our results are robust with constant returns to scale production function, as well
as 1984Q1-2006Q4 period.
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implying that news shocks are not the major source of business cycles. The fact that our
results are robust with respect to different data vintages suggests that whether forecasters
try to forecast first or revised release does not matter much.
3.6.3 Types of Data on Expectations
We consider different types of data on expectations that can be used as observables such
as data on expectations of different horizons and data on expectations of all the aggregate
variables.
Expectation Horizons
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 1.7 show that the baseline estimation results are robust when
using only four-quarter ahead data on expectations or all of the one-, two-, three- and four-
quarter data on expectations. Compared to the baseline model, both cases predict a similar
importance of news shocks to business cycles. The precision of these estimates are also in line
with the baseline results. Although using all horizons of data on expectations lead to tighter
estimated contribution of news shocks to consumption and government spending, the rest of
the results remains the same as our baseline model. These findings suggest that four-quarter
ahead data on expectations alone are helpful in inferring news shocks. The intuition is that
since we include four- and eight-quarter ahead news shocks in the model, the four-quarter
ahead data on expectations summarize the information agents have about the economy a
year ahead. Although observing additionally the eight-quarter ahead data on expectations
compared to only the four-quarter ahead can give us more information about the timing of
eight-quarter ahead news shocks, the four-quarter ahead data on expectations still help to
infer news shocks of horizons longer than four. If, on the other hand, our model includes
two-quarter ahead news shocks, data on expectations with shorter horizons are important
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to help better identify these news shocks.
Other Data on Expectations
Since the SPF data contain forecasts of other variables such as consumption, investment and
government spending, we estimate the baseline model using two- and four-quarter ahead
data on expectations of these variables in addition to the data on expectations of output.
The result of this robustness exercise is reported in Column 5 of Table 1.7. In this case, news
shocks contribute to about 20% of output fluctuations and less than 10% to consumption
fluctuations. Also, data on expectations of government spending point to an even smaller
contribution of news shocks to government spending than the baseline estimation: in fact,
the role of news shocks is close to zero. That our baseline estimates are robust to adding
more data on expectations as observables suggests that data on expectation for output are
informative about the role of news shocks. This result together with the result estimated
using different horizons of data on expectations of output suggest that the four-quarter ahead
data on expectations for output alone are useful to infer the role of news shocks in business
cycles in our case.
3.6.4 The Role of News Shocks To Hours
We analyze why news shocks remain important for hours, explaining over 40% of hours
fluctuations. To that end, we first show that data on expectations about the labor market
suggest that news shocks may not be the major source of uncertainty for hours. Furthermore,
the importance of news shocks to hours decreases once we augment the model with a labor
adjustment cost, suggesting that further incorporating data on expectations from the labor
market can be helpful in determining the role of news shocks for hours.
In the model, since news shocks have largest impact on hours when the shock has mate-
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rialized, data on expectations of hours worked would be informative about the role of news
shocks on hours. In particular, if news shocks were as important to hours as in our base-
line estimation, the model-implied expectations of hours would have large movements that
resemble realized hours movements. Therefore, comparing the model-implied and data on
expectations of hours would shed light on the possible role of news shocks. However, we do
not have sufficient data on expectations of hours or employment, so we resort to the change
in unemployment rate and its expectations in the SPF survey plotted in Figure 1.9. Simi-
larly to output, data on expectations of the change in unemployment rate are smooth and do
not track the movements of realized unemployment rate change, which suggests that agents
in the economy do not have much information about the future movements in the labor
market. In contrast, when the model is estimated with data on expectations of output, the
four-quarter ahead model-implied expectations of hours growth rate, plotted in Figure 1.10,
have significant movements over time that track the movements of realized hours growth
rate well because news shocks explain 46% of hours fluctuations. In other words, we may
have overestimated the role of news shocks for hours worked.
The reason for why news shocks are estimated to be important for hours is that news
shocks help to explain the persistent and delayed responses of hours relative to output in
the data. The second moments implied by the model presented in Table 1.4 show that the
persistence of hours is much lower than in the data. However, conditional on wage markup
news shocks, we find that this type of news shocks helps to explain the persistence of hours
and the delayed response of hours compared to output, so there is a tension between fitting
the movement of hours worked and the movement of expectations. Therefore, the estimation
assigns a non-negligible role of news shocks to hours. Without any change in the model in
the labor market to explain hours worked, the model needs wage markup news shock to help
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explain the data even when we observe data on expectations4.
Motivated by our analyses above, we augment the baseline model to include a labor
adjustment cost to account for the behavior of hours and estimate this augmented model,
“model with LAC”. For simplicity, the labor adjustment cost is of the quadratic form as
follows:
φ(ht, ht−1) = φH (ht − ht−1)2 ,
where φH > 0 is the parameter governing the adjustment cost. Labor adjustment cost can
change the model’s behavior in two ways. The first is that the responses of hours can be
more persistent and delayed in response to unanticipated shocks depending on how large the
labor adjustment cost is. This implies that news shocks may not be necessary to explain
hours. However, labor adjustment cost can also make news shocks more important. The
reason is that upon receiving news that exogenous fundamentals will change in the future,
agents change their labor supply today. Therefore, news shocks may generate substantial
Pigou cycles, i.e. stronger movements of output before the shock materializes. In that case,
news shocks can be more important than the 24% reported in the baseline estimation and
still be consistent with data on expectations.
When estimating the augmented model with labor adjustment cost, we find that the
data prefer this model to the baseline model in terms of log marginal likelihood, and the
estimated parameter of the labor adjustment cost, φH , is significantly different from zero.
Furthermore, this model has a better fit in terms of matching empirical second moments.
As reported in the last row of each panel in Table 1.4, this augmented model can explain
the persistence of hours as well as the correlation of hours and output.
4A recent paper by Khan and Tsoukalas (2012) also finds that in a New Keynesian model similar to
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2012) model, wage markup news shocks specifically continue to play a significant
role explaining hours worked. Their findings suggest that sticky prices framework is not the answer to explain
hours movement, so the model would still resort to wage markup news shocks to be able to explain hours.
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In terms of the importance of news shocks, the estimation assigns a smaller contribution
of news shocks to hours than the baseline estimation. In particular, news shocks account
for about 33% of hours fluctuations, compared to 46% in the baseline model as reported in
Column 3 of Table 1.5. The contributions of news shocks to other variables are, nevertheless,
similar to the baseline model. For example, the estimation attributes about 25% of the
variations in output to news shocks, consistent with our baseline estimation. The estimated
importance of news shocks for consumption, investment and government spending is also
similar to the baseline model.
The results of this model with labor adjustment cost suggest that the importance of
news shocks to hours can be sensitive to the specification of the labor market. Additionally,
since the confidence interval of the estimate for the role of news shocks in hours worked
is relatively wide, incorporating data on expectations of unemployment into the estimation
can be helpful to further understand the role of news shocks in explaining the variations of
hours.
3.6.5 Models with Nominal Rigidities
In this section, we show that data on expectations are also informative about the role of news
shocks in models with nominal rigidities, and the estimated model with nominal rigidities
predicts a similar contribution of news shocks to aggregate fluctuations. To this end, we
augment the baseline model with Calvo-type sticky prices and wages. We additionally add
three types of shocks: price markup shocks, persistent interest rate target shocks and iden-
tically independent monetary policy shocks. Unlike the seven shocks in the baseline model,
these three shocks do not have any news component.
Similar to the baseline model, we estimate this model using Bayesian methods for two
cases. The first case is without data on expectations which includes ten observables: the
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seven observables in the baseline estimation and inflation, growth rates of real wage and
nominal interest rate:
[∆ ln yt−1,t,∆ ln ct−1,t,∆ ln It−1,t,∆ lnht−1,t,∆ lnTFPt−1,t,
∆ ln pinv,t−1,t,∆ lnGt−1,t, πt−1,t,∆ lnWt−1,t, Rt]
The second case includes 14 observables, consisting of the ten observables above and the
data of two- and four-quarter ahead expectations of output and inflation from the SPF.
As reported in the last column of Table 1.7, the estimated model with data on expec-
tations attributes about 28% of output fluctuations to news shocks, which is in the similar
range estimated in the baseline model without nominal rigidities. The contributions of news
shocks to consumption and investment are also similar to the real model. An interesting note
is that news now explains only about 14% of hours growth rate, supporting our conclusion
that the role of news shocks to hours may be sensitive to the model’s ability to replicate the
behaviors of hours. Also consistent with the baseline estimation, data on expectations help
to estimate the role of news shocks much more precisely. In Figure 1.11, we plot the prior
distributions as well as the posterior distributions of the shares of the variances of output,
consumption, investment, hours and government spending estimated with and without data
on expectations. The precision of the estimates of the role of news shocks increases greatly
for all variables when the model is estimated with data on expectations. We also find that
news shocks are negligible in explaining short run fluctuations and news about preference
and government spending shocks are almost nil in this model with nominal rigidities. These
results are consistent with our baseline estimates.
The reason for why we obtain similar results to the baseline estimation is that even in the
model with nominal rigidities, data on expectations put strong restrictions in the estimation
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which help to distinguish news shocks from unanticipated shocks. It turns out that in this
model with nominal rigidities, preference and government spending news shocks are also
“non-Pigou cycle” shocks, which makes it difficult to distinguish them from unanticipated
shocks of the same kind without data on expectations. Therefore, when we observe addi-
tionally data on expectations, we are able to separate news from unanticipated shocks. Also,
although under extreme parameterization such as fixed prices, “Pigou-cycle” news shocks
such as news about stationary TFP shocks may cause substantial change in output today
without changing expected future output, the data inform us that the “Pigou-cycle” news
shocks still lead to substantial changes in expected future output. Therefore, data on ex-
pectations are still helpful in inferring news shocks in this case. As data on expectations are
relatively smooth, the role of these news shocks are negligible and precisely estimated.
3.6.6 Imperfect Information and Data on Expectations
Finally, we discuss the sensitivity of our results with respect to the assumption of perfect
information. In particular, our maintained assumption of the paper is that agents have
perfect information about news about the future as well as the current states of the economy
and estimate the model using data on expectations. However, Coibion and Gorodnichenko
(2012a and 2012b) suggest that rational expectation imperfect information models are more
appropriate to explain the behavior of data on expectations than rational expectation perfect
information models. We argue that news shocks cannot be a major driver of business cycles in
the imperfect information setting. The intuition is that if agents have an imprecise knowledge
about future fundamentals, they do not change their expectation, and consequently, they
do not change their behaviors until they actually observe the change in fundamentals. In
other words, the fact that expectations do not change so much over time is important for
our results, regardless of where expectations come from.
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To demonstrate our intuition above, we augment the baseline model with homogeneous
imperfect information, i.e. agents have the same imperfect information set. For simplicity,
we assume that agents observe all shocks perfectly except for the four-quarter ahead news
about future permanent productivity shocks, which agents observe with a noisy signal, i.e.
st+4t = ε
t+4
x,t + ηt. (3.13)
Another simplifying assumption is that agents do not get any update until the shock ma-
terializes, which is when they observe the shock perfectly. We follow the solution method
as in Collard et al. (2009) to solve the model. We keep the parameter values the same as
the estimates of the baseline model without data on expectations. We then vary the level
of noise to news shocks to show intuitively how imperfect information can alter the results.
Figure 1.12 plots the impulse responses of output growth rate and its four-quarter ahead
expectations to a TFP news shock happening in period 1 for different level of noises. In the
first panel, we consider the case when the signal is precise and the noise is small, meaning
that agents can perceive fairly accurately in period 1 that there is a news shock. In this case,
output growth rate responds similarly to the perfect information case, i.e. output increases
from today. Since agents can precisely perceive the news, they could forecast the movements
of future output fairly well: the response of the four-period ahead expectations is the same
as the response of output growth rate from period 5. In other words, this case is similar to
the model with perfect information. Therefore, the role of news shocks when noise is small
is similar to our baseline model where agents have perfect information.
In a setting where agents have a more noisy signal, news shocks do not generate substan-
tial movement in expectations, causing output not to change substantially before the shock
materializes. We plot in the second panel of Figure 1.12 the responses of output growth rate
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and its four-period ahead expectation when the standard deviation of noise is the same as
the standard deviation of news. Agents in this case are not sure if there is news or not, so
they put less weight on the noisy information and their four-period ahead expectations do
not move as much as realized output realized in four-period. In this case, output does not
change so much before agents can observe the shock, i.e. there is no strong Pigou cycle.
When agents do not perceive news shock happens as the signal is very noisy as plotted in
the last panel of Figure 1.12, expectations do not move much, and output growth rate does
not change until the shock materializes in period 5. This case suggests that in a noisy signal
setting, the fact that expectations do not move much implies that agents do not change their
behaviors until they observe the shock. Therefore, the effect of news shocks in explaining
short run fluctuations is negligible, and news cannot generate strong Pigou cycles. Especially
in a very noisy signal situation, since agents do not change their expectations, news only
matter when the shock materializes, and there is no good way to distinguish between news
and unanticipated shocks. With this simple experiment, we demonstrate that news shocks
are unlikely a major source of business cycles even in an imperfect information setting.
3.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we provide a new evidence about the role of news shocks in business cycles
using data on expectations. This identification strategy exploits the fact that only through
changes in expectations can news shocks affect agents’ behaviors before actual shock mate-
rializes. We find a robust result that news shocks explain about 24% of output fluctuations
in the U.S. between 1955Q1 and 2006Q4 when the model is estimated with data on expecta-
tions. This result is about half of that estimated without data on expectations. Furthermore,
the precision of this estimate also improves when we use data on expectations in our estima-
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tion. The estimated contribution of news shocks to explaining short run fluctuations is even
smaller, explaining about 10% of output for horizons up to two years before actual shocks
materialize. These results arise because data on expectations show that changes in expecta-
tions are not large and do not resemble realized output. Therefore, news shocks cannot be
main driver of business cycles when we take into account the movements of data on expecta-
tions. Additionally, our historical variance decomposition indicates that news shocks are not
important in past business cycles in our sample except for the 1980 recession and 1993-94
boom, consistent with data on expectations. Our results show that data on expectations are
informative about the role of news shocks in business cycles.
One implication of our analysis is that since data on expectations do not exhibit substan-
tial movements over time, there may not be large expectation-driven business cycles. Our
paper focuses on estimating a perfect information model and argues that imperfect informa-
tion models are unlikely to overturn our results. Nevertheless, a future research project can
formally use data on expectations to estimate models with other information structure to
quantify expectation-driven business cycles.
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3.8 Main Figures and Tables







Four quarter growth rate of output and its four−quarter ahead forecast in the model vs data
 
 
Actual output growth rate
Expectation in model w/ forecast
Forecast data
Figure 3.1: Four quarter output growth rate data with expectation implied in Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2012) model and forecast data. Blue dotted line is realized output growth rate, red line with
plus sign is model-implied expectation 4 quarter ahead, black dashed line is four-quarter ahead data
on expectations.
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Figure 3.2: Four quarter growth rate of output: realized and data on expectations at horizon 2 and
4.





















Figure 3.3: Four quarter output growth rate forecast from different surveys.
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Figure 3.4: SPF four-quarter output growth rate forecast a year in advance (blue dashed line) and
Expected changes in business conditions in a year from the Michigan survey of Consumer Confidence
(gray line).








Four−quarter output growth in the data and in the model with only news shocks
 
 
Output conditional on news
Output
Data on expectations
Figure 3.5: Four quarter output growth rate in the data (the dashed blue line) and in the model with










































Figure 3.6: Posterior distribution of the shares of the variances of output, consumption, investment,
hours and government spending growth rates due to news with and without forecast.




































































































































IR to news stationary IST shock
Figure 3.8: Impulse responses of output growth rate ∆ ln yt to unanticipated and 4-period ahead news
shocks.
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Figure 3.9: Realized unemployment rate change and the corresponding four-quarter ahead forecast.








Four−quarter growth rate of hours and its four−quarter ahead forecast in the model
 
 
Actual hours growth rate
Expectation in SGU model with forecast w/o LAC
Figure 3.10: Four-quarter hours growth rate and the four-quarter ahead expectation implied by the
SGU model estimated with output forecast. The model-implied expectations are calculated using the











































Figure 3.11: Posterior distribution of the shares of the variances of output, consumption, investment,
hours and government spending growth rates due to news with and without forecast in the model
with nominal rigidities.



































Four quarter ahead expectation
Realized output growth rate
Figure 3.12: Impulse responses of output growth rate and four-quarter ahead expectations to a four-
quarter ahead TFP news shock received with different level of noises.
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Nowcast Horizon 1 Horizon 2 Horizon 3 Horizon 4
Standard deviation: σforecast/σrealized
∆ ln yt−1,t 0.56 0.38 0.29 0.25 0.25
∆ ln ct−1,t 0.51 0.33 0.25 0.23 0.21
∆ ln It−1,t 0.59 0.39 0.27 0.23 0.22
Correlation with Output growth rate
∆ ln yt−1,t 0.71 0.46 0.33 0.12 0.08
∆ ln ct−1,t 0.60 0.41 0.22 -0.06 -0.01
∆ ln It−1,t 0.59 0.44 0.30 0.11 0.03
Autocorrelation
∆ ln yt−1,t 0.67 0.67 0.69 0.74 0.75
∆ ln ct−1,t 0.54 0.68 0.63 0.53 0.71
∆ ln It−1,t 0.82 0.80 0.78 0.77 0.76
Mean forecast errors (in percent)
∆ ln yt−1,t 0.16* 0.08 0.03 -0.02 -0.01
Persistence of forecast errors: ∆ ln yt−1,t − Ft−k∆ ln yt−1,t = α+ β (∆ ln yt−k−1,t−k − Ft−k−k∆ ln yt−k−1,t−k)
α 0.09 0.04 0.00 0.00
β 0.10 0.10 0.04 0.06
Table 3.1: Second moments of SPF data for quarterly output, consumption and investment growth
rates between 1970Q4 and 2010Q4. ∆ ln yt−1,t,∆ ln ct−1,t,∆ ln It−1,t denote growth rates between
time t−1 and time t of output, consumption and investment, respectively. Ft−k denotes the forecast
made at time t− k.
Note: a star next to the autocorrelation of forecast errors, mean and the regression coefficient means
it is significant at at least 10% confidence level.
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Parameter Value
δ0 depreciation rate 0.025
β discount factor 0.99
αk capital share 0.225
αh labor share 0.675
h steady state hours 0.2
gss steady state share of government spending in output 0.2
µzi steady state gross growth rate of price of investment 1.01
µy steady state gross per capital GDP growth rate 1.0045
ηwss steady state wage markup 1.15
Table 3.2: Calibrated parameters
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Parameters Priors Posterior without forecast Posterior with forecast
Distribution Mean Std median 5% 95% median 5% 95%
v G 4 1 4.11 3.21 5.16 4.79 3.74 6.05
γ U 0.5 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
δ2/δ1 IG 1 1 0.36 0.24 0.52 0.39 0.25 0.56
s G 4 1 9.22 7.41 11.34 8.84 7.10 10.89
κ B 0.5 0.2 0.90 0.87 0.92 0.94 0.92 0.96
ρµzn B 0.7 0.2 0.86 0.61 0.98 0.95 0.83 0.99
ρµzi B 0.5 0.2 0.48 0.39 0.58 0.48 0.38 0.57
ρan B 0.7 0.2 0.92 0.84 0.96 0.75 0.64 0.85
ρai B 0.5 0.2 0.43 0.20 0.63 0.42 0.32 0.51
ρg B 0.7 0.2 0.96 0.93 0.99 0.97 0.95 0.99
ρb B 0.5 0.2 0.18 0.08 0.31 0.36 0.27 0.46
ρηw B 0.7 0.2 0.98 0.95 1.00 0.96 0.93 0.98
ρxg B 0.7 0.2 0.73 0.44 0.89 0.66 0.37 0.85
σ0µzn G 0.45 0.45 0.38 0.19 0.56 0.33 0.26 0.42
σ0µzi G 0.31 0.31 0.20 0.03 0.34 0.25 0.05 0.35
σan G 1.5 1.5 0.65 0.53 0.74 0.64 0.52 0.73
σai G 17.15 17.15 12.10 8.94 15.86 12.86 9.97 16.51
σg G 1.05 1.05 0.66 0.09 1.07 1.07 0.97 1.18
σb G 6.3 6.3 3.95 0.73 6.54 11.30 7.28 18.00
σηw G 1.19 1.19 0.84 0.10 2.58 3.58 2.60 4.67
σ4µzn G 0.19 0.19 0.09 0.01 0.28 0.10 0.01 0.26
σ8µzn G 0.19 0.19 0.11 0.01 0.29 0.20 0.04 0.35
σ4µzi G 0.13 0.13 0.16 0.02 0.34 0.08 0.01 0.24
σ8µzi G 0.13 0.13 0.17 0.02 0.34 0.21 0.02 0.34
σ4an G 0.61 0.61 0.12 0.02 0.33 0.13 0.02 0.32
σ8an G 0.61 0.61 0.11 0.01 0.30 0.15 0.02 0.41
σ4ai G 7 7 2.55 0.30 7.39 4.83 1.78 7.38
σ8ai G 7 7 5.70 1.12 10.75 4.32 1.02 6.80
σ4gvt G 0.43 0.43 0.59 0.06 1.06 0.14 0.02 0.40
σ8gvt G 0.43 0.43 0.35 0.04 0.96 0.11 0.01 0.31
σ4ηw G 0.49 0.49 4.74 0.31 5.81 0.45 0.04 1.73
σ8ηw G 0.49 0.49 0.73 0.06 5.16 4.58 3.67 5.56
σ4b G 2.57 2.57 2.14 0.23 5.75 1.58 0.19 4.24
σ8b G 2.57 2.57 2.16 0.22 5.92 1.10 0.13 3.16
mey U 0.14 0.08 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29
mey2 U 0.06 0.03 0.11 0.10 0.12
mey4 U 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.03
Table 3.3: Estimated Parameters. Note: The estimated parameters are reported at posterior mean
of the distribution computed from the last 200,000 draws.
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∆ ln yt−1,t ∆ ln ct−1,t ∆ ln It−1,t ∆ lnht−1,t ∆ lnGt−1,t
Standard deviation
Data 0.91 0.51 2.28 0.84 1.15
W/o forecast 0.65 0.75 2.67 0.83 1.13
W/ forecast 0.63 0.58 2.75 0.88 1.15
W/ LAC w/ forecast 0.64 0.61 2.78 0.76 1.13
Correlation with ∆ ln yt−1,t
Data 1.00 0.50 0.69 0.72 0.25
W/o forecast 1.00 0.63 0.76 0.45 0.36
W/ forecast 1.00 0.55 0.72 0.43 0.38
W/ LAC w/ forecast 1.00 0.56 0.71 0.50 0.37
Autocorrelation
Data 0.28 0.20 0.52 0.59 0.05
W/o forecast 0.49 0.37 0.59 0.13 0.02
W/ forecast 0.49 0.43 0.56 0.06 0.03
W/ LAC w/ forecast 0.48 0.35 0.57 0.44 0.04
Table 3.4: Model Fit: second moments. Each panel displays the second moments (standard deviation, corre-
lation with output growth rate, and autocorrelation) of output (∆ ln yt−1,t), consumption (∆ ln ct−1,t, invest-
ment (∆ ln It−1,t), hours (∆ lnht−1,t) and government spending (∆ lnGt−1,t) in the data (“Data”), and the
corresponding second moments implied in the estimated model without data on expectations (“W/o forecast”),
in the estimated model with data on expectations (“W/ forecast”), and in the model with labor adjustment
cost estimated with data on expectations (“W/ LAC w/ forecast”).
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Variable Without forecast With forecast With forecast
Baseline model W/ Labor adj
∆ ln yt−1,t 42.2 24.2 24.7
(29.3, 56.7) (18.4, 30.5) (17.8, 31.6)
∆ ln ct−1,t 53.1 11.1 8.3
(21.8, 87.3) (5.80, 20.4) (3.5, 15.4)
∆ ln It−1,t 34.3 28.2 30.9
(19.6, 52.0) (21.7, 34.9) (23.1, 38.7)
∆ lnht−1,t 75.8 46.1 33.6
(59.8, 83.5) (35.3, 57.6) (12.2, 50.8)
∆ lnGt−1,t 57.3 7.7 7.0
(6.69, 96.0) (1.96, 18.3) (1.6, 17.1)
Table 3.5: Contribution of all news shocks. The contribution is reported at posterior mean of the













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Adolfson, M., S. Laséen, J. Lindé, and M. Villani (2007): “Bayesian estimation of
an open economy DSGE model with incomplete pass-through,” Journal of International
Economics, 72(2), 481–511.
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Schmitt-Grohé, S. (1998): “The international transmission of economic fluctuations:: Ef-
fects of US business cycles on the Canadian economy,” Journal of International Economics,
44, 257–287.
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Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1 Data Source
The data are compiled from many sources but primarily, as written in the paper, from Barro
and Ursúa (2009) dataset for GDP per capita and consumption per capita. All population
data are taken from Maddison (2009). All terms of trade data are taken from Oxford Latin
American Economic History Database (OxLad), International Financial Statistics (IFS),
World Development Indicators (WDI) and the historical data sources listed below.
1. Argentina: Updated the dataset given by Garcia-Cicco, Pancrazi and Uribe (2010)
available at http://www.columbia.edu/\char126\relaxmu2166/rbc_emerging/rbc_
emerging.html
2006 data are from Secretearia de Politica Economica (2006). Available at http://
www.mecon.gov.ar/peconomica/informe/indice.htm and http://www.indec.gov.
ar/principal.asp?id_tema=165
2. Australia: GDP and Consumption per capita are taken from Barro and Ursúa (2009)
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available at http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/barro/data_sets_barro
Investment and Trade balance:
1901-1959: Vamplew, Wray (ed.), Australians, historical statistics, Fairfax, Syme &
Weldon, Australia, 1987.
1960-2006: Central bank Statistics available at http://abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@
.nsf/DetailsPage/5206.0Dec%202009?OpenDocument
3. Brazil: GDP and Consumption per capita are taken from Barro and Ursua (2009) as
above
Investment and Trade balance:
1900-2000: OxLad available at http://oxlad.qeh.ox.ac.uk/search.php
2001-2007: IFS available at http://www.imfstatistics.org/IMF/imfbrowser.aspx?
branch=ROOT
IPPEA available at http://www.ipeadata.gov.br/ipeaweb.dll/ipeadata?Tick=1356034625
and Estat́ısticas Econômicas available at http://www.ibge.gov.br/seculoxx/economia/
contas_nacionais/contas_nacionais.shtm
4. Canada: GDP and Consumption per capita are taken from Barro and Ursúa (2009)
as above
Investment and Trade balance:
1900-1925: Urquhart, M.C., Gross National Product, Canada, 1870-1926: The Deriva-
tion of the Estimates, McGill-Queen’s University Press, Canada, 1993
1926-1960: Historical Statistics of Canada, 2nd edition. 1983, available at http:
//www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/11-516-x/11-516-x1983001-eng.htm
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1961-2006: Statistics Canada, National Income and Expenditure Accounts [Table 380-
0017: Gross Domestic Product (GDP), expenditure-based]. Available at: http://
cansim2.statcan.ca/
5. Chile: GDP and Consumption per capita are taken from Barro and Ursúa (2009) as
above
Investment and Trade balance:
1900-1980: OxLad as above
1981-2006: IFS as above
Braun, Juan, Mat́ıas Braun, Ignacio Briones, and José Dı́az, ”Economı́a Chilena 1810-
1995: Estad́ısticas Históricas”, Instituto de Economı́a - Pontifica Universidad Católica
de Chile, Documento de Trabajo No. 187, January, 2000.
6. Colombia: All data are taken from Fernández, Andrés. “Tropical” Real Business
Cycles? A Bayesian Exploration (2009). Mimeo, Rutgers University, and Banco de
la República Colombia, at http://www.banrep.gov.co/series-estadisticas/see_
prod_salar.htm
7. Finland: GDP and Consumption per capita are taken from Barro and Ursúa (2009)
as above
Investment and Trade balance:
1900-1975: Hjerppe, Riitta, The Finnish Economy 1860-1985: Growth and Structural
Change, Bank of Finland Publications, Studies on Finland’s Economic Growth XIII,
Helsinki, 1989.
1975-2006: Statistics Finland, available at http://pxweb2.stat.fi/database/StatFin/
kan/pka/pka_en.asp
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8. India: GDP and Consumption per capita are taken from Barro and Ursúa (2009) as
above
Investment and Trade balance:
1919-1950: Narasinham, N. V. A., A Short Term Planning Model for India, North
Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 1956.
1951-2006: Central Statistical Office, Government of India, ”National Accounts ta-
bles”, available at http://mospi.nic.in/mospi_nad_main.htm
9. Mexico: I updated the dataset given by Garcia-Cicco, Pancrazi and Uribe (2010).
2006 data are from Instituto Nacional de Estadıistica, Geografıia e Informatica (IN-
EGI), available at http://dgcnesyp.inegi.org.mx/bdiesi/bdie.html
10. Norway: All data are taken from:
1830-1969: Grytten, Ola, “The gross domestic product for Norway 1830–2003”, in:
Øyvind Eitrheim, Jan T. Klovland and Jan F. Qvigstad (eds.), Historical monetary
statistics for Norway, 2005. Available at the Nordic Historical National Accounts
Database,(courtesy of Prof Guomundur Jonsson), available at http://old.nhh.no/
forskning/nnb/
1941-1945: Ola Grytten kindly provided me with his estimates
1970-2006: Central Bank of Norway, ”National accounts”, available at http://www.
ssb.no/english/subjects/09/01/nr_en/
11. Peru: GDP and Consumption per capita are taken from Barro and Ursúa (2009)
as above. All other data are from courtesy of Bruno Seminario, available at http:
//sites.google.com/site/lbseminario/peru-2021
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12. Portugal: GDP and Consumption per capita are taken from Barro and Ursúa (2009)
as above. All other data are taken from:
Batista, Dina; Martins, Carlos; Pinheiro, Maximiano and Reis, Jaime, New Estimates
for Portugal’s GDP (1910-1958), Lisboa, 1997. Available at Professor Pedro Lain’s per-
sonal website http://pedrolains.typepad.com/pedrolains/estatsticas-data.html
13. Spain: GDP and Consumption per capita are taken from Barro and Ursúa (2009) as
above. Additionally, data are taken from
1900-1994: Prados de la Escosura, Leandro, El progreso económico de España, 1850-
2000, Fundacion BBVA, Madrid, 2003
1995-2006: Instituto Nacional de Estad́ıstica, Contabilidad Nacional de España, Pro-
ducto interior bruto a precios de mercado y sus componentes http://www.ine.es/
jaxi/menu.do?L=1&type=pcaxis&path=%2Ft35%2Fp008&file=inebase&N=&L=
14. Sweden: GDP and Consumption per capita are taken from Barro and Ursúa (2009)
as above.
Investment and Trade balance:
Edvinsson, Rodney, Historical national accounts for Sweden 1800-2000 (Historiska-
nationalräkenskaper för Sverige 1800-2000). Based on:Edvinsson, R., 2005: Growth,
Accumulation, Crisis: With New Macroeconomic Data for Sweden. Almqvist & Wik-
sell International; Stockholm.
1900-1992: the Nordic Historical National Accounts Database, available at http://
old.nhh.no/forskning/nnb/
1993-2006: Statistics Sweden, Economic statistics available at http://www.scb.se/
Pages/List____258713.aspx
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15. Taiwan: GDP and Consumption per capita are taken from Barro and Ursúa (2009)
as above.
Investment and Trade balance:
1901-1950: National Historical data
Mizoguchi, Toshiyuki, ”Estimates of the Long-run Economic Growth of Taiwan Based
on Revised SNA (1901-2000) Statistics”, Institute for Economic Research - Hitotsub-
ashi University, Discussion Paper Series, No. 123, October, 2005.
1951-2006: National statistics, available at http://eng.stat.gov.tw/mp.asp?mp=5
16. Turkey: GDP and Consumption per capita are taken from Barro and Ursúa (2009)
as above.
Investment and Trade balance:
Altug, Sumru, Alpay Filitztekin and Sevket Pamuk. “Sources of long-term economic
growth for Turkey, 1880-2005”. European Review of Economic History, 12(3) pp.393-
430, December 2008. Available at http://myweb.sabanciuniv.edu/alpayf/my-research/
data/
Turkish Statistical Institute. Foreign Trade table, available at http://www.turkstat.
gov.tr/PreTablo.do?tb_id=12&ust_id=4
State Institute of Statistics (Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü), Statistical indicators (İstatistik
göstergeler): 1923-2008, Ankara, Turkey, 2009, available at http://www.tuik.gov.
tr/Kitap.do?metod=KitapDetay&KT_ID=0&KITAP_ID=158
17. Venezuela: Besides data taken from Barro and Ursúa (2009) as above, I also con-
structed GDP, Consumption per capita and the other series from:
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1920-2002: Baptista, Asdrúbal, Bases Cuantitativas de la Economı́a Venezolana: 1830-
2002, Fundación Polar, Caracas, Venezuela, 2006
1998-2006: Central bank of Venezuela: Banco Central De Venezuela, available at http:
//www.bcv.org.ve/c2/indicadores.asp
Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 2
B.1 Non-fuel Terms of trade
















where nf denotes non-fuel, Si is the share of non-fuel export (import) in total export (import)
in current prices, QF is the ratio of the quantity of non-fuel imports to the quantity of total
trade valued at base year. Assume QF = QD, we calculate the non-fuel terms of trade.
B.2 Additional Evidence of Transmission: Mexico
190
Figure B.1: The responses of Mexico to a positive U.S. permanent technology shocks using Mexican
manufacturing data between 1980Q1 and 2011Q3. Lines with plus sign is the point estimate and
the shaded areas are the 95% confidence intervals.
Appendix C
Appendix for Chapter 3
C.1 Data Appendix
 Population: smooth out LNU00000000Q
 Real GDP (from NIPA 1.1.6): Real GDP/Population
 Investment: Nominal fixed investment/Population/GDP deflator
 Consumption: Nominal consumption/Population/GDP deflator
 Hours: PRS85006023*Employment (LNS12000000) /100/Population
OR PRS85006033/Population
 Wage: nominal wage (PRS85006103)/GDP deflator
 Government spending: Nominal Government spending/Population/GDP deflator
 Interest rate: Tbill from FRB H15
 Relative investment prices: Fixed investment price deflator/GDP deflator
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−btv−σt ψνhν−1t nt + λ1twht = 0 (C.4)
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)−αk uαkt kαkt hαht L1−αk−αh (C.16)
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−btv−σt ψνhν−1t nt + λ1twht = 0 (C.20)



















































































































































































)−αk uαkt kαkt hαht − fc (C.35)


















lnµt+1 = ρµ lnµt + (1− ρµ) lnµss + εµ,t+1 (C.37)
ln gvtt+1 = ρg ln gvtt + (1− ρg) ln gvtss + εg,t+1 (C.38)
ln eR,t+1 = ρeR ln eR,t + εeR,t+1 (C.39)
C.4 Extra Figures and Tables
Figure A.1: SPF four-quarter investment growth rate forecast a year in advance and model-implied
investment growth rate when estimated with data on expectations of output.
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